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OF THE
GANGANATHA JHA
RESEARCH INSTITUTE



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CONTENTS

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| Definition of Brahman. By Prof. M. Hiriyanna | 287 |
| Lord Wellesley and the Puri Priests. By Dr. S. N. Sen | 293 |
| The Nandi-Purāṇa. By Dr. R. C. Hazra | 305 |
| The Conception and Number of Pramāṇas According to Vṛtti- kāra Upavaṛṣa. By Prof V. A. Ramaswami Sastri | 321 |
| The Locus Classicus of the Theory of Suggestion. By Pandit Shrikrishna Mishra | 337 |
| Date of Vācaspati Misra and Udayanācārya. By Prof Dinesh Chandra Bhattachāryya | 349 |
| The Concept Duḥkha in Indian Philosophy. By Jaideva Singh | 357 |
| Gosvāmin Śivānanda Bhaṭṭa, his Works and Date : Identificat- ion of his two Royal Patrons. By Sadashiva L. Kātre | 369 |
| Relation According to the New School of Indian Logic (Navya-Nyāya). By Tara Sankar Bhattacharyya. | 389 |
| Assyrian and Sanskrit Their Resemblance. By Vidyadhar Shastri | 401 |
| Some Unpublished Maithili Songs. By Ramanatha Jha | 403 |
| Reviews of Books | 417 |

JOURNAL

OF THE

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ALIGARH

CONTENTS

| | |
|-----|--------------------|
| 1 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 2 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 3 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 4 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 5 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 6 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 7 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 8 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 9 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 10 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 11 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 12 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 13 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 14 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 15 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 16 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 17 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 18 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 19 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 20 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 21 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 22 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 23 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 24 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 25 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 26 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 27 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 28 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 29 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 30 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 31 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 32 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 33 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 34 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 35 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 36 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 37 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 38 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 39 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 40 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 41 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 42 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 43 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 44 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 45 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 46 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 47 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 48 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 49 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 50 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 51 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 52 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 53 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 54 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 55 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 56 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 57 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 58 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 59 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 60 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 61 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 62 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 63 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 64 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 65 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 66 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 67 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 68 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 69 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 70 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 71 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 72 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 73 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 74 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 75 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 76 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 77 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 78 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 79 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 80 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 81 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 82 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 83 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 84 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 85 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 86 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 87 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 88 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 89 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 90 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 91 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 92 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 93 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 94 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 95 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 96 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 97 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 98 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 99 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |
| 100 | Dr. B. N. Dasgupta |

JOURNAL OF THE GANGANATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Vol. II]

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[Part 4

DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN

By M. HIRIYANNA

It is usual to find in advaitic works a two-fold definition of Brahman—one called *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* and the other *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*. This distinction is apt to be taken as peculiar to the Advaita doctrine ; but there is nothing in the terms to restrict them to that doctrine or to make them applicable exclusively to Brahman. They are of almost universal application, and practically all things can be defined in both the ways. It may, therefore, be useful to say a few words about the nature of these definitions, and point out the exact difference between them.

The object of defining a thing is to differentiate it from everything else ; and this result is attained generally by reference to a property that is distinctive of it.¹ To give the stock example, a cow is defined by reference to the dewlap (*sāsnā*)—a feature which is found in all animals of the species and in none other. This is an instance of *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*, for the defining characteristic is an essential feature or a part of the nature of the animal defined. It will serve our present purpose better to take another example. Let us

¹ This is *vyāvṛtti* or 'differentiation.' There is also another purpose of definition, viz., *vyavahāra*, or fixing the meaning of a term for the sake of conveying an idea to others, which we are not taking into account here.

think of a village in which there is only one house that is built of bricks, the rest being all huts or mud houses. Now, we may define it by reference to this character, and the definition will enable any one to identify the house correctly. This is also an instance of *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*, for 'being built of bricks' forms an essential feature of the house.

The above, however, is not the only way of distinguishing the house in question from others. If we suppose that there is some kind of tree, say a mango tree, just by the side of the house and that no other house in the village is similarly characterised, then that mark will suffice to define the house. This definition, or more properly description, equally well helps in the identification of the house. The mark here, however, is not a part of the nature of the house, but is external to it. The definition is accordingly designated as *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*, literally 'definition by reference to a nearby circumstance or an accidental feature.' One advantage in this variety of definition is that it serves to identify the house (through appeal to memory), even when the mark has disappeared from the locality.² There is an important distinction between the two types of definition which we should bear in mind. While both alike differentiate the thing defined from the rest, the *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* alone gives us a notion of its character.

In some cases, however, the first of these *lakṣaṇas* is not possible. Let us take the case of a primary colour like 'red.' It cannot be defined by means of its intrinsic character, for 'red-ness,' which is its sole *distinctive* feature, is obviously of no help in doing so. In such cases, the only

² Sometimes the two *lakṣaṇas* are distinguished from each other on this basis of separable connection: *Taṭa-stha-lakṣaṇam nāma yāval-lakṣya-kālam anavasthitatve sati yat vyāvartakam tadeva.* (*Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, vii). We have based the distinction here on the circumstance whether the mark is or is not a part of the nature of the thing defined; *Taṭasthatvam ca lakṣyasvarūpa-babirbhūtatvam*: See *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha* (com), p. 53. Kumbhakonam Edn.

course open to us is to describe it in the other way. We may do so, for example, by indicating its precise place in the prismatic spectrum. That would be a *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*, since it identifies the colour by reference not to its essential nature but to its relation to elements external to it in a connected system of colours.

There are cases in which neither of these definitions is possible; and a pre-eminent example of it is the supreme Brahman as taught in Advaita.³ No *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* is conceivable of it because, though Brahman is not without its own essence, it has no characteristics by means of which it may be defined. For, according to the doctrine, it is *nirguṇa* or altogether without attributes. Nor is the other type of definition feasible for, by hypothesis, Brahman is the sole reality and there is nothing outside it. But for purposes of teaching or expounding the doctrine, a definition of Brahman is necessary since, without a general idea of it, no inquiry into its nature (*jijñāsā*) can be instituted. The work of reason pre-supposes some knowledge of the thing reasoned about. *Lakṣaṇa-pramāṇābhyām hi vastu-siddhiḥ*.⁴ Hence the advaitin has devised means to define Brahman in both the above ways. But before describing those ways, it is necessary to draw attention to an important principle underlying the advaitic inquiry as a whole.

All philosophy starts from experience. But it is usually assumed that the data of experience, if they are to lead to right conclusions, should stand for actual facts or be valid. This is not admitted by the advaitin as necessary; and he illustrates his position by examples like the false image of a person, reflected in a mirror, being the means of showing to him

³ *Śūnya* or the Absolute of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism would be another instance of it.

⁴ Cf. Aristotle: 'Definition is the beginning and the end of all knowledge.'

what is true about his appearance.⁵ That is, the advaitin attaches no necessary ontological significance to the data that serve as the bases of reasoning. He begins his inquiry, taking them at their face value, and leaves their validity or invalidity to reveal itself in the course of the inquiry or as its result. This is the meaning of the distinction of *prasiḍḍha* and *pramāṇa-siḍḍha* among them, which is sometimes made in advaitic works.⁶ The former are mere reiterations (*anuvāda*) of common beliefs, and are not demonstrated truths like the latter. They are psychologically given, but are not logically established. In other words, *kalpita* factors may, according to Advaita, be as fruitful in philosophic inquiry⁷ as actual ones. Or, as it is somewhat differently stated, empirical facts, though they are not finally true, may be the means of leading us to transcendental truth.

This method of utilising untested beliefs is extended to the field of definition also. To explain how it is done, we shall go back to the example of the house. We may describe it, say, as 'haunted,' if there is a popular belief to that effect in the neighbourhood and there is no other house with the same evil repute in the village. The definition will serve to identify the house quite as well as either of the two given above but it does not necessarily mean that the person who defines it thus, or he for whose sake the definition is framed, believes in the actual existence of ghosts. The advaitin defines Brahman on similar lines :

⁵ See Śaṅkara on *Vedānta-sūtra*, II. i. 14., and cf. *Vākya-paṭīya* ii. 240 : *Asatyē vartmani sthitvā tataḥ satyam samīhate*. It may appear that the *jñāna* is real here; although its object may be false. But knowledge without reference to its object is a mere abstraction. Or, as the Advaitin puts it, the former cannot be real when the latter is not so. Strictly, it is not *jñāna* at all, according to him, but *jñānābhāsa*. See *Iṣṭa-siddhi* i. 9.

⁶ See e.g. *ibid.*, p. 2.

⁷ It is clear that this principle does not apply to the realm of being, and does not therefore mean that unreal causes can give rise to real effects.

(1) It is a common belief that the world is an effect which owes its existence to God. The Advaitin, utilising belief, defines Brahman as the cause of the world; and he thereby distinguishes it from entities like Prakṛti and atoms which are regarded as the source of the world by other schools of thought. The definition merely means that there would be no world but for Brahman, and does not imply that the one has *actually* emerged from the other. The true nature of the relation between the two is to be known through investigation.⁸ It is a *tatastha-lakṣaṇa* in that the characteristic of being the cause of the world (*kāraṇatva*) does not, according to Advaita, really pertain to Brahman. This is how the second *sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa—*Janmādyasya yataḥ*—is explained by Śaṅkara.

(2) It will be seen that the above definition only marks off Brahman from certain entities, but does not give us any notion of the actual nature of Brahman. That can be done, as stated above, by the *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* of Brahman. It also is framed in a similar way. Phenomena like knowledge (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*) are often explained as qualities of the self; and they are usually taken to characterise God also, who is the highest self. The Advaitin starts from this common conviction, and describes Brahman as their substance. All that he does thereby is to convey to us the idea that Brahman is spiritual in its nature. Whether it is their substrate, in fact, is left to be determined by subsequent inquiry. According to the advaitic conclusion, as it is well known, none of them, as such, is a fact. The single or non-dualistic Brahman merely *appears* to possess these qualities by association with the *antahkaraṇa*.⁹ Really, therefore, they are manifestations through an imperfect medium, or limited

⁸ Primarily this means a rational consideration of the teaching of the scriptures.

⁹ Cf. *Ānando viṣayānubhavo nityatvam iti santi dbarmāḥ aprthaktevopi caitanyāt prthagiva avabhāsante : Pañca-pādikā : (p. 4).*

revelations, of Brahman ; and, though they cannot in themselves represent its nature which is infinite knowledge and infinite bliss, they are fitted to give us a 'conjectural insight' into it as, for instance, limited space, which is what we know, may enable us to get an idea of infinite space.

This two-fold way of defining Brahman, it is pointed out, has the support of the Upaniṣads. In the third section of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, for example, Varuṇa, in teaching his son, Bhṛgu, the nature of Brahman, starts with its *taṭastva-lakṣaṇa* : 'That verily from which all these beings are born ; by which, when born, they live ; and into which they pass at death—that is Brahman.' Bhṛgu is then taken through a succession of inadequate conceptions of the ultimate reality, like matter (*anna*) and unconscious life (*prāṇa*) ; and the teaching culminates in the *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* of Brahman which refers, though but indirectly, to its very essence, viz., bliss (*ānanda*) : 'From bliss all these beings are born ; by bliss, when born, they live ; and into bliss they pass at death'.¹⁰ Only the Advaitin, as the result of his reading of the scriptures, regards the defining characteristics in both cases as *kalpita* or fancied.

¹⁰ As another form of *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* of Brahman may be instanced *Prajñānam Brahma*. (*Aitareya Upaniṣad*).

LORD WELLESLEY AND THE PURI PRIESTS

By S. N. SEN

On the 18th July 1804, Col. Harcourt addressed a letter to the Governor-General from Cuttack. Enclosed with it was a long slip of paper entirely overlaid with gold leaf bearing a message in a strange character with signatures in diverse scripts. The grateful priests, abbots, recluses, Vaiṣṇavas, Brahmans and the royal preceptor (*Rājaguru*) of Puri headed by Krishna Chandra Mahapatra had in a Sanskrit epistle paid their humble tribute to Lord Wellesley's prowess and policy of conciliation. The compliments so spontaneously paid to the Governor-General were by no means undeserved. It was his deliberate object to cultivate the good will and to win the good opinion of the priests of Jagannātha. When the second Maratha War broke out and the British troops were sent to take possession of the Maratha province of Cuttack and a Civil Commissioner was appointed with the Military Commander to restore normal conditions in the conquered country as early as possible, they were specially enjoined to look after the interests of the pilgrims and priests of Puri. In the instructions drawn up on the 3rd of August Col. Campbell and Mr. Melville were told :—

“ 6. The situation of the pilgrims passing to and from Jaggernaut will require your particular attention; you will be careful to afford them the most ample protection and to treat them with every mark of consideration and kindness.

7. On your arrival at Jaggernaut you will employ every possible precaution to preserve the respect due to the Pagoda and to the religious prejudices of the Brahmins and Pilgrims you will furnish the Bramins with such guards

as shall afford perfect security to their persons, rites and ceremonies and to the sanctity of the religious edifices, and you will strictly enjoin those under your command to observe your orders on this important subject with the utmost degree of accuracy and vigilance.

8. The Bramins are supposed to derive considerable profits from the duties levied on pilgrims, it will not therefore be advisable at the present moment to interrupt the system which prevails for the collection of those duties. Any measures calculated to relieve the exactions to which Pilgrims are subjected by the rapacity of the Bramins would necessarily tend to exasperate the Persons whom it must be our object to conciliate. You will therefore signify to the Bramins, that it is not your intention to disturb the actual system of collections at the Pagoda. At the same time you will be careful not to contract with the Bramins any engagements which may limit the power of the British Government, to make such arrangements with respect to that Pagoda or to introduce such a reform of existing abuses and vexations, as may hereafter be deemed advisable.

9. You will assure the Bramins at the Pagoda of Jagernaut, that they will not be required to pay any other revenue or tribute to the British Government, than that which they may have been in the habit of paying to the Marhatta Government, and that they will be protected in the exercise of their Religious duties.

10. In every transaction relative to the Pagoda of Jagernaut, you will consult the Civil Commissioner whom I have named for the settlement of the Province of Cuttack.

11. You will understand that as part of the property, treasure or valuable articles of any kind contained in the Pagoda of Jagernaut, or in any religious edifice, or possessed by any of the Priests or Bramins or Persons of any description attached to the temples or religious institutions is to be considered as prize to the Army. All such

property must be respected as being consecrated to religious use or by the customs and prejudices of the Hindoos. No account is to be taken of any such property, nor is any person to be allowed to enter the Pagodas or sacred buildings without the express desire of the Bramins.

12. You will leave a sufficient force in the vicinity of Jaggernaut under the Command of an Officer whom you will particularly select and in whom you can place perfect reliance for the due execution of the directions contained in these instructions."¹

Intent on accomplishing a peaceful conquest of Cuttack if possible and to alienate the local people from their Maratha rulers Wellesley used diplomacy to reinforce arms and the services of a famous Bengali Pandit were enlisted to remove any doubt that might still lurk in the minds of the temple-priests about British intentions. "Jaggernaut of Triveni the oldest and most eminent of the Pundits in Bengal" may safely be identified with the celebrated Jagannatha Tarkapanchanan who survived till 1806. Unfortunately, the letter he addressed to "Ramchund and other Bramins residing at the temple of Jaggernaut" has not been preserved but in the English abstract with which Melville and Campbell were furnished, the Pandit.

"States from the knowledge which he possesses of the character of the English, he is enabled to assure Ram Chund & Co. that they need not be afraid to form a connection with the British Government, which is distinguished for its peculiar benevolence to its subjects.—Thus satisfied of this truth themselves, they must exert all their powers of persuasion to inspire the respectable characters in that quarter with the same degree of confidence. That it is impossible adequately to express his sense of the excellencies which characterize the disposition of the English; and that the British Government not only permits the Hindoos to enjoy

¹ *Ser. Cons.*, 1 March 1804, No. 46, paras 6-12.

the free exercise of their religion, but manifests the greatest degree of benevolence, favour and indulgence towards them, and all persons of whatever persuasion, rank, or condition in life."²

Ramchand was not one of the signatories to the letter that Col. Harcourt forwarded to the Governor-General, nor is his name mentioned in the text. For all that we know he might have been a close relation of Krishnachandra Mahapatra and might have been dead since Jagannatha Tarkapanchanana's last visit to Puri. Meanwhile, the exertions of the mortal Jagannatha were being suitably backed by his divine namesake. On the 11th September a Brahman told Mr. Melville "That the Bramins at the Holy Temple had consulted and applied to Jaggernaut to inform them what power was now to have his temple under its protection and that he had given a decided answer that the English Government was in future to be his guardians."¹³ Whether the reputed invincibility of British arms had anything to do with the deity's decision did not matter in the least. His predilection for the new power was decisive and we learn from another of Melville's letters (dated 19th September) that "The letter which Col. Harcourt wrote to the priests of the Temple of Jaggernaut gave them much satisfaction, and they sent a deputation of some of their principal Men to meet him one March distance from the Temple." Melville further adds "that they appear to consider their being placed under the protection of the British Government as a blessing of Providence."⁴ Col. Harcourt had in fact taken possession of the city of Jagannatha on the 18th September and he informs the Governor-General, "Upon application from the chief Bramins of the Pagoda I have

² *Sec. Cons.*, 1 March 1804, No. 12-12A.

³ *Secret Cons.*, 1 March 1804 No. 13.

⁴ *Ibid*, No. 14.

afforded them guards (of Hindoos) and a satisfactory confidence is shewn by the Bramins, priests and officers of the Pagoda and by the inhabitants of Jaggernaut both in their present situation and in the future protection of the British Government.”⁵

The confidence of the Priests were not ill-placed and their expectations were not unjustified. They were not indulging in oriental hyperboles where they expressed their hope that numerous pilgrims will ere long pour into the holy city from Brindaban and Benares, from Ramnath (Rameswaram) and Dwaraka. The Maratha Government used to levy a tax of eleven rupees on all pilgrims with the exception of “the notoriously” indigent and an additional levy of 2 Rupees per capita was made by the temple officers. The pilgrim tax used to bring a substantial sum (from 2½ to 5 lakhs) to the coffers of the state out of which forty to fifty thousand rupees had to be annually spent at the time of the two principal festivals. The pilgrim tax was for the time being suspended and such was the influx of devotees that Melville deemed it necessary to prohibit export of food grains from the province.⁶

This was not the only evidence of the prevailing sense of security. The Government used to employ an officer of their own to superintend the management of the temple. Its normal income derived from the daily presents of the devotees was by no means inconsiderable and went to defray the ordinary expenses. The deity had extensive landed property as well. Shivaji Pandit, the Officer in Charge of the temple on behalf of the Maratha Government, had absconded on the approach of the British troops. But he soon returned to the city and begged to be restored to his office. Melville had no confidence in him but he was tem-

⁵ *Ibid*, No. 59.

⁶ *Ibid*, No. 16-18, and 17 May, No. 112-13.

porarily re-appointed so that his knowledge of the previous administration might be fully exploited.⁷

Harcourt and Melville received repeated petitions and applications from "the officer and priests of the Temple of Jagernaut requesting the renewal of the toll" (pilgrim tax), a proposal which met with their unqualified support.⁸ Thus was a bloodless conquest crowned with the spontaneous submission of a contented people. When the Puri priests bore a glowing testimony to the blessings of the British administration Lord Wellesley's diplomacy that did not ignore a retired octogenerian in a Bengal village or the poor pilgrims who visited the holy cities of Orissa, or the priests who had the custody of the great temple was crowned with its greatest triumph. The conciliation of Orissa was by no means a lesser achievement than the elimination of the Marathas from that province.

THE DOCUMENT

॥ श्रीस्वामी जगन्नाथजी सहाय ॥

श्रीमदिष्टदेवोप (पा) सनाप्रभावविभावितक्षितिभारोत्तारणपरायणेषु⁹ निजभुज-
वीर्याश्रितशौर्यचर्यापर्याप्तभूमडलांतर्वात्तिरिपुमण्डलप्रतापनिर्वाणपणीकृ-
तस्त्रीगणगीयमानगुणगणाश्रयेषु सत्कीर्त्तिकीर्त्तनप्रवर्त्तनासक्तजगज्जनेषु इं-
गरेजकुलकमलप्रकाशकैकास्करेषु देववैष्णवब्राह्मणरक्षादीक्षितेषु नवा-
वमुस्तताव¹⁰ मालिअलकाव¹¹ असरफ अल्लअसराफ¹² मारकोइसवलज¹³
ल गोरनरजनरल-¹⁴

बहादुरदामअकयालहु¹⁵ इतिनामधेयेषु श्रीमत्सु समस्तपुरुषोत्तमक्षेत्रवासि-

⁷ *Ibid*, 1 March 1804 Nos. 16-18, 25, 32.

⁸ *Ibid*, No. 37.

⁹ The expression suggests a comparison of the addressee with the Boar Incarnation of Viṣṇu.

¹⁰ Ar. *Nawab Mustatāb*.

¹¹ Ar. *Mu'ala-i-alqāb*.

¹² Ar. *Ashraf-ul-asbrāf*.

¹³ Marquess Wellesley.

¹⁴ Governor-General.

¹⁵ Ar. *Dam-i-Iqb-al-a-hu*.

नां श्रीमतां सतां महतां समस्तवैष्णवानां राजगुरुप्रभृतीनामशेषत्राह्मणानां षड्वि-
 शत्रियोग¹⁶नायककृष्णचंद्रमहापात्रप्रभृतिसेवकानां च परमाशिषो विलसंतुरा
 श्रीजगन्नाथस्य महाप्रभोरिच्छानुसारेण नवावसाहेवस्याज्ञया च श्रीमदिरे श्रीजग-
 न्नाथस्वामिनः इंगरेजबहादुरस्यावधानपूर्वकप्रयत्नेन ससहायानामस्माक सम्प्र-
 ति प्रावत्यमासीत् अतः कारणादेवास्माकं नैश्चित्यं मुखं च भाग्यानुसारेणागतं त-
 स्माद्वयं सर्वे क्षेत्रवासिनः सदाशीर्षचनानि कुमहे ते वयं सर्वे भवत्संस्थानं प्रति मं-
 गलं प्रेषयितुमिच्छामः एवमेव च श्रीक्षेत्रे भवतामधिकारः स्यादिति विचिंतय-
 मः भवद्यशोविषये चिंतायां श्रीजगदीशस्वामिमदिरे भवत्प्रभुत्व लोकमुखात्कर्त्तव्या-
 स्त्रात्सूचनाच्च प्रागेव निरचैष्म संप्रति यथानिश्चयं नेत्रद्वारानुभवामः भवत्पक्षाणां
 युद्धोद्यमवेलायामनंतरे रिपुपराजये तद्विद्रावणे च यादृक् (क्) पराक्रममद्राक्षमः तादृक्
 पराक्रमं न कस्याप्यपश्याम न वा द्रक्ष्यामः तत्समये एव तात्पर्येण सर्वेषां पा-
 लनं कृतं कस्यापि कुतश्चिदुपप्लवो नाभूत् तत्समयेस्माभिर्भगवत्परिचर्या नियुक्तैर-
 त्रस्थले युद्धं जातमिति न ज्ञातं प्राचीनाधिकारे यत्र कुत्रचित्स्वल्पकार्येऽप्यस्माक
 बाधा स्थिता अधुना सर्वप्रकारेण भवदधिकारात्सुखमनुभूयते अस्माभिस्सत्यत-
 या आशास्यते यथा ब्रह्मादिभिर्द्धर्मसंस्थापनमकारि तथैव भवान्करोतु इति इंगरेज
 बहादुरस्य सावधानतयास्माकं सर्वेषां प्राणानां धनानां च रक्षां निशम्याव्यभ्यो व
 दावन-वाराणस्यादिदेशेभ्यः रामनाथात्द्वारिकातः सर्वे समागत्य भगवद्दर्शनं
 कृत्वा वैकुण्ठाधिरोहणमधिकरिष्यन्ति अत्र वयमपि भगवदग्रेऽहोरात्रं सर्वदा इच्छामः
 इंगरेजबहादुरस्याधिकारः सदा जागर्तुं श्रीभगवान्भवंतं प्रत्यहं स्वच्छायायां स्थाप-
 यित्वा उत्तरोत्तरं वृद्धिं प्रापयतु वयं सर्वे भवत्कल्याणापेक्षिणो भवत्पालनया निर्भयाः
 संतः जगन्नाथस्य सेवायां नियुक्ताः स्थास्यामः ॥ ७ ॥ भोगोपि साधयति योगफ-
 लं हि यत्र जातिं विशेषयति भोजनमव्यवस्थं एतादृगस्य महिमा पुरुषोत्तमस्य दा-
 सीपदद्वयं रजांसि पुनन्ति देवान् । १ । श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यां गहनोहि पन्था बुधा म्वा धावत
 किं श्रमेण न्यग्रोधमूले लवनोदतीरे ब्रह्मामृतं लोचनपेयमस्ति ॥ कुक्कुरस्य मुखा-
 द्भ्रष्टं यदन्नं पावनं महत् ब्रह्माद्यैरपि भोक्तव्यं भाग्यतो यदि लभ्यते ॥ योगिनां यो ह-
 दाकाशे विद्युद्वर्णः प्रकाशते स एव दारुरूपेण नीलाद्रौ भासते महः ॥ ब्रह्मादिश्वप-
 चांतानां यत्प्रसादान्नभोजने न च पंक्तेर्हि भेदोस्ति जगन्नाथाय मंगलं । लक्ष्मीश्चे-
 न्न सरस्वती तदुभयं यद्यस्ति नोदारता तच्चापि त्रितयं घटेत कतिचित्पुण्यैर-

¹⁶ i.e., the 36 orders into which the immediate attendants on the god are divided. The Raja of Khurdhā the representative of the ancient royal house of Orissa holds the lowly office of sweeper to the god. According to Hunter (*Orissa*, I. 128) the Raja himself is the traditional head of the 36 orders. His defection from loyalty to the British power about the date of the present document perhaps explains why it is not he but Krishna Chandra Mahapatra, who is signing it as the head of the 36 offices.

गण्यैरपि सौजन्यं न विजृम्भते तदपि चेन्नास्त्येव धर्मो रतिस्तत्सर्वं जगदीश्वरस्य कृपया
त्वय्येव संराजते ॥

Signatures :—

(In Oriya)

श्रीगोपीनाथशरणं
छतीशानीयोगनायक
कृष्णचन्द्र महापात्रंकर
ये दसकत्

(In Devanagari) श्रीजगन्नाथजी

एदस्तक जगन्नाथ
वल्लभके अधिकारी गु
रुमुखदासजी का ॥
श्रीराममहंतराम रत्नदास
सुरदासु (?) गुरुजी
(Illegible)

श्रीगोपाला जी (श्री ?)

श्रीइन्दरलालजी

श्रीराम

एदस्तक बडा अखाडा के महंत चेतनदासजी का

(In Kanarese)

श्रीमंत रत्ननृसिंहाचारि स्वामि

(In Devanagari)

श्रीमते रामानुजाय नमः

महंत सौम्यजा-

मात्रजि

(In Telugu)

श्रीराजगुरु उ तिरुभलपिचिडि
वेंकटाचार स्वामी

(In Devanagari)

श्रीराम श्रीरामजी

महंत छोटेसंत

बडेसंत रामसेवकदास जी

श्रीराम

महंत श्रीरामदासजी

(In Bengali)

श्रीराधाकृष्णः ।

श्रीकृष्णचन्द्रदेवगोस्वामि ॥

श्रीशीतलानन्ददेवस्य गोस्वामि

श्रीगोपीनाथदेवगोस्वामिनः

(In Devanagari)

श्रीराम अधिकारी नारायणदास

श्रीराम श्रीमहं

त जराम

दास जी

प्रमाणमिदं

जगन्नाथ

राजगुरोः ॥

(OR 24 July, 1804 No. 345)

Translation

MAY THE ILLUSTRIOUS LORD, THE SOVEREIGN
OF THE UNIVERSE, BE OUR REFUGE—

May the sincerest felicitations of the entire population of this city of the Supreme One, wealthy, pious and noble,¹⁷ of the whole Sect of the Vaiṣṇavas, of countless Brāhmaṇas headed by the Royal preceptor and lastly, of all the attendants of the Deity, like Krishna Chandra Mahapatra, the Chief of the thirty six holy offices, shed brilliant lustre on the exalted (personage) Governor-General, Marquess of Wellesley, known by the following titles “One—with—everlasting—fame” (lit. May—his—glory—continue), “the ruler universally accepted,” “Chief among all nobles,” and “wielding lofty titles;” who is devoted to (the task of) bearing the burden of the earth which testifies to the (unique) virtue of worshipping his illustrious patron deity; who is the repository of a host of virtues which are being sung by numerous women, who have been turned into his chattels, in consequence of his having extinguished the splendour of the orb that his enemies are, included in the globe of the earth, itself held in fee by the exhibition of his majesty derived from the prowess of his own arms; to whom the entire world is devoted on account of the repeated recounting of his noble fame; who is the unrivalled sun that has caused to bloom the lotus that the English race is; and who has

¹⁷ The expressions *satām* and *mahatām* possibly stand for ‘of saints’ and ‘of mahants’ respectively.

besides taken the vow of protecting the gods, the Brāhmaṇas and the Vaiṣṇavas.

Supported as we are by the solicitous attention of the English power, our predominance has been established in the holy temple of our Divine Master Jagannātha partly through the grace of the Supreme Lord, the illustrious Sovereign of the Universe and partly through the desire of the esteemed ruler. It is on this account that security and comfort have come to us according to our luck. Therefore, we, the people of the holy city are ever engaged in pronouncing our benedictions and we wish to send our felicitations to your lordship. Further, we cherish but this desire that your authority over this holy city may continue in this way for ever. Previously while pondering on your Lordships reputation, we became convinced of (the inevitability of) your control over the holy temple from reports, discussion, the sacred texts and the trends (of current events). We are now beholding with our own eyes exactly what we foresaw. In no instance did we witness nor shall we ever discern such prowess as we saw when your forces were preparing for war and again at the time of the defeat and the expulsion of the enemies. During this period the entire population was protected by you in such a manner that not a single soul suffered even the slightest loss, and we who were employed in attending on our Lord were not even aware that a war was raging in the land. While in the previous regime we had to meet with obstruction even in the smallest matter, we enjoy happiness now in every respect under your government. Sincerely do we hope that your lordship will establish justice in the same way as it was done (of yore) by Brahmā and other gods and that having heard of the security in which our lives and properties are, thanks to the care of the British authority, people from other places like Vṛndāvana, Vārāṇasī, Rāmanātha and Dvārikā will all come to this city and having viewed the Deity will ascend to Vaikuṇṭha.

And we here are praying night and day to God that the supremacy of the English power may last for ever, that the Lord by placing your lordship under his lasting protection may promote your steady advancement and that, we your well-wishers, being rid of all fear (worries) under your rule may ever remain engaged in the service of the Sovereign of the Universe :—

Verses.—Such is the virtue of this city of the Supreme Being that here indulgence (of the senses) brings the same reward as asceticism, taking of meals in disregard of (caste) rules serve only to cleanse the stains of birth and the dust of a slave girl's feet is capable of purifying even the gods (1).

The journey (of life) has been rendered difficult by the Vedas and the Dharma-Śāstras. In vain, oh elite, have you pursued (your path)? Of what use is this labour? On this sea-coast, beneath the banyan tree, is available the nectar of absolute truth for any one to drink in with his eyes. (2)

(*Here*) The purifying food even if dropped from a dog's mouth should be eaten by Brahmā and other Gods if by luck they find it. (3)

The light which flashes like lightning in the firmament of the soul of the ascetic, shines on the Blue Rock in the form of wood. (4)

Glory to the Lord of the Universe, in partaking of the leavings of whose food the bars of proximity do not operate between the Brāhmaṇas and other high castes on the one hand and dog-feeders and untouchables on the other. (5)

Where there is prosperity there is no learning; where both co-exist liberality is wanting: If three of them happen to occur in one place in consequence of numerous meritorious deeds (done), courtesy does not manifest itself; and where the last-named is found piety is sure to be absent. But it is in you alone, that all these shine together through the grace of God. (6)

THE NANDI-PURĀṆA

By R. C. HAZRA

No *Ms* of this work has been discovered up to the present time. There is a work called *Kedāra-kalp*¹ which, in one *Ms*², claims to be a part of the *Nandīśvara-purāṇa* or *Nandī-purāṇa*, but it can be little doubted that this *Kedāra-kalpa* is really an independent work having nothing to do with the *Nandīśvara-p.* or *Nandī-p.* The total absence of any *Ms* of the *Nandī-p.* has compelled us to base our present account of this Purāṇa on the information contained in the extant Purāṇas and the *Smṛti-Nibandhas* as well as on the verses quoted from the *Nandī-p.* in the latter works.

In all the printed editions of the *Matsya-p.* the *Nandī-p.* is described as follows :

नन्दाया यत्र माहात्म्यं कार्तिकेयेन वर्ण्यते ।
नन्दिपुराणं तल्लोकैराख्यातमिति कीर्त्यते³ ॥

‘It is declared that (the Purāṇa), in which the glory of Nandā (i.e. Gaurī) was declared by *Kārttikeya*, was called *Nandī-p.* by the people.’ The above mentioned verse of the *Matsya-p.* of which the second line has obviously defective readings, occurs in Aufrecht’s *Ms* of the *Matsya-p.* with the reading

¹ Haraprasad Shastri, *Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss.*, ASB, V, pp. 794—799 (No. 4143) and pp. 792-794 (No. 4142). In the former *Ms* the work consists of three parts, of which the first part claims to belong to the *Rudrayāmala*; but in the latter *Ms* the work claims to be a part of the *Vikhyādu-purāṇa*.

² Aufrecht, *Bodleian Catalogue*, pp. 81-82, No. 137. In this work Śaṅkara speaks to Nandikeśvara on Mahāpatha. It is the same as Pāṭalas 11 ff. of Shastri’s *Ms* No. 4143, but in Shastri’s *Ms* Īśvara (i.e. Śiva) speaks to Kārttikeya.

³ *Matsya-p.* AnSS ed. 53, 61; Venkaṭ. ed. 53, 60 (v.1. ākhyānam for ākhyātam), Vaṅga. ed. 53, 60, Jivānanda Vidyāsāgara’s ed. 53, 60.

'nandāpurāṇam' for 'nandipurāṇam' in the second line⁴. This verse is also found quoted in *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* II, i, p. 21, *Nityācāra-pradīpa*, p. 18, and *Vīra-mitrodāya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 15; but in these three Smṛti-Nibandhas the text of the second line is given respectively as follows :

‘नन्दिपुराणं तल्लोके नन्दाख्यमिति कीर्त्यते,’⁵

‘नन्दिपुराणं तल्लोके नन्दाख्यमिति चोच्यते,’

‘नन्दापुराणं तल्लोके नन्दाख्यमिति कीर्त्यते’

It is obvious that the text of the second line of the above-mentioned verse, as preserved in the Smṛti-Nibandhas, is better than that found in the printed editions and in Aufrecht's Ms of the *Matsya-p.* The Prabhāsa-khaṇḍa (I, 2, 81) of the *Skanda-p.*, on the other hand, describes the *Nandi-p.* as follows :

नन्दिने यत्र माहात्म्यं कार्त्तिकेयेन वर्ण्यते ।

लोके नन्दिपुराणं वै ख्यातमेतद्विद्वज्जोत्तमाः ॥

‘Oh best of the twice-born, (that Purāṇa), in which the glory is described by Kārttikeya to Nandin, is well-known as *Nandi-p.* on earth.’ In the *Devī-bhāgāvata* I, iii, 15 the twelfth Upapurāṇa is called ‘*Nandi-kṛta*,’ and there is no mention of any ‘*Nandi-p.*’ ‘*Nandī-p.*’ ‘*Nandā-p.*’ ‘*Nānda*’ or ‘*Skānda*’ in the *Devī-bhāgāvata*.

An examination of the texts of the above mentioned verses shows that the *Nandi-p.* was originally declared by Kārttikeya to Nandin⁶ (who, then, narrated it to some other person addressed as ‘king’ in some of the quoted

⁴ Aufrecht, *Bodleian Catalogue* p. 40, No. 95.

⁵ This line, as quoted in the *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, p. 533, reads ‘tallokair vyākhyātam’ in place of ‘talloke nandākhyam’.

⁶ Cf. *Devī-bhāgāvata* I, iii, 15 in which the twelfth Upapurāṇa is called ‘*Nandi-kṛta*.’ In *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, p. 917 two of the quoted verses are ascribed to a work called ‘*Nandi-prokta*,’ but this ‘*Nandi-prokta*’ Upapurāṇa may be the same as the *Siva-dharma* which is called ‘*Nandi-prokta Sivadharmā*’ or ‘*Nandikeśvara-prokta Sivadharmā*’ in its chapter-colophons. (See H. P. Shastri, *Cat. of Sans. Mss*, ASB, V, pp. 718 and 723-8, Nos. 4084 and 4085 respectively).

verses,⁷ that it dealt primarily with the glorification of Nandā (or Nandī, i.e. Gaurī), and that it was also called 'Nandī-p., and 'Nandā-p.'⁸

The *Nandī-p.* (or *Nandā-p.*), being originally declared by Kārttikeya, was also called 'Skānda.' In giving a list of the eighteen Upapurāṇas the *Kūrma-p.*, the *Garuḍa-p.*, and the *Saura-saṃhitā* of the *Skānda-p.* name the third Upapurāṇa as 'Skānda' and describe it as follows :—

तृतीयं स्कान्दमुद्दिष्टं कूर्मेण तु भाषितम्⁹

'The third (Upapurāṇa) is called *Skānda*, and it was spoken out by Kumāra (i.e. Skanda).' That this '*Skānda*' Upapurāṇa is the same as the *Nandī-p.* (or *Nandā-p.*) is shown by the following facts : (1) the chief speaker in both these Upapurāṇas is Kārttikeya ; (2) the *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* and the *Vīra-mitrodaya* quote all the verses of the *Kūrma-p.* containing the list of Upapurāṇas but reads 'tṛtiyaṃ nāndam-uddiṣṭaṃ kumāreṇa tu bhāṣitaṃ' for the above mentioned line of the *Kūrma-p.*¹⁰ ; (3) in the lists of the eighteen Upapurāṇas given in the *Parāśara-upapurāṇa*, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Prasthāna-bheda*, and the Śiva-māhātmya-khanda of the *Sūta-saṃhitā* of the *Skānda-p.*, the third Upapurāṇa is named 'Nānda' (i.e. the Purāṇa on Nandā);¹¹ (4) '*Skānda*,

⁷ *Dāna-kaumudī*, p. 40 (nṛpa), *Smṛti-tattva* I, p. 131 (rājan); *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* III, i, p. 668 (viśāṃpate); and so on.

⁸ In *Viśvaśa* (a Bengali encyclopædia) IX, p. 546 the *Nandī-p.* and the *Nandā-p.* have been regarded as different works.

⁹ *Kūrma-p.* I, i, 17b; *Garuḍa-p.* (Venkaṭ ed.) I, 223, 18a; Eggleing, *India Office Catalogue*, VI, p. 1382. All the printed editions of the *Kūrma-p.* read 'skāndaṃ'; but in Jivānanda Vidyāsāgara's edition (I, 215, 18a) of the *Garuḍa-p.* the reading is wrongly given as 'skāndaṃ.'

¹⁰ *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* II, i, p. 21, and *Vīra-mitrodaya*, Pari, bhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 13. In the *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, p. 532, the erroneous reading 'nāndaṃ' is found in place of 'nāndaṃ.'

¹¹ Eggleing, *Ind. Off. Cat.*, VI, p. 1230. *Prasthāna-bheda* (ed. Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam 1912), p. 10. Eggleing, *Ind. Off. Cat.*, VI, p. 1378.

is the name for the third Upapurāṇa in some of the *Mss* of the Prabhāsa-khaṇḍa of the *Skanda-p.*, but 'Nānda' in the rest;¹² and (5) Narasiṃha Vājapeyin, who quotes *Kūrma-p.* I, i, 10 (anyānyupapurāṇāni, etc.) and then gives, in his *Nityācāra-pradīpa*, p. 19, the titles of the eighteen Upapurāṇas according to the list contained in the *Kūrma-p.*, names the third Upapurāṇa as 'Nandi-purāṇa' and not as 'Skānda'.

The *Nandi-p.* was also called 'Vāyavīya.' In his *Malamāsa-tattva* Raghunandana quotes the line 'anyānyupapurāṇāni, etc.' with the mention of the *Kūrma-p.* as its source and then says that this line refers to the 'Narasimha-p., Nandi-p., Āditya-p., Kālikā-p. etc.'¹³ Raghunandana then reproduces those lines of the *Kūrma-p.* which contain the list of the Upapurāṇas. According to the second of these quoted lines 'the third Upapurāṇa is the *Vāyavīya* spoken out by Kumāra'¹⁴, there being no mention of any 'Nandi-p., Nandā-p., Nānda-p or 'Skānda-p.', in any of these quoted lines. So, it is evident that according to Raghunandana the *Vāyavīya-upapurāṇa* (spoken out by Kumāra) and the *Nandi-p.* were the same. The mention of the 'Vāyavīya narrated by Kumāra' as the third Upapurāṇa is also found in the list of the eighteen Upapurāṇas given from the *Kūrma-p.* in *Śabda-kalpadruma*, 119 (under 'Upapurāṇam').

¹² *Skanda-p.* VII, i, 2, 11b—*tṛtīyaṃ skādam* (v. 1 'nādam' in the Veṅkaṭ. and Vaṅga. editions) *uddiṣṭaṃ kumāreṇānu-bhāṣitam*.

¹³ *Smṛti-tattva* I, pp. 792-3—*kaurme—* 'anyānyupapurāṇāni munibhiḥ kathitāny-api tāni ca narasiṃha-nandy-āditya-kālikāpurāṇā dīnīti, yathā—ādyam sanatkumāroktam, etc.'

¹⁴ 'tṛtīyam vāyavīyam ca kumāreṇa ca bhāṣitam'—*Smṛti-tattva* I, p. 793. The Vaṅga. ed. of the *Malamāsa-tattva* (p. ?) reads 'kumāreṇābhībhāṣitam.' So also does Caṇḍīcaraṇa *Smṛtibhūṣaṇa*'s edition (p. 213).

In the *Revā-māhātmya*,¹⁵ the third Upapurāṇa is named 'Nandā-p.', and is connected with the *Viṣṇu-p.* thus :—

नन्दपुराणं च तथा तृतीयं वैष्णवे मतम्

But in the *Revā-khaṇḍa* of the *Skanda-p.*, which is practically the same as the *Revā-māhātmya* mentioned above, the above mentioned line occurs with the mention of the 'Śaukeya' as the third Upapurāṇa.¹⁶ So, it seems that the *Nandi-p.* was also sometimes called 'Śaukeya-p.'

Thus, the *Nandi-p.* was known under different titles, viz., *Nandi-p.*, *Nandī-p.*, *Nandā-p.*, *Nānda-p.*, *Skānda-p.*, *Vāyaviya-p.* and *Śaukeya-p.* For some of these titles we find clear reasons; viz, it was called *Nandi-p.*, because it was reproduced by Nandin; its title 'Skānda', was due to its original narrator Skanda; and it was called *Nandā-p.*, *Nānda-p.* or *Nandī-p.*, as it dealt primarily with the praise of Nandā or Nandī (i.e. Gaurī). But we do not know how it came to be known as 'Vāyaviya', and 'Śaukeya' also. Whatever different titles our *Nandi-p.* might have had in early times, the *Smṛti*-writers refer to it very often as 'Nandi-p.', and sometimes as 'Nandī-p.'¹⁷

Numerous verses are found quoted from the 'Nandi-p.', in Gadādhara's *Kālasāra*, Gopālabhaṭṭa's *Haribhaktivilāsa*, Narasiṃha Vājaṇṇin's *Nityācārapradīpa*, Raghunandana's *Smṛti-tattva*, Govindānanda's *Dāna-kaumudī* and *Varṣa-kaumudī*, Mādhavācārya's commentary on the *Parāśara-smṛti*, Sridatta's *Kṛtyācāra*, Hemādri's *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi*, Vallālasena's *Dānasāgara* and *Adbhutasāgara*, and Aparārka's commentary on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*. Vallālasena, who was extremely cautious about the authenticity of the *Purā-*

¹⁵ Aufrecht, *Bodleian Catalogue*, p. 65.

¹⁶ *Skanda-p.* V, iii (*Revā-kh.*), 1, 48b—śaukeyam hi tṛtīyam tu purāṇe vaiṣṇave matam.

¹⁷ See *Ācāra-bhūṣaṇa* (of Tryambaka), p. 183; *Smṛti-ratnabhāra* (of Bṛhaspati Rāyamukuta), fol. 56b (Shastri, *Cat. of Sans. Mss.*, ASB, III, No. 2138, p. 228).

nas he used in his *Dānasāgara*, utilised its contents without the least shade of doubt. Further, a 'Nanda-p.' is mentioned by Alberuni in that list of Purāṇas which he committed to writing from dictation.¹⁸ In his *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* Kalhaṇa says that 'having heard the *Nandipurāṇa* from some pupil of Vyāsa the king (Jalauka) frequented Sodara and other (sacred springs) as vying (in holiness) with Nandiśa'.¹⁹ These evidences, as well as the facts that the *Nandi-p.*, as known from the quoted verses, was non-Tantric, and that its name is mentioned in the *Matsya-p.* and is found included in all the early lists of the eighteen Upapurāṇas, show definitely that *it was an early work and must have been written before 700 A.D.* As not even a single Ms of this work has been discovered up to the present time, it is not possible to say anything definitely about the upper limit of its date. From an examination of the quoted verses, however, we feel inclined to take it as a work of the sixth or seventh century A.D. In one of the verses quoted from this Purāṇa in Govindānanda's *Varṣa-kaumudī* (p. 458) there is mention of the names of a few zodiacal signs, viz., Tulā, Makara and Meṣa.

It has already been said that the Revā-māhātmya and the Revākhaṇḍa of the *Skanda-p.* connect the *Nandi-p.* with the *Viṣṇu-p.* as a part of the latter and are thus inclined to regard it as a work of the Vaiṣṇavas. This Vaiṣṇava character of the *Nandi-p.* is supported by a verse which has been quoted from the 'Nandi-p.' in the *Nityācāra-pradīpa* and in which Kṛṣṇa appears as an object of worship.²⁰ There

¹⁸ Sachau, *Alberuni's India* I, p. 130. That this 'Nanda-p.' was the same as the 'Nandi-p.' is shown definitely by Alberuni himself when he says "Nanda-p. i.e. a servant of Mahādeva."

¹⁹ *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* I, 123.

श्रुतनन्दिपुराणः स व्यासान्तैवासिनो नृपः ।

सेवनं सोदरादीनां नन्दीशस्पर्धया व्यधात् ॥

²⁰ न शल्लकाज्येन तृणं न सिक्थवसा सम्भूतम् ।

धूपं प्रत्यङ्गनिर्मुक्तं दद्यात् कृष्णाय बुद्धिमान् ॥

(Quoted in the *Nityācāra-pradīpa*, p. 647.)

is another verse, quoted in *Haribhaktivilāsa* (p. 677) which says that sinners may attain the highest abode of Viṣṇu by singing his name.²¹ But this last-mentioned verse must not be taken seriously, because there are other quoted verses in which the regions of Brahmā, Varuṇa, Bṛhaspati and others have been mentioned as places capable of being attained by certain pious acts.²² On the other hand, Nara-siṃha Vājapeyin calls the '*Nandi-p.*', a part of the *Skanda-p.*²³ which is pre-eminently a Śaiva work. More detailed information in this direction is furnished by Kalhaṇa when he says that after hearing the *Nandi-purāṇa* from a pupil of Vyāsa, king Jalauka frequented Sodara and other holy springs with a view to be equal with Nandiśa. We know that Nandiśa (or Nandikeśa) was an attendant of Śiva; and Sodara (in Kashmir) has been shown by Stein to have been situated in close proximity to the temple-ruins of Bhūteśvara,²⁴ which is a Śaiva Tīrtha. Hence, it is clear that according to Kalhaṇa the *Nandi-p.* was a Śaiva work; otherwise, it could not be said to make the king so much zealous in his devotion to Śiva. The Śaiva character of the *Nandi-p.* is also shown by a large number of quoted verses in which Śiva (also called Śarva, Rudra, Śaṅkara, etc.) is regarded as the object of worship,²⁵ the Linga-worship is prescribed,²⁶

²¹ sarvadā sarva-kālesu ye' pi kurvanti pātakam |
nāma-saṅkīrtanam kṛtvā yānti viṣṇoḥ param padam ||
(*Haribhaktivilāsa*, p. 677).

²² See, for instance, the verses quoted from the '*Nandi-p.*', in Aparārka's com. on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, p. 366; *Dānasāgara*, fols. 118b, 131a, 169a, 18cb, etc.; and so on.

²³ *Nityācāra-pradīpa*, p. 18-mātsye- nandāyā yatra mātmyam kārṭtikeyena varṇyate | nandīpurāṇam talloke nandākhyamiti cocyate | tacca skāndaikadeśaḥ ||

²⁴ M.A. Stein, Kalhaṇa's *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, I, pp. 20-21 and 23-24 notes on verses 107 and 123 of Chap. I.

²⁵ For such verses see *Nityācāra-pradīpa*, pp. 683-6; *Dānasāgara*, fols. 131a, 196b, 197a, 198b, etc; *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, pp. 907, 957; and so on.

²⁶ *Smṛti-tattva* I, p. 129; *Nityācāra-pradīpa*, pp. 685-6.

the sectarian Mantra 'om namaḥ Śivāya' is praised,²⁷ and the Śiva-worshippers are given preference to other sectaries.²⁸ In his *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* (III, ii, p. 691) Hemādri quotes from the '*Nandi-p.*' an extract in which Īśvara (i.e. Śiva) speaks on the result of avoiding meat; and in the *Adbhuta-sāgara* Vallālasena quotes from the same Purāṇa seven metrical lines on Śiva's burning of Tripura.²⁹ So, the Śaiva character of the *Nandi-p.* is unmistakable. But as we have already seen that the *Matsya-p.* describes the *Nandi-p.* as a work dealing with the praise of Nandā, it seems that the *Nandi-p.*, like the earlier *Linga-p.*, was originally a Śaiva work in which both Śiva and his Śakti (i.e. Nandā) were praised. Or, it may be that it originally dealt with the praise of Nandā but was later on utilised by the Śiva-worshippers for spreading their ideas. Its Vaiṣṇava character was most probably the last stage in its change.

The *Nandi-p.* must not be taken to be the same as the *Nandikeśvara-p.* (also called *Nandiśvara-p.*).³⁰ The distinct character of these two Purāṇic works is shown by the following facts :—(1) in the list of the eighteen Upapurāṇas given by Raghunandana in his *Malamāsa-tattva* there is mention of a '*Vāyaviya Upapurāṇa*' (which we have already found to be the same as the *Nandi-p.*) and the '*Nandikeśvara-yugma*' (i.e. the two *Nandikeśvara-purāṇas*, which the commentator Kāśīrāma Vācaspati takes to mean the '*Bṛhannandikeśvara-p.*' and the '*Nandikeśvara-p.*³¹); (2) The *Śabda-kālpadruma* quotes from the '*Kūrma-p.*' a few verses on the

²⁷ *Smṛti-tattva* I, pp. 130-1.

²⁸ Aparārka's com. on *Yāj.*, p. 399; *Dānasāgara*, fol. 198b.

²⁹ *Adbhutasāgara*, p. 485.

³⁰ In *Viśvaśa IX*, pp. 547 and 549 the *Nandi-p.* has been wrongly identified with the *Nandiśvara-p.* or *Nandikeśvara-p.*

³¹ *Malamāsa-tattva* (ed. Caṇḍicaraṇa Smṛtibhūṣaṇa with Kāśīrāma Vācaspati's commentary), p. 213—*nandikeśvara-yugmaṁ bṛhannandikeśvarapurāṇaṁ nandikeśvarapurāṇaṁ ca.*

list of the eighteen Upapurāṇas which includes the 'Vāyaviya' and the 'Nandikeśvara-yugma'³²; (3) the *Caturvarga-śāntāmani*, Vrata-khaṇḍa, gives from the *Kārma-p.* a list of the eighteen Upapurāṇas in which the third Upapurāṇa is the 'Nānda,' but the fourth is named 'Siva-dhārma' in some *Mss* and as 'Nandikeśvara-yugma' in others;³³ (4) the same *Smṛti*-writers are found to draw upon both the *Nandi-p.* and the *Nandikeśvara-p.*, but there is not a single verse which has been ascribed by any one of them to the *Nandi-p.* in one place of their work and to the *Nandikeśvara-p.* in another, nor is there a second instance in which the same verse has been ascribed to the *Nandi-p.* by one writer and to the *Nandikeśvara-p.* by another. It is only in Śūlapāṇi's *Durgotsava-viveka* (p. 8) that the verse 'ṛkṣa-yogānurodhena,' really belonging to the *Nandikeśvara-p.*, has been ascribed to the 'Nandi-p.'. That Śūlapāṇi's ascription of this verse to the *Nandi-p.*, is wrong is shown by the facts that this verse occurs only in some of the *Mss* on which the printed edition of the *Durgotsava-viveka* is based, and that the verse 'bhagavatyāḥ praveśādi,' which belongs to the group of those eight verses (including the above mentioned verse 'ṛkṣa-yogānurodhen') which are found quoted as 'Nandikeśvara-p.' in Raghunandana's *Durgāpūjā-tattva* (pp. 2-3) is ascribed to the *Nandikeśvara-p.* by Śūlapāṇi himself in his *Durgotsava-viveka* (p. 9) and *Vāsantī-viveka* (p. 28). A similar instance of wrong ascription is found in the ASB edition of the *Dāna-kaumudī* (p. 46) in which there is a verse³⁴ which is ascribed to the 'Nandikeśvara-p.' in only one *Ms* and to the 'Nandi-p.' in the rest. But this difference in ascription is simply due to

³² See *ABORI*, XXI, p. 43, foot-note 2.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 43, foot-note 1.

³⁴ *Dāna-kaumudī*, p. 46—nandipurāṇe (v. 1. 'nandikeśvara-purāṇe' in *Ms* ३) तृणार्ता-जला-दाने—

yo'pi kaścit tṛṣṇārtāya jala-dānaṃ prayacchati |
sa nitya-tṛpto vasati svarge yugaśataṃ nṛpa ||

a scribal mistake, because this verse is found quoted in many other Nibandhas with the mention of only the 'Nandi-p.' as the source.³⁵

It has already been said that not a single *Ms* of the *Nandi-p.* has been found as yet. So, we do not know exactly what its contents were. We shall, however, try to give an idea of its *Smṛti* contents from an examination of those of its verses which are found quoted in the *Smṛti-Nibandhas*.

Regarding the *Ādya-p.*, *Sāmba-p.*, *Kālikā-p.*, *Nandi-p.*, *Āditya-p.*, *Narasimha-p.*, *Viṣṇudharmottara*, etc., Vallālasena says in his *Dānasāgara* that these works dealt prominently with donations.³⁶ As a matter of fact, the great majority of the verses quoted from the *Nandi-p.* in the commentaries and Nibandhas deal with various topics on gifts; viz., praise of donations;³⁷ results of following the right procedure in making donations;³⁸ bad effects of making gifts to an unworthy person;³⁹ benefits of giving water (to a thirsty person for drinking, or to a Brahmin for washing his feet), horse, elephant, chariot, cows which are well-decorated or are in the course of delivery (the best recipients of such cows being the spiritually developed persons, the Agnihotrits and the deities), well-furnished house, clothes, umbrella, turban (*uṣṇīṣa*), shoes (especially to a Brahmin going on a journey), collyrium (to the eyes of a Brahmin),

³⁵ See *Kālasāra*, p. 584; *Dānasāgara*, fol. 144; *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, p. 989; and so on.

³⁶ kūrmapurāṇādipruṇayoḥ ।

ūkrāṇy upapurāṇāni vyakta-dāna-vidhīni ca ॥

ādyam purāṇam śāmbam ca kālikāhvayam eva ca ।

nandim āditya-saṃjñam ca nārasimham tathaiva ca ॥

Dānasāgara, fol. 2a.

³⁷ *Dānasāgara*, fol. 6a; *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, pp. 5, 49; Aparārka's com. on *Yāj.*, p. 406.

³⁸ *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, p. 102.

³⁹ Aparārka's com. on *Yāj.*, p. 296; *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, pp. 102, 450.

stick (to an old man), ornaments, sacred thread, coins called Suvarṇa as Dakṣiṇā (a Suvarṇa being said to be equivalent to 16 Māṣas), land (which is productive or is shining with crops such as sugarcane, wheat, barley, etc.), food (to all without distinction of castes, except in śrāddha ceremonies), drink (pānaka, prepared with water mixed with molasses), milk, ghee, curd, molasses, fruit-bearing trees, orchards, gardens, pleasure-gardens, etc.⁴⁰ It is needless to say that, except in a very few cases, the recipients of these gifts are only the Brahmins.

More interesting is the topic on Vidyā-dāna, on which about 300 metrical lines are found quoted in Aparārka's commentary on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, Vallālasena's *Dāna-sāgara*, Hemādri's *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi*, Raghunandana's *Smṛti-tattva*, and Govindānanda's *Dāna-kaumudī*.⁴¹ According to these verses, there are fourteen kinds of Vidyās, viz., the four Vedas, the six Vedāṅgas, Dharmaśāstra, Purāṇa, Mīmāṃsā and Tarka (Logic). Besides these, there are other secondary sciences which have grown out of the principal Vidyās mentioned above, viz., Āyurveda (medical science), Sasya-veda (science of agriculture), Kalā-vidyā, Śilpa-vidyā, etc. All these sciences (including Sasyavidyā) have been highly praised; and though the benefits of teaching these Vidyās as well as Ślokas, Prahelikās, Gāthās, etc., to worthy students and of giving books on these sciences

⁴⁰ Aparārka's com. on *Yāj.*, pp. 296, 379, 406; *Dānasāgara*, fols. 118a, 118b, 133b, 138a, 138b, 143b, 144a-b, 149b-150a, 152a-b, 158a, 158b, 159b, 160a, 162b, 169a, 170b, 171a, 171b, 172b, 180b, 184b, 210a, 211a, 221b, 224a, 225a, 226b, 228a, 281a-b, 285a, 285b; *Kṛtyācāra*, fol. 70a; *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, pp. 456, 477, 507, 571-2, 892, 904, 907, 909-910; 957, 960, 984, 984-5, 989, 1041, 1050; *Dāna-kaumudī*, pp. 46, 83; *Kālasāra*, p. 584; *Smṛti-tattva* I, pp. 502, 503, II, pp. 366, 628; *Haribhaktivilāsa*, pp. 316, 317; and so on.

⁴¹ Aparārka's com. on *Yāj.*, pp. 396-403; *Dānasāgara*, fols. 195b-201a; *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, pp. 511, 513-6, 526, 526-7, 547-556, 559, 561; *Smṛti-tattva* I, pp. 347, 348, 502, 503, 656, 657, 658, II, pp. 362, 588; *Dāna-kaumudī*, p. 67.

(including *Sasya-vidyā*) to gods or worthy Brahmin recipients have been described elaborately, greater importance has been attached to donation of books on *Ātma-vidyā* (i.e. philosophical treatises), *Paurāṇī Vidyā* (i.e. *Purāṇas*) and *Dharmaśāstrātmikā Vidyā* (i.e. *Dharmaśāstras*). The whole procedure of copying and giving books, which has been elaborately described in these verses, consists mainly of the following operations:—the donor's selection of an able scribe (whose qualifications have been given in some of the verses) as well as of an auspicious day; preparation of ink of different colours; preparation of pens; construction, in the prescribed manner, of a *Sarapatra* (also called *Vidyādhara*, i.e. a stool, on which a book to be copied is placed) with gold, silver, ivory or durable wood; collection of leaves (*patra*) required for the *Ms* and furnishing their margins with lines drawn in black and red ink; construction of wooden covers for the *Ms* and furnishing the outer sides of these covers with ornamental paintings; decoration of the house in which the copying is to be made; honour to be shown to the scribe by presenting to him money, ornaments, etc., before he begins his work; furnishing the scribe with knife and other requisites; the scribe's ceremonious beginning, with the sound of musical instruments, of his work of copying in the appointed house on an auspicious day after duly performing *Puṇyāha-vācana* and *Svasti-vācana* and worshipping *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu* and *Śiva*; feeding of Brahmins at the completion of the work of copying; comparison of copied *Ms* with its original, and making necessary corrections in it; furnishing this new *Ms* with covers of wood and cloth; taking this *Ms* with pomp and ceremony to a temple of *Śiva*, and dedicating it to the deity; appointment of qualified Brahmin readers (*vācaka*, *Pāṭhaka*, whose qualifications have been mentioned in a number of verses) for reading out the *Ms* and explaining its contents to the audience, the

language used in explaining being Sanskrit or Prakrit according to the language of the book; presents to be made to the readers and to the donor's teacher, who is to attend the function; decorations and merri-makings in towns and villages on this occasion. If the *M* is to be given to some worthy Brahmin, it should be taken to his house in the above mentioned manner and formally given to him. One may also acquire the merits of Vidyā-dāna by building a house, inviting a learned teacher there, honouring him with wealth, raiments, etc., and making him teach a number of students.

Equally interesting are the 25 metrical lines, quoted by Aparārka, Vallālasena and Hemādri⁴², on the praise of foundation of hospitals (ārogya-śālā) for the suffering humanity and the poor. According to these lines, such hospitals should be furnished with qualified and experienced physicians and powerful medicines, and food, honey, ghee, etc., should be supplied to the patients free of cost.

There is also a large number of verses on the benefits of the following acts:—digging of tanks and wells, and their dedication to a Brahmin or a deity, or for public use;⁴³ giving food to cows;⁴⁴ feeding a Brahmin who is visiting holy places;⁴⁵ avoiding meat in the month of Kārttika and under different Rāsis, viz., Tulā, Makara and Meṣa;⁴⁶ worshipping an earthen Śiva-liṅga;⁴⁷ offering incense and flowers to gods and Brahmins;⁴⁸ furnishing temples and

⁴² See Aparārka's com. on *Yāj.*, pp. 365-6; *Dānasāgara*, fols. 230b-231b; *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, pp. 892-4.

⁴³ Aparārka's com. on *Yāj.*, pp. 408-9; *Smṛti-tattva* II, pp. 514, 516; *Dāna-kaumudī*, p. 164; *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, pp. 1002, 1004-5.

⁴⁴ *Dānasāgara*, fol. 131a.

⁴⁵ *Dānasāgara*, fol. 152 a-b.

⁴⁶ *Varṣa-kaumudī*, p. 458; *Kālasāra*, p. 26.

⁴⁷ *Smṛti-tattva* I, p. 129.

⁴⁸ *Dānasāgara*, fols. 165a, 166b; *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, p. 922.

houses of Brahmins with lamps⁴⁹; muttering the six-syllabled Mantra 'om namaḥ śivāya' and using it in worship, donations, etc.;⁵⁰ curing a person of his disease with the help of one's knowledge of Āyurveda;⁵¹ assuring safety to a person distressed with fear;⁵² offering incense to Kṛṣṇa, gold to a Śiva-linga, and Madhuparka to Śiva;⁵³ shampooing the feet of a tired Brahmin traveller, and offering to him ointments for use on his feet;⁵⁴ singing the names of Viṣṇu;⁵⁵ and so on.

In the *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* III (Pariśeṣa-khaṇḍa) a large number of verses has been quoted from the *Nandi-p.* on the various topics connected with Śrāddha; viz., classification of Pitṛs; mention of the different classes of Pitṛs whose satisfaction is created by the worship of Viṣṇu, Brahmā and Śiva; determination of proper time for the performance of funeral ceremonies; persons who deserve to be invited and fed in a funeral ceremony; enumeration of the various objects to be given to Brahmins in a funeral ceremony, viz., gold, silver, ornaments of various kinds (such as armlets, necklace, earrings, waist-bands, anklets, bracelets, etc. all set with gems), foot-wears (pādukā), palanquins, vehicles, various kinds of food, clothes, fans, umbrellas, scents and other articles for toileting, cows, buffaloes, young elephants, bulls, etc.; praise of giving gold coins (called Suvarṇa) and silver as Dakṣiṇā; origin of silver from the drop of tear fallen from one of the unblinking eyes of Śiva when he was looking at Tripura with the intention of destroying it; and

⁴⁹ *Dānasāgara*, fols. 190a, 190b; *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, p. 941.

⁵⁰ *Smṛti-tattva* I, pp. 130-1.

⁵¹ *Smṛti-tattva* I, p. 678.

⁵² Aparārka's com. on *Yāj.*, p. 385; *Dānasāgara*, fols. 232a, 232a-b; *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi*, I, p. 946.

⁵³ *Nityācāra-pradīpa*, pp. 647, 685-6.

⁵⁴ *Dānasāgara*, fol. 163a; *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, p. 956,

⁵⁵ *Haribhaktivilāsa*, p. 677.

so on. In his *Parāśara-bhāṣya* (II, ii, p. 242) Mādhavācārya quotes from the *Nandi-p.* seventeen metrical lines on the innumerable rebirths (first as shrubs, plants, etc., and next as various lower animals and members of lower castes) which a murderer of a Brahmin has to pass through after residence in hells for Kalpas, before he is born as a Brahmin. That the *Nandi-p.* contained the story of Śiva's burning of the city called Tripura is shown not only by the above mentioned account of the origin of silver but also by the seven metrical lines, quoted in Vallālasena's *Adbhutasāgara* (p. 485) on the omens foreboding the destruction of Tripura.

In some of the quoted verses Śiva speaks most probably to a king (who is addressed as 'viśāmpate' and 'vatsa' in some other verses)⁵⁶.

The *Nandi-p.* seems to have been a non-Bengal work. The crops mentioned in connexion with Bhūmi-dāna exclude rice.⁵⁷

APPENDIX

The *Nandi-p.* has been drawn upon in the following works :

(1) Aparārka's com. on *Yāj.*, pp. 296, 365-366, 379, 385, 396-403, 406, 408-409.

(2) *Adbhutasāgara*, p. 485.

(3) *Dānasāgara*, fols. 6a, 118a, 118b, 131a, 118a(?), 133b, 138a, 138b, 143b, 144a-b, 149b-150a, 152a-b, 152b, 156a, 158a, 158b, 159b, 160a, 162b, 163a, 165a, 166b, 169a, 170b, 171a, 171b, 172b, 180b, 184b, 190a, 190b, 195b-201a, 210a, 211a, 221b, 224a, 225a, 226b, 228a, 230b-231a, 232a, 232a-b, 232b, 281a-b, 285a, 285b.

(4) *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, pp. 5, 49, 102, 450, 456, 477, 507, 511, 513-516, 526, 526-7, 547-556, 559, 561, 571, 571-2, 892, 892-4, 904, 907, 909-910, 922, 923, 941, 946, 956, 957, 960, 984, 984-5, 989, 1002, 1004-5, 1041, 1050, 917 (?); III, i, pp. 45, 64, 79, 153, 221, 389.

⁵⁶ See *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* I, pp. 571-2, III, i, pp. 45, 64 and 668, and III, ii, p. 691.

⁵⁷ See the verses of the *Nandi-p.* in *Dānasāgara*, fols. 138a and 138b.

389-390, 476, 657, 658, 667, 668, 682, 706, 721-2, 738-9, 889, 933, 1100;
III, ii, pp. 26, 691.

(5) *Kṛtyācāra*, fol. 70a.

(6) *Parāśara-bhāṣya* (of Mādhavācārya) II, ii, p. 242.

(7) Śūlapāṇi's *Durgotsava-viveka*, p. 8 (?).

(8) *Dāna-kaumudī*, pp. 46, 67, 83, 164.

(9) *Varṣa-kaumudī*, p. 458.

(10) *Smṛti-tattva* I, pp. 129, 130-1, 347, 348, 502, 503, 656, 657,
658, 678; II, pp. 362, 366, 514, 516, 588, 628.

(11) *Kālasāra*, pp. 26, 584.

(12) *Haribhaktivilāsa*, pp. 316, 317, 677.

(13) *Nityācāra-pradīpa*, pp. 647, 685-6.

THE CONCEPTION AND NUMBER OF PRAMĀṆAS ACCORDING TO VṚTTIKĀRA UPAVARṢA

By V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI

(Continued from page 242)

or (3) "ज्ञातः सम्बन्धः ययोः"—both the probans and the probandum, the mutual relation of which is already known. If it be taken as a karmadhāraya, it means the sambandha itself which is already known. The word "एकदेश" in the definition would mean the probans and the probandum. The *Vārttika* says :

"प्रमाता ज्ञातसम्बन्ध एकदेशयवोच्यते ।
कर्मधारयपक्षो वा सम्बन्धिन्येकदेशता ॥
द्वयं वा ज्ञातसम्बन्धमुपलब्धं परस्परम् ।
तस्यैकदेशशब्दाभ्यामुच्यते समुदायिनी ॥"

The import of the word Sambandha : The word sambandha in the compound "ज्ञातसम्बन्धस्य" is explained thus :— "सम्बन्धो व्याप्तिरिष्टावलिङ्गधर्मस्य लिङ्गिनः" the invariable concomitance of the liṅga and the liṅgin when the relation is thus spoken of, the related objects are also spoken of as vyāpya—the probans—and the vyāpaka—the probandum. The vyāpya is one which exists either in all cases of the vyāpaka or in some only, while the vyāpaka exists in all cases of the vyāpya.

"व्याप्यस्य गमकत्वं च व्यापकं गम्यमिष्यते ।
यो यस्य देशकालाभ्यां समो न्यूनोऽपि वा भवेत् ॥
तेन व्याप्ये गृहीतेऽर्थे व्यापकस्तस्य गृह्यते ।
नह्यन्यथा भवत्येषा व्याप्यव्यापकता तयोः ॥"

of the two, the vyāpya is the gamaka—the chief means of inferential knowledge and the vyāpaka is the gamya—the object inferred.

"व्याप्यांशो व्यापकांशस्य तथैव प्रतिपादकः"

Bhūyodarśana—a means of *vyāptijñāna*: The knowledge of *vyāpti* or the invariable concomitance which is the chief property of the *vyāpya* “व्याप्तिविशिष्ट” is the result of *bhūyodarśana*—the experience of the probans and the probandum in many instances in different times and places. It is possible to experience the *vyāpti* of the two properties of a general character — “सामान्यधर्म” —or between two concrete objects. The experience of the *vyāpti* between the धूमाकृति” and “अग्न्याकृति” is that between two general properties while the *vyāpti* between the rise of Kṛttikā in the horizon and that of Rohiṇī in succession to it is that between two concrete instances ;

“भूयो दर्शनगम्या च व्याप्तिः सामान्यधर्मयोः ।

ज्ञायते भेदहानेन काचिच्चापि विशेषयोः ।

कृत्तिकोदयमालक्ष्य रोहिण्यासत्तिकलृप्तिवत् ॥” ¹

This *vyāpti* has to be ascertained carefully. Only certain hetus (probans) possess it while others do not. For example, some mistake that all instances of *himsā* are instances of *adharma* ; in other words, *himsātva* has *vyāpti* with *adharmitva*. The Vedic passage “न हि स्यात् सर्वा भूतानि” prohibits certain *himsās* which are practised for selfish ends and those selfish *himsās* are no doubt *adharmitas*. But the *himsā* enjoined like the “अग्नीषोमयहिंसा” as accessories to *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice cannot be called *anarthas*. So what is prohibited by Śāstra is *anartha* ; that is *niṣiddhatva* has *vyāpti* with *anarthatva*. In this connection the *Vārttikakāra* explains many fallacies associated with hetus (probans) and other parts of the syllogism.

The purport of the word असन्निकृष्टे : The purport of the word “असन्निकृष्टे” in the definition is explained by *Vārttika* thus :

¹ Vide, *Śloka-vārttika*, verses 12 and 13.

“असन्निकृष्टवाचा च द्वयमत्र जिहासितम् ।
 ताद्रूप्येण गृहीतत्वं तद्विपर्ययतोऽपि च” ॥
 “प्रमितस्य प्रमाणे हि नापेक्षा ज्ञायते पुनः ।
 ताद्रूप्येण परिच्छिन्ने प्रमाणं निष्फलं परम् ॥
 वैपरीत्यपरिच्छिन्ने नावकाशः परस्य तु ।” ²

What is already cognised cannot be the object of inferential knowledge since it is presumed that all pramāṇas work for the advancement of knowledge. Again the inferential knowledge cannot present an object when its absence has already been established. Hence the term “असन्निकृष्ट” is taken in the sense of ‘non-determined’—in the form in which the object is to be inferred. An inference, for example, of fire by smoke, if it had been previously determined as existing in the pakṣa will be a restatement “अनुवादः” of what had been already known, and it will be invalid if fire had already been determined as non-existing in the pakṣa.

The division of Anumāna with illustrations :

The *Bhāṣya* text :—“तत्तु द्विविधम्-प्रत्यक्षतो दृष्टसम्बन्धं सामान्यतो दृष्टसम्बन्धं च । तत्र प्रत्यक्षतो दृष्टसम्बन्धं यथा—धूमाकृतिदर्शनादग्न्याकृतिविज्ञानम् । सामान्यतो दृष्टसम्बन्धं यथा—देवदत्तस्य गतिपूर्विकां देशान्तरप्राप्तिमुपलभ्यादित्येऽपि गतिस्मरणम्” ³ gives two kinds of inference with illustrations. The former “प्रत्यक्षतो दृष्टसम्बन्ध” is explained by Vārttikakāra as the inference of one particular from another particular—where the invariable concomitance of the two particulars is known—taking the ‘word pratyakṣa’ in the sense of viśeṣa (particular), in contrast with sāmānya (generality) in the latter.

“प्रत्यक्षदृष्टसम्बन्धं ययोरिव विशेषयोः ।
 गोमयेन्धनतज्जन्यविशेषादिमतिः कृता ॥
 तद्देशस्थेन तेनैव गत्वा कालान्तरेऽपि तम् ॥
 यदाग्निर्बुध्यते तस्य पूर्वबोधात् पुनः पुनः ।
 सन्दिह्यमानसद्भाववस्तुबोधात् प्रमाणता ॥” ³

² *Ibid.*, verses 55 and 57.

³ *Ibid.*, verses 141 and 142.

This kind of inference of a particular is acceptable to Vindhyavāsin, who is identified by some with Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the author of the *Sāṅkhyakārikās* ;

“विशेष्यदृष्टमेतच्च लिखितं विन्ध्यवासिना ।”⁴

The term ākr̥ti in the *Bhāṣya* is to be taken in the sense of special generalities like “गोमयेन्धनधूमत्व” and “गोमयेन्धनाग्नित्व”, so that there may not be overlapping as between the two. So observes the Vārttikakāra :

“आकृत्योरिव चैषेष्टा व्यवच्छेदेन केनचित् ।

हेतुसाध्यव्यवस्थेति विशेषो नोपदर्शितः ॥”⁵

The second variety is illustrated thus in the *Bhāṣya* : “देवदत्तस्य गतिपूर्विकां देशान्तरप्राप्तिमुपलभ्यादित्यगतिस्मरणम् ॥” when we see that Devadatta moves from one place and reaches another we suppose that all the gatis (movements) lead to some destination ; “यत्र यत्र गत्याकृतिः तत्र तत्र प्राप्त्याकृतिः यथा देवदत्ते ।” On the basis of this “सामान्यव्याप्ति” we infer that the sun moves from one place to another since his presence is seen in different places.

The meaning of the word ‘Arthe.’ The word ‘arthe’ in the definition of the anumāna will have been fully explained if it is taken in the sense of an object that has objective reality. The very fact that the inferential knowledge presents an object of reality proves that according to the Mīmāṃsakas, sāmānya (generality) is a vastu—object which is perceptible—त्यक्षम्. But the Bauddhas do not accept sāmānya as an object of reality. Thus observes the Vārttikakāra :

“प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वं च सामान्यस्य प्रसाधितम् ।

वस्तुत्वं चात्र हेतुर्वा द्वयस्याप्यभिधीयते ॥

धूमादन्यनुमानस्य वस्त्वालम्बनता भवेत् ।

अभावस्य प्रमाणत्वात् स्वार्थे श्रोत्रादिबुद्धिबत् ॥

⁴ *Ibid.*, verse 143.

⁵ *Ibid.*, verse 144.

सामान्यस्य च वस्तुत्वं प्रत्यक्षग्राह्यतापि च ।

अभावान्यप्रमेयत्वादसाधारणवस्तुवत् ॥”⁶

All pramāṇas except non-apprehension—“अनुपलब्धि” generate cognitions that present objects of reality ; so the anumāna-pramāṇa which is distinct from anupalabdhi generates the cognition of the probandum which may be a generality (सामान्यम्) or some other category.

The Vārttikakāra concludes the anumāna section with the important observation that all objects, either generalities or other, are to be accepted as they are experienced. A generality like gotva can be considered asādhāraṇa—more particular—than the generality sattva. But nobody could conceal the existence of sattva when he talks of the particular feature of the other generality gotva. The conceptions of sattva and gotva as “महासामान्य” and “असाधारणसामान्य” are relative and it is possible to speak of these generalities in such terms as they are universally experienced :

“तस्माद् यद्गृह्यते वस्तु येन रूपेण सर्वदा ।

तत्तथैवाभ्युपेतव्यं सामान्यमथवेतरत् ॥

सत्तादिसामान्यमपेक्ष्य सर्वं गोत्वाद्यसाधारणतामुपैति ।

तस्मादसाधारणमक्षगम्यं वदन्न सामान्यमपह्नुवीत ॥

सामान्यरूपेण न गृह्यते चेत् किं वास्त्वसाधारणबुद्धिरत्र ।

यद्वस्तु लोकः प्रतिपद्यतेऽस्मिन् द्विधापि तच्छक्यत एव वक्तुम् ॥”⁷

Śabda and the propriety of its placement after Pratyakṣa and Anumāna

After anumāna, śābdapramāṇa is defined by the Vārttikakāra. The importance of śabda as a pramāṇa is greater than upamāna, arthāpatti or anupalabdhi. The Sāṅkhyas who do not accept upamāna recognise śabda as a separate pramāṇa under which Śāstra the self-revelatory śabdās, viz.,

⁶ *Ibid.*, verses 146—148.

⁷ *Ibid.*, verses 186—188.

the Vedas, are taken as infallible authority on supernormal dharma and mokṣa. Pratyakṣa is first defined since pratyakṣa, the first and foremost of all 'ज्येष्ठप्रमाणम्' is accepted by all schools of thought including the materialist Lokāyatikas who do not recognise any other pramāṇa. Anumāna is then taken up in view of the fact that the Vaiśeṣikas and the Bauddhas accept two pramāṇas only, viz., pratyakṣa and anumāna, and that anumāna is dealt with immediately after pratyakṣa in most of the works dealing with pramāṇas; hence the propriety of defining Śāstra (śabda-pramāṇa) as the third important means of knowledge. Since the Naiyāyikas and many others accept upamāna as an important source of knowledge it is defined after śabda. Pārāśarya (who may be identified with Vyāsa?), whom, as Sucarita Miśra observes, Kṛtakoti follows, speaks of arthāpatti as the fifth pramāṇa. And abhāva is given at the end since it works only in the absence of all other bhāva-pramāṇas.

The definition of śabda applicable to one variety only--
Śāstra: The definition of śabda as given by the *Bhāṣya* runs thus: "शास्त्रं शब्दविज्ञानादसन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे विज्ञानम्" Śāstra produces a cognition presenting an object having no contact with the sensory organs on the basis of the cognition of śabda. This definition evidently refers to Śāstra the Vedic passages that enjoin or prohibit certain things, producing good or evil for the performer. It is asked: "Why has the Vṛttikāra or Bhāṣyakāra defined the particular śabdapramāṇa viz., 'codanā,' without defining the general śabda, both laukika and vaidika, especially when he has given the general definitions of all other pramāṇas?" The answer is simple. According to Upavarṣa, the nature and function of all pramāṇas are well-known and as such, need not be investigated. They are however given here, as understood by all śāstrakāras, for our correct guidance. In Pūrvamīmāṃsāśāstra investigating the nature of dharma, the particular śabda, viz., codanā, with all its supplementary portions, is consi-

dered the only pramāṇa on dharma and so it is defined, and it is easy to understand the general definition of śabdapramāṇa from that of the particular śabda, viz., Śāstra.

The Utility of other Pramāṇas in relation to Śāstra : Even pratyakṣa, anumāna and other pramāṇas are defined here with the purpose that these pramāṇas help in some way or other the Vedic student in understanding the nature and function of the Śāstra, viz., the vedic texts. The pratyakṣa-pramāṇa helps him to discern the nature of varṇa, pada, mātṛā and other details of the vedic texts that he studies under an Ācārya. The utility of anumānapramāṇa is explained by the fact that the vedic student infers in instances like “देवस्य त्वेति निर्वपति” the remaining portions of the mantra beginning with “देवस्य त्वा”. So also arthāpatti would help him in tracing the passages in instances where complete vākyas are not found in the vedic texts. Upamāna is helpful to trace the relation between prakṛti and vikṛti sacrifices. Even abhāvapramāṇa guides him in the interpretation of avyaktacodanās which enjoin sacrifices without dravya and devatā. As the word Śāstra means only the vedic injunctions, so the words ‘शब्दविज्ञानम्’ and ‘अर्थविज्ञानम्’ in the body of the definition mean only the knowledge for ‘विवायकशब्द’ and ‘विवेयार्थ’ respectively. The word Śāstra not only means the vedic texts but (by yogarūḍhi) all writings that instruct mankind in the means of attaining the human values, dharma and mokṣa. The important vedāṅga, the Vyākaraṇaśāstra, for example, explains the correct formation of words with their correct usage and prescribes it for the attainment of abhyudaya. The Mīmāṃsā-śāstra interprets the Vedic texts by enunciating many rules for the correct understanding of the Vedic sacrifices which, if performed properly, produce abhyudaya for the performer. So these systems can also be called Sāstra. The Vārttika text runs :

“अपरीक्षामिषेणापि लक्षणानि वदन्नयम् ।
 न स्वतन्त्रोपयोगित्वनिरपेक्षाणि जल्पन्ति ॥
 तत्र यल्लोकावाक्यस्थं कथयेच्छब्दलक्षणम् ।
 वेदं व्याख्यातुकामस्य तन्नातीवोपयुज्यते ॥
 प्रत्यक्षाद्युपयोगं तु वर्णमात्रादितः पुरः ।
 शास्त्रार्थज्ञानतेलायां मत्वा तल्लक्षणं कृतम् ॥
 यत्तु गामानयेत्यादिवाक्यस्थं शब्दलक्षणम् ।
 तस्य नेहोपयोगोऽस्ति तस्माच्छास्त्रगतं कृतम् ॥
 विशेषश्च न सामान्यमन्तरेणास्ति कश्चन ।
 तस्मात्तमप्युदाहृत्य सामान्यं लक्षयेत् सुखम् ॥
 सामान्यरूपमप्येनदधिकारादि शिष्यते ।
 चोदना चोपदेशश्च शास्त्रमेवेत्युदाहृतम् ॥
 यथा च चोदनाशब्दो वैदिकग्रामेव वर्तते ।
 शब्दज्ञानार्थविज्ञानशब्दो शास्त्रे तथा स्थितो ॥
 प्रत्यक्षाद्यपरीक्षत्वे तदन्तर्भावहेतुकम् ।
 शास्त्रस्याप्यपरीक्षत्वमनयैव धियोदितम् ॥”⁸

Upamāna

After the śabdapramāṇa, Upamāna is defined thus :
 “उपमानमपि सादृश्यमसन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे वृद्धिमुत्पादयति—अथा गवयदर्शनं गोस्मरणस्य”
 Upamāna is similarity (experienced in the object) generating a cognition (of the same) in another which has no contact with the senses. This definition has been fully explained in the *Kāśikā* : “एकत्र दृश्यमानं सादृश्यं प्रतिशोग्यस्तरे दृश्यमान-प्रतियोगि-ज्ञादृश्यविशिष्टतया असन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे या वृद्धिमुत्पादयति एतत्सादृश्यविशिष्टो-ऽनविति सोपमानमिति यादौ रध्याहारः ॥”

The illustrative passage “गवयदर्शनं गोस्मरणस्य” is to be interpreted as follows : the compound “गवयदर्शनम्” is a bahuvrīhi—“गवयो दर्शनं अस्य (सादृश्यस्य)”. The word “दर्शनम्” is to be interpreted as ‘दृश्यते अस्मिन्निति’—that in which (sādṛśya) is experienced in gāvaya—‘गवये दृश्यमानं सादृश्यम्’. The compound ‘गोस्मरणस्य’ means the pramātā who recollects the cow ‘गां स्मरतः’. The word ‘स्मरणम्’ is to be

⁸ *Ibid*, I, 1, 5, *Śabda*, verses 7—14.

taken in the sense of the agent—the pramātā who recollects. So the total sense will be —‘गवये दृश्यमान सादृश्य एतत्सदृश। गरिति बुद्धिमुत्पादयति’ the similarity experienced in *gavaya* produces a cognition ‘the cow is similar to this (*gavaya*).’

Naiyāika definition criticised: While explaining this definition of *upamāna*, the *Vārttikakāra* points out that the definition given above is different from the one given by the *Naiyāyikas* ‘प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनमुपमानम्’. The *Naiyāyika* definition would not prove that *upamāna* is a *pramāṇa* as distinguished from *āgama* or *śabda*. So begins the *Vārttika* text in the *upamāna* section :

“कीदृग्गवय इत्येवं पृष्टो नागरिकैरेदि ।
ब्रह्मत्यारण्यको वाक्यं यथा गीर्गवयस्तथा ॥
एतस्मिन्नुपमानत्वं प्रसिद्धं शावरे पुनः ।
तस्यागमब्रह्मिवादन्यथैवोपवर्णितम् ॥”⁹

In this connection the scope of *upamāna* is discussed. It is said that *upamāna* generates a cognition of similarity in the object which has no contact with the senses. The similarity that is cognised may be the object of a perception and the object that possesses the similarity (like the cow in the example cited above), may be the object of a recollection ; but the cognition “एतत्सदृश गीः” with the cow as *viśeṣya* and similarity as *prakāra* is nothing but *upamiti*. Thus the *Vārttikakāra* concludes :

“तस्माद्यत्स्मर्यते तत्स्यात् सादृश्येन विशेषितम् ।
प्रमेयमुपमानस्य सादृश्यं वा तदन्वितम् ॥
प्रत्यक्षेणावबुद्धेऽपि सादृश्ये गवि च स्मृते ।
विशिष्टस्यान्यतोऽसिद्धेरुपमानप्रमाणता ॥”¹⁰

Upamāna as a separate pramāṇa: The importance of *upamāna* as a separate *pramāṇa* in the interpretation of the Vedic texts is emphasised by the *Vārttikakāra* at the end of

⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 1, 5, *Upamāna*, verses 1 and 2.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, verses 37 and 38.

the upamāna section. The atideśa by which the accessories of a prakṛti sacrifice are transferred to a vikṛti on the basis of similarity is nothing but upamānapramāṇa. Some think that it is anumāna. But there is no vyāpti between the Sauryādi-vākyas and the Āgneyavidhyanta. Similarly, the acceptance of a pratinidhi, substitute, of an accessory is based on a similarity—upamānapramāṇa. If a substitute (pratinidhi) is closely similar to the original, then it is to be preferred to anything less similar. Observes the Vārttikakāra :

“भिन्नानुमानादुपमेयमुक्ता सीर्यादिवाक्यैरसहापि (?) दृष्टम् ।

सादृश्यतोऽन्यादियुतं कथं नु प्रत्याययेदित्युपयुज्यते नः ॥

प्रतिनिधिरपि चैवं ब्रीहिसादृश्ययोगाद्

भवति तदपचारे यत्र नीवारजाती ।

तदपि फलमभीष्टं लक्षणस्योपमायाः

प्रतिकृतिरपि गौर्नैर्वाध्यते यत्र चान्यैः ॥

यदि सुसदृशमन्यल्लभ्यते तत्र मिथ्या

भवति विसदृशत्वान्मन्दसादृश्ययुक्तम् ।

मतिरपि च तथैव द्रुगिवोत्पद्यतेऽस्मि-

न्नितरविषयबोधऽमत्यपीत्थं च बाधः ॥”

Arthāpatti

Arthāpatti presents an object presumed to exist without which another object seen or heard of, cannot be spoken of as existent — ‘अर्थपत्तिरपि दृष्टः श्रुतो वार्थोऽन्यथा नोपपद्यत इत्यर्थकल्पना” (*Śābarabhāṣya*). This is illustrated in the *Bhāṣya* : “यथा जीवनो देवदत्तस्य गृहाभावदर्शनेन बहिर्भावस्यादृष्टस्य कल्पना”—the presumption that Devadatta exists outside (the house) is based on the experience of his non-existence in the house and on the fact that he is alive. Here there is a conflict (‘विरोध’ or “अनुपपत्ति”) between two pramāṇas, viz., abhāva which makes us know that Devadatta is not in his house (‘गृहाभावदर्शनेन’) and the anumāna that makes us infer that he lives (‘जीवतः’), but is not found in his house and on the basis of this conflict it is presumed that Devadatta exists in some place outside the house (‘बहिर्भावकल्पना’). This is explained by the Vārttikakāra :—

“प्रमाणषट्कविज्ञातो यत्रार्थो नान्यथा भवेत् ।
अदृष्टं कल्पयेदन्यं सार्थापत्तिरुदाहृता ॥”¹¹

The non-existence of the person concerned in the house is known by anupalabdhi or abhāva pramāṇa, while his existence in some place is inferred since he is known to live. The conflict between the two pramāṇas—abhāva and anumāna—is to be explained as that between a viśeṣa-śāstra and a sāmānya-śāstra and not as between two particulars like “इदं रजतम्” and “नेदं रजतम्” in which case one is sublated by the other. Just as the scope of the sāmānya-śāstra—न हि स्यात् सर्वा भूतानि is restricted in the light of the particular injunction of the kratuhimsā, the scope of anumāna is restricted in the light of the abhāvapramāṇa, so that the person who is not in his house should still be living in a particular place outside since he lives.

Arthāpatti based on other Pramāṇas. That this arthāpatti-pramāṇa is based on pratyakṣa is illustrated in the *Vārttika*: “तत्र प्रत्यक्षतो ज्ञानादाहादहनशक्तता, वहेः”¹²—the presumption of the existence in fire of a śakti to burn “दहनशक्तता” without which the perception of burning cannot be satisfactorily explained. That it is based on anumāna is illustrated in the *Vārttika*. “अनुमितात् सूर्ये यानात्तच्छक्तियोग्यता”—from the fact that the sun is in different places in different times, it is inferred that he moves from place to place and it is presumed that the movement is not possible without possessing the śakti for movement. Those that are based on upamāna, arthāpatti and anupalabdhi are illustrated in the *Vārttika* as follows :

“गवयोपमिताया गौस्तज्ज्ञानग्राह्यता मता ।
अभिधानप्रसिद्धयर्थमथपित्यावबोधितात् ॥
शब्दे बोधकसामर्थ्यात्तन्मित्यत्रकल्पनम् ।
अभिधा नान्यथा सिद्धयेदिति वाचकशक्तताम् ॥

¹¹ *Ibid.*, I, 1, 5, Arthāpatti. verse I.

¹² *Ibid.*, I, 1, 5, Arthāpatti, verse 3.

अर्थापत्त्याद्यगम्यैवं तदनन्यगतेः पुनः ।
 अर्थापत्त्यन्तरेणैव शब्दनित्यत्वनिरुचयः ॥
 'दर्शनस्य परार्थत्वा' दित्यस्मिन्नभिधास्यते ।
 प्रमाणाभावनिर्णीतचैत्राभावविशेषितात् ॥
 गेहाच्चैत्रबहिर्भावसिद्धिर्यात्विह दक्षिता ।
 तामभावोत्थितामन्यामर्थापत्तिमुदाहरेत् ॥" 13

Two main varieties of Arthāpatti. Arthāpatti is of two kinds : "दृष्टार्थापत्ति" and "श्रुतार्थापत्ति". The varieties under "दृष्टार्थापत्ति" have been already mentioned. The "श्रुतार्थापत्ति" is illustrated in the *Vārttika* thus :

"पीनो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते वेत्येवमादिवचः श्रुता ।
 रात्रिभोजनविज्ञानं श्रुतार्थापत्तिरुच्यते ॥" 14

When we hear the statement that Devadatta does not eat in day time but is at the same time fat, we presume that he should be eating in the night time, since his fatness cannot be accounted for otherwise.

The utility of "श्रुतार्थापत्ति" for the interpretation of the Vedic texts is further elucidated in the *Vārttika* thus:

"स्मृत्या श्रुतिर्या परिकल्पितेऽस्मिन्
 लिङ्गादिभिर्या विनियोजिका च ।
 फलादिभिर्यत्पारंपूरणं च
 समन्वदृक् तत्र न का चिदस्ति ॥" 15

The authoritativeness of the vidhi passages in the Smṛti of Manu and other great Ācārya enjoining aṣṭakā and other śrāddhas is explained by śrutārthāpatti that they are based on smṛtivākyas and not on the ordinary statements of men which may or may not be valid. The liṅga — the capacity of a mantra to convey a particular sense—becomes a pramāṇa on aṅgatva on the basis of śrutārthāpatti. The mantra "बर्हिर्देवसदनं दामि" which explains the cutting of barhis

13 *Ibid.*, verses 4—9

14 *Ibid.* Verse, 51.

15 *Ibid.*, Verse 87.

in the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice will be of no use unless we take it as an accessory of barhirlavana in the sacrifice ; and this cannot be made out by līṅgapramāṇa unless we take for granted a śruti : “अनेन मन्त्रेण लवनं कर्तव्यम्” i.e. this mantra should be utilised as an accessory of barhirlavana in this sacrifice. The presumption of a śruti without which the līṅgapramāṇa cannot explain the aṅgāṅgibhāva is the result of śrutārthāpatti. The supplying of the word expressing a phala (fruit) in those codanās without phalaśravaṇa is again made possible by śrutārthāpatti. The codanās like “विश्वजिता यजेत” which enjoin sacrifices like Viśvajit cannot convey a complete sense unless they are related to words expressing reward. Hence the presumption that these sacrifices are related to a phala like svarga which is desired by all alike. In all these instances it is not possible to speak of the existence of vyāpti between the gamaka and gamya. So the question does not arise that anumāna can work in all instances of arthāpatti.

Arthāpatti as a separate pramāṇa. The Nāiyāyikas, however, hold the view that arthāpatti can be brought under anumāna. They argue that in the example of arthāpatti : “जीवतो देवदत्तस्य गृहाभावदर्शनेन बहिर्भाविकल्पना” it can be suggested that arthāpatti is nothing but a syllogistic statement such as “देवदत्तो बहिरस्ति, जीवित्वे सति गृहेऽस्तत्वात्, यो जीवन् यत्र नास्ति स ततोऽन्यत्रास्ति यथा अहम् ॥” This is met by the Mīmāṃsakas, as follows : the probans in the example cited above, viz., “जीवनविशिष्टगृहाभाव” cannot be spoken of as existent in the pakṣa (subject) without knowing Devadatta’s outside existence “देवदत्तबहिर्भावसत्त्वम्”. Hence the fallacy of svarūpāsiddhi—the absence of probans in the subject. This fact has been explained in one of the kārīkās of Kumārīlabhaṭṭa’s forgotten work ‘*Bṛhaṭṭikā*’, cited by Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa in his *Mānameyodaya* :

“तस्माद्यो विद्यमानस्य गृहाभावोऽवगम्यते ।
स हेतुः सबहिर्भावं नागृहीत्वा च गृह्यते ॥” 16

Anupalabdhi

Next to arthāpatti, the abhāvapramāṇa is explained : “अभावोऽपि प्रमाणाभावो नास्तीत्यरूपार्यस्यासन्निकृष्टस्य”. Abhāva is the absence of the five other pramāṇas (already dealt with) and it produces a cognition presenting abhāva without any contact with the senses. Whether abhāva is an object to be cognised is a vexed question. The Prābhākaras do not accept abhāva except the adhikaraṇasvarūpa in instances like : “भूतले घटो नास्ति” and consequently they do not recognise the abhāvapramāṇa. But the Bhāṭṭas accept the four well-known varieties of abhāva and explain that the cognitions presenting abhāva are produced by anupalabddhipramāṇa. The Vārttikakāra opens this section thus :

“प्रमाणपञ्चकं यत् वस्तुरूपे न जायते ।
वस्तुसत्तावबोधार्थं तत्राभावप्रमाणता ॥” 17

The object which cannot be cognised with the help of the five other pramāṇas is cognised by abhāvapramāṇa. The first five are known as bhāvapramāṇas in the sense that they are helpful to cognise positive entities while the sixth is known abhāvapramāṇa in that it produces a cognition presenting abhāva which is also accepted as a vastu. That both abhāvas —the pramāṇa and the prameya—are different from the bhāvapramāṇas is explained in the Vārttika in syllogistic forms :

“अभावंशब्दवाच्यत्वात् प्रत्यक्षादेश्च भिद्यते ।
प्रमाणानामभावो हि प्रमेयानामभाववत् ॥
अभावोऽपि प्रमाणेन स्वानुरूपेण मीयते ।
प्रमेयत्वाद्यथा भावस्तस्माद्भावात्मकात्पृथक् ॥” 18

16 p. 126. T. P. H. edn.

17 *Śloka-vārttika* ; I, 1, 5, Abhāva, verse 1.

18 *Ibid.*, verse 54 and 55.

The utility of abhāvapramāṇa in the interpretation of the vedic texts is also explained by the Vārttikakāra :

“कर्माणि सर्वाणि फलेस्समस्तैः सर्वैर्यथावच्च यदङ्गकाण्डैः ।

न सङ्गतानीह परस्परं हि नाङ्गं तदेतत्प्रभवं ऋतूनाम् ॥”¹⁹

To explain that the fruit of one sacrifice is not produced by another, and that one pradhāna sacrifice is not accessory of another and that two accessories of a pradhāna sacrifice are not accessories to each other require the aid of abhāvapramāṇa.

Sambhava and Aitihiya not separate pramāṇas

Only six pramāṇas are recognised by the Vārttikakāra and the Bhāṣyakāra. The two other pramāṇas—sambhava and aitihiya—are placed under anumāna and āgama respectively, though they are recognised by some Ācāryas as separate pramāṇas. The Vārttikakāra observes:

“इह भवति शतादौ सम्भवात्मा सहस्रा-

मतिरवियुतभावाद्यानुमानादभिन्ना ।

जगति बहु न तथ्यं नित्यमैतिह्ययुक्तं

भवति तु यदि सत्यं नागमादिभद्यते तत् ॥”²⁰

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Verse 56.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, verse 58.

THE LOCUS CLASSICUS OF THE THEORY OF SUGGESTION

By SHRIKRISHNA MISHRA

In order to get the meaning out of a word or a sentence Sanskrit scholars postulate what they call *Vṛtti* or *Vyāpāra* which can be translated as 'power' or 'force' or 'function' without which words are incapable of giving any meaning.¹ Firstly, there is *Abhidhā* or Denotation, the primary function by which a word like 'cow' means the particular object known as 'cow.'² About the meaning of a sentence, some say that it is no more than the meanings of the different words used in the sentence, for a sentence is but a collocation of words. Really these scholars hold that words have no meaning apart from the sentence in which they occur and so are called *Anvitābhidhānavādins*.³ But others⁴ believe that the meaning of a sentence is not expressed by any single word of that sentence, but is something new and different from the meanings of its constituent words, and is the resultant of the relation of the word-meanings through expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition, which are the causes of the meaning of the sentence.⁵ Against their opponents the *Abhibhitānvayavādins* affirm that the relation between the different words in a sentence is ex-

¹ नागृहीतवृत्तिकस्य शाब्दबोधः—*Paramalaghbumāñiṣā* (Benares Edition), Page 7.

² To be more precise, the word 'cow' means 'cowness' which being a quality and unable to exist without a substratum implies the body or form in which 'cowness' subsists, and thus means the cow as we see her. *Vide Vākyapadīya* quoted by *Kāvya-prakāśa* (Ānandāśrama series Ed.), page 32.

³ The followers of the Prabhākara school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

⁴ The followers of Bhaṭṭa Kumārila and the Naiyāyikas.

⁵ आकांक्षा योग्यता सन्निधिरच वाक्यार्थज्ञाने हेतुः—*Tarkasaṅgraha*.

pressed, and in order to know the meaning of the sentence, which depends on this relation, there should be another function which they call *Tātparya* or Import.⁶ In any case, however, these two functions, *Abhidhā* and *Tātparya*, can bring out the meaning of ordinary sentences only and an apparently contradictory sentence like "the hamlet is in the Ganges" cannot be understood with the help of either or both of them. For, in this case, the primary meanings of the two words used in the sentence are incompatible. A 'hamlet' cannot exist in the *stream* of the Ganges, which is the primary meaning of the word 'Ganges'. In order, therefore, to make the sentence intelligible, Sanskrit scholars postulate a function called *Lakṣaṇā* or Indication, which is different from the two functions above discussed. Whenever there is incompatibility between the primary meanings of different words in a sentence to the effect that the meaning of the sentence is rendered unintelligible, this function of indication renders it intelligible by bringing out of one such word a meaning closely related to its primary meaning.⁷ Thus the incompatibility in the present case is removed by bringing out of the word 'Ganges' the meaning, the bank of the 'Ganges,' which is closely related to the stream, the primary meaning of the word.

Now the question arises : Do these three functions suffice for bringing out the meaning of all different types of sentences that we come across in literature. And the answer that the Sanskrit literary critics of the Suggestion School give is an emphatic 'no.' They postulate a function called Suggestion which is of the utmost importance in poetry. We shall not here define poetry but that it deals with human sentiments can very safely be asserted. But they hold that an express statement of a sentiment is dull

⁶ Vide *Kāvyaprakāśa*, *vṛtti* on *Kārikā VI*, and *Locana* (Paṭṭābhīrāma Sāstri's edition), Page 56 वाक्यार्थे तात्पर्यशक्तिः परस्परान्विते

⁷ *Kāvyaprakāśa*, *Kārikā IX*.

and stale and is one of the defects of poetry.⁸ In order to get pleasure from poetry, that ecstatic joy which it undeniably gives, the sentiment must be presented to us from this very function of Suggestion. Thus, for instance, the word *Rati*, meaning the sentiment of love, does not move us at all while the same when suggested, for example, by the description of the different poses of bashful *Śakuntalā* in

वाचं न मिश्रयति यद्यपि मद्वचोभिः

कर्णं ददात्यभिमुखं मयि भाषमाणे ।

कामं न तिष्ठति मदाननसंमुखीयं

भूयिष्ठमन्यविषया न तु दृष्टिरस्याः ॥

transports us to an extraordinary world of enchantment. Any sensitive and cultured mind will bear witness to the fact. But apart from the joy-giving characteristic of this function, it is indispensable even for understanding the meaning of sentences. Take, for instance, the following verse—..

भम धम्मिअ बीसत्थो स सुणओ अज्ज मारिओ देण ।

गोलाणइकच्छुड्डङ्गवासिणा दरिअसीहेण ॥

The speaker here is a woman who daily goes to the bowers on the bank of the Godāvarī to meet her lover, and the verse is addressed to a pious man whose frequent visits to the place for fetching flowers disturb her in her secret amours. She tries to dissuade him from going there. She cannot speak out her intention in open and clear words, nor can she possibly succeed in removing him from her way even if she does so. Therefore, she tells him, "O pious man, that dog has been killed today by that ferocious lion living in the bower on the bank of the Godāvarī river; now you may wander (there) with confidence." The dog of the verse may refer to an actual dog which might have disturbed the fellow in getting the flowers, or it may be an

⁸ स्वशब्देन सा केवलमनूयते न तु तत्कृता ।... न हि केवल-शृङ्गारादिशब्दमात्र मात्रभाजि... काव्ये मनागपि रसवत्त्वप्रतीतिरस्ति । *Dhvanyāloka* (Paṭṭābhīrama Sāstri's edition) p. 81-83, and also *Kāvya-prakāśa* Kārikā IX.

imaginary creature—a mere invention of the courtesan speaker to introduce the lion in order to terrify the naturally timid pious man. In any case, the cultured and sensitive listener, conversant with the context of the verse, will at once pick up that the true meaning of the verse is just the opposite of its apparent meaning and that the woman's recommendation is only a subtle device to remove the obstacle from her rendezvous. He will relish the disguised manner of her speech to get her heart's desire.

Now, not only does meaning presented through Suggestion become charming and relishable, but it cannot be understood without this function. It is a remarkable example of the predominance of the function of Suggestion in the field of literature. In the verse above quoted describing bashful Śakuntalā, it may be contended that the charm lay in the faithful portrayal of her amorous poses and not in the suggestion of love, but in the present instance, laying aside the poetic charm, the meaning itself is not clear without the help of Suggestion. And Ānandavardhana, the famous exponent of the theory of Suggestion, did well to choose such a verse in order to prove his thesis. The scholarly world will be, again, in a perpetual debt to his great interpreter Abhinavagupta who actually opened the eyes⁹ of those who are desirous to know the truth about poetry. He finally refuted the arguments of those who did not believe in Suggestion in his fine and elaborate exposition of this verse which has now become the classical example on the subject. His explanation of this verse has finally solved the Gordian knot of the nature of poetic communication. And the aim of the present article is to present briefly and clearly before the scholarly world Abhinavagupta's interpretation of this verse and his refutation of other interpreters.

⁹ लोचनोन्मीलनं व्यधात् *Locana*. Page 164.

II

The difficulty in the above mentioned classical example lies in the fact that the actual word used by the wench is *bhama* or 'you may wander,' while (her intended meaning as well as) the meaning conveyed by the sentence is just its opposite-- 'you should not wander.' Now, the crux of the problem is that this latter is not the primary or express meaning (*abbibhitārtha*) of the word *bhama*. Again, it cannot mean 'may wander' and 'should not wander' at one and at the same time, as the two meanings are contrary to each other. Nor can it mean both alternately, because the power of a word ceases to function after it has expressed one sort of meaning.¹⁰ So the difficulty remains unsolved.

Three kinds of explanations of this verse have been recorded and refuted by Abhinavagupta. One explains it with the help of a means of knowledge; another does it by means of a function other than that of Suggestion; and yet a third brings out the meaning by dint of the manifestation of Rasa.

III

Of all the means of knowledge the one that can have a choice of application to the present case is Inference. In general we may note that the complex mental state of the woman in her inability to speak her heart's desire as is

¹⁰ So says the author of the *Locana*, quoting the authority of the *Vākyapadiya* in support of his argument. In note 2 above we mentioned how the word 'cow' actually means 'cowness' and not a particular cow. Now if anybody says that the word 'cow' means 'a particular being endowed with 'cowness,' to him the author of the *Vākyapadiya* says : विरोधं नाभिधागच्छेत् क्षीयराक्तिर्विशेषणे i.e., Denotation having exhausted its power of denoting the attribute, cannot express the substantive which must therefore be implied. On the authority of this axiom, Abhinavagupta says that Denotation having once expressed the meaning of *bhama* as 'you may wander' has exhausted its power of expressing any other meaning : विरस्यन्वापारासम्भवात् *Locana*, page 55.

suggested by the verse is not so dull as inferential knowledge is. Nobody, for example, gets pleasure in inferring from the blinding smoke of the kitchen that there is fire in the kitchen. Pleasure derived from literature is an extraordinary experience and should not be thus dispensed with.”¹¹

But apart from the general criticism of the theory of inferential interpretation, we find the Naiyāyika is overthrown on his own grounds. Let us listen to his interpretation of the verse. He thus derives the meaning intended by the speaker: The advice of ‘wandering’ given by the licentious woman to the naturally frightful pious man causes us to infer just the opposite meaning (‘should *not* wander’) by her mention of the ‘ferocious lion haunting the Godāvarī groves.’

Now such a syllogistic reasoning commits the fallacy of the ‘discrepant reason’ (*anaikāntika hetu*) because even a fearful man sometimes goes to such dreadful places if he is so ordered by his master or so desired by his sweetheart. Moreover the pious man will certainly be in doubt whether he should believe in the words of so objectionable a character as the speaker of this verse, and hence the reason given is inconclusive (*asiddha*). Thus we find that the syllogistic or inferential interpretation lacks its main prop, the validity of reasoning.¹²

The second kind of interpretation seeks to derive the meaning of the verse with the help of the function either of Denotation (*abhidhā*) or of Import (*tātparya*).

The *Abhihitānvayavādī*, who derives the meaning by Import construes it thus: It is incompatible to ask a naturally timid ‘pious’ man to go to a place haunted by a ‘fero-

¹¹ यत्स्वलीकृतमत्कारात्मा रसास्वाद...नासौ स्मरणानुमानादिसाम्येन खिलीकार-
पात्रीकर्तव्यः *Locana*, Page 155.

¹² Vide *Locana*, Page 60, and also *Sābityadarpaṇa* (edition of Haridāsa Siddhānta Vāgīśa), Page 280.

cious lion.' This incompatibility terminates the meaning of the verse in the other meaning—'you should not wander'—by the function of the sentence known as Import. The interpreter means to say that Import takes the help of Indication and functions after the latter has shown the incompatibility of the primary meaning of the words 'pious man' and 'ferocious lion.' Now such an interpretation is based on a false notion of the two functions. From the exposition given at the outset it should have been clear that Indication is the third function in the series of functions. It cannot work before Import, but only after it, because the connexion between the primary meanings of the different words—which constitutes Import—must be known first even to comprehend their incompatibility. The notion of contradiction itself presupposes the notion of connexion. Even in such absurd sentences as "Hundred elephants are on my finger's end" the connexion between the subject and the predicate cannot be denied, as absurdity is cognizable only after the knowledge of this connexion. In the present instance the lion has killed the dog which disturbed the man. Now the obstacle, the dog, having been removed, he can easily wander there. 'You may wander there, because the obstacle is removed' is quite an intelligible sentence. It would have been otherwise had the form of the sentence been 'you may wander there where the ferocious lion lives.' And once Import has expressed the apparent meaning of the sentence, it ceases to function.¹³

Thus we find that Import is unable to bring forth the required meaning of the verse. The *Anvitābhīdhanavādī*, who seeks to convey the meaning by Denotation itself is as badly off. He thinks that the meaning of a word or sentence (a collocation of words) is that which it means last. Denotation, for him, is like an arrow which once discharged, passes

¹³ See note 8 above.

through many intermediaries to reach its final target.¹⁴ But if it be so and Denotation express many meanings, how can it be one function? Expressing different meanings is not possible for one function, for one function is postulated to express one sort of meaning. This difficulty cannot be set aside even if Denotations be of one type. And it will simply be a case of misnomer of functions of various types are known by the name, Denotation.

If by the comparison of the discharged arrow the *Anvitābbhidhānavādī* means that this required last meaning is very swiftly expressed by the sentence we may question him: How can the sentence *directly* express the meaning when the convention regarding its denoting this meaning is not known?¹⁵

Moreover, the law of causation must be observed, for, otherwise, the difference between the 'Denotative' and the 'Indicative' meanings cannot be maintained. Incompatibility between the primary meanings of words in a sentence is the cause of Indication. Without such a cause there will be no need or justification of postulating a new function. If Denotation be like a discharged arrow, which prolonging its reach further and further expresses all the different meanings of a sentence, then, in that case, all the causal peculiarities must be dispensed with, which surely cannot be tolerated even by the *Anvitābbhidhānavādī* who has

¹⁴ ..अन्विताभिधानवादी 'यत्परः शब्दः स शब्दार्थः' इति हृदये कृत्वा शरवदभिधान्यापारमेव दीर्घदीर्घमिच्छति। *Locana*, Page 64.

¹⁵ In a very subtle and ingenious way the *Anvitābbhidhānavādī* says that there is no need of establishing any separate convention for denoting this last meaning. He says that the meanings of the words have been already established by convention and when the convention is established in the material cause (the words) there is no need of establishing another or the same again to get the meaning of the effect (the sentence). But this makes him inconsistent, for, according to his theory, the meaning of the sentence precedes that of the word, and so cannot have word-meaning as its cause, as cause precedes the effect,— *Vide Locana* Pages 65-66.

burnt his boats on this score by postulating a second function called Indication.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka, the reputed author who wrote his *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* to demolish the theory of Suggestion, thinks that the required meaning of the verse cannot be had only of the force of the meaning of words or the sentence. The cognition of the fearful nature of the pious man and the ferocious nature of the lion account for it a great deal. In the present case, therefore, he says the meaning 'should not wander' is cognised not by any function of the word but by the manifestation of the 'Frightful Rasa.' He means to say that the listener or the reader of the verse will be impersonating the pious man in order to enjoy the Rasa of the verse and so electrified he will shudder at the mention of the 'ferocious lion' and thus the negative meaning of the verse will be at once apparent to him.¹⁶

Apart from the fact that the electrification of the sympathetic reader depends on the Rasa being first *suggested* to him—for Rasa can never be expressly conveyed—Bhaṭṭanāyaka's explanation loses ground when we see that the sympathetic reader should not necessarily be as coward as the pious man. Moreover, if there is any Rasa in the verse, it is the *Śṛṅgāra* and not the *Bhayānaka* as is clear from the context.

Thus we find that neither a means of knowledge nor any function other than that of Suggestion is capable to call out the true meaning of the verse and Bhaṭṭanāyaka's explanation puts the cart before the horse, in taking the help of Rasa for understanding the meaning.

IV

The nature of the function of Suggestion which alone can make the meaning of the verse intelligible has been defined very simply and succinctly by the author of the *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, when he says that Suggestion is that function

¹⁶ *Locana*, Page 68.

If the dog disturbed the man greatly, what business had this of the meaning which brings about the cognition of another meaning—that is, other than the express or indicated meaning?¹⁷ The nature of this suggested meaning as well as that of the composition having the suggested meaning have been more clearly stated by Ānandavardhana in these words:— ‘Where the word having subordinated its express meaning or the express meaning having subordinated itself suggest a new meaning which is sweet and relishable, that species of poetry is called *Dhvani* or Suggestion’.¹⁸ The casual peculiarities of this forth function of the word and meaning have been enumerated in the *Kāvyaaprakāśa*.¹⁹ They are the peculiarities of the speaker, the person spoken to, intonation, the sentence, place, time and others. The singularity in the person capable of understanding the suggested meaning is that he is endowed with imaginative intuition and must be dissatisfied with the ordinary express meaning of the verse.²⁰ This casual peculiarity—that of the reader being possessed of imaginative intuition—is the very life of Suggestion.²¹

Thus in the verse in question the meaning ‘should not wander’ is suggested not because there is any incompatibility between the primary meanings,²² but because the imaginative listener is not satisfied with the primary meaning—the unsolicited advice of the *barlot* to the *pious* man.

¹⁷ योऽर्थस्यान्यार्थधीहेतुव्यापारो व्यक्तिरेव सा । *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, *Kārikā* XXII.

¹⁸ *Dhvanyāloka*, *Kārikā*, XIII.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, *Kārikās* XXI and XXII.

²⁰ प्रतिभाजुषाम्, , *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, *Kārikā* XXII ; and वाच्यार्थविमुखात्मनाम् *Dhvanyāloka*, *Kārikā* 12.

²¹ प्रतिपत्प्रतिभासहकारिणं अस्माभिर्योतनस्य प्राणत्वेनोक्तम् *Locana*, page 63.

²² Hence it is not a case of लक्षयामूलकव्यञ्जना like गङ्गावां घोषः. Moreover, in लक्षयामूलकव्यञ्जना, the suggested meaning is closely related to the primary meaning; here the suggested meaning ‘you should not wander’ is just opposite to the primary meaning, ‘you may wander’, of the word *bhama* in the verse.

woman to inform him that his obstacle had been removed. The reader at once gets the scent and the idea suddenly flashes to his mind that the pious man must have disturbed her in her secret amour in his frequenting the Godāvārī groves in search of flowers for adoration, and her only intention is to stop his movements thereabout.

We have taken time to explain how the true hidden meaning of the verse is suggested to the imaginative listener, but in actual experience it is instantaneously known.²³ This immediate cognizance of the suggested meaning misled the *Anvitābhīdhānavādī* to hold that it was nothing more than the express meaning. The swift perception of the quintessential meaning does not deny the existence of an order of sequence which, as a matter of fact, is always present there. The word-meaning is first apprehended, then the meaning of the sentence, then its suggested meaning. The sequence of these different meanings is not perceived in the same manner as that in remembrance of established convention (*saṅketa*) or invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) in recognising the most familiar objects, or as the function of the word-meaning of the sentence is not known separately. The reason for this non-perception of sequence is excessive and constant study of poetry which makes the mind capable of grasping the quintessential meaning the moment a poetic piece is heard.²⁴ The incomprehension of the process in spite of its existence proves only the importance of the function of Suggestion in the realm of poetry.²⁵

²³ *Dhvanyāloka*, *Kārika* XII.

²⁴ किन्तु सातिशयानुशीलनाभ्यासवशात् तत्र सम्भाव्यमानोऽपि क्रमः.....अभ्यस्तविषय-
व्याप्तिसमयस्थितिक्रमवन्न संवेद्यत इति । *Locana*, Pages 66-67

²⁵ प्राधान्यादेव तत्पर्यन्तानुसरण्यरण्यकस्वरिता मध्ये विश्रान्ति न कुर्वत इति क्रमस्य
सतोऽप्यलक्षणं प्राधान्ये हेतुः । *Locana*, Page 101.

By *Locana* and *Dhvanyāloka* in this paper I refer to one and the same book, the *Dhvanyāloka* with *Locana* and *Bālapriyā* commentaries edited by Paṭṭābhīrāma Sāstri and published by Chowkhambha Sanskrit series, Benares.

DATE OF VĀCASPATI MIŚRA AND UDAYANĀCĀRYA

By DINESH CHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA

Vācaspati Miśra wrote his *Nyāyasūtrīnibandha* in the year 898 बस्वकवसुवत्सरे of an unspecified era. The year if referred to the Śaka era is only 8 years before Udayana wrote the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* in 906 Śaka. Such a close contemporaneity of Udayana and Vācaspati is untenable. The year, therefore, is now usually referred to the *Vikramābda*, placing Vācaspati in 841 A.D. We shall invite scholars to reconsider the problem in the light of the latest materials, some of which are briefly noted below :

1. Vācaspati is separated by a considerable length of time from Śaṅkarācārya, as he has refuted in the *Bhāmatī* the views of the latter's opponent Bhāskara. The date of Śaṅkara is uncertain, but we can put in round numbers as 800 A.D. Vācaspati ought, therefore, to be placed early in the 10th cent. A.D. at the earliest.

2. In the *Tātparyatīkā* (p. 339, Viz. Ed., cf. also *Nyāyakanīkā* p. 187) while refuting the Buddhist theory on the negative meaning of words (*apoha*) Vācaspati says :—*स्याद् भदन्तधर्मोत्तरः* and quotes the line—*बुद्ध्या कल्पितया विविक्तमपरैर्यद्रूपमुल्लिख्यते, बुद्धिर्नो न बहिरिति*. The whole passage, as Stcherbatsky has shown¹ is mainly based on a separate tract of Dharmottara named *Apoha-prakaraṇa* preserved in the Tibetan. It should be noted that Vācaspati has quoted the Buddhist scholar with the utmost respect by actually naming him with a honorific epithet *bhadanta*. This can only be explained by assuming that they were separated by a considerable length of time, not less than a century. According to Tibetan works Dharmottara flourished under King Vanapāla in the middle

¹ *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 476 f. n. & Vol. II, p. 403 ff.

of the 9th cent. A.D.² Vanapāla is a myth, but the fact remains that Dharmottara came after the first four or five monarchs of the Pāla dynasty. Dharmottara is mentioned in the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*³ as a contemporary of Jayāpīḍa (*circa* 800 A.D.) thus :

स स्वप्ने पश्चिमाशायां लक्षयन्नुदयं रवेः ।

देशं धर्मोत्तराचार्यं प्रविष्टे साध्वमन्यत ॥

This is not in conflict very much with the Tibetan evidence and Dharmottara can be safely placed in the first half of the 9th cent. A.D. Vācaspati cannot, therefore, be placed before the 10th cent. A.D.

3. In the *Nyāyalīlāvati*⁴ occurs the following passage तदिदं चिरंतनवैशेषिकमतदूषणं भूयणकारस्यातित्रपाकरम् । तदियमनाम्नातता भासर्वज्ञस्य यदियमाचार्यमभ्यवमन्यते । तथा च तदनुयायिनस्तात्पर्याचार्यस्य सिह्नादः संविदेय भगवतीत्यादि, which is also quoted by Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tātparyāṭīkā* (p. 277.) So, according to Vallabhācārya (*cir.* 1100 A.D.) Vācaspati came after Bhāsarvajña, author of the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*. In the latter book, which remains yet to be published, Bhāsarvajña refuted at length the views, among others, of the Buddhist scholar Prajñākaragupta (*Gaṇakārikā*, G. O. S., Intr. p. i). So the earliest date that can be assigned to Bhāsarvajña will fall in the 9th cent. A.D.

4. Udayana in the *Kiraṇāvalī* (p. 114) while explaining the argument establishing 'time' as a separate entity quotes the following passage :—

न चात्माकाशी तथा भवितुमर्हती विशेषगुणवत्त्वात् पृथिव्यादिवदित्याचार्याः ।

The reference is evidently to Vācaspati (cf. *Tātparyāṭīkā*, p. 280) अपिचाकाशात्मानो न परापरव्यतिकरकारणम् असाधारणगुणयोगित्वात् पृथिव्यादिवन् । But curiously enough Vardhamāna in his gloss

² (*Vidyābhūṣaṇa* : *Indian Logic*, pp. 329 & 318. Also *Pag Sam*, Index, p. xxxiv : read Vanapāla for Nayapāla .

³ IV. 498.

⁴ n. 118 Chow Benares Ed

here definitely identifies this Ācārya with Vyomaśivācārya⁵ and not Vācaspati. This can only be explained by the assumption that according to Vardhamāna Vācaspati came after Vyomaśiva. It should be noted in this connection that a careful study of the relevant passages of *Vyomavatī* (pp. 342-43), *Kandalī* (pp. 64 ; 168-9) *Tātparyatīka* (pp. 280-1) and *Līlāvatī* (p. 283) seems to show that all the scholars including Vācaspati attempted here to meet a familiar argument ascribed in the *Līlāvatī* to the *Bhāṣya* (of Bhāsarvajña):—न च परत्वापरत्वसिद्धिरपि बहुतरनपनपरिस्पन्दान्तरितजन्मत्वेनैव तदुपपत्तेः इति भूषणः. Vyomaśiva preceded both Udayana and Śrīdhara. Let us give some references on the point. On p. 46 of the *Kandalī* the views of a scholar (*kaścit*) on the perceptibility of *vāyu* is refuted. The views belong to Vyomaśiva (pp. 272-4). Udayana ((pp. 82-84) mainly agrees with Śrīdhara here but criticises one of his arguments : न च स्पर्शमात्रमेव तत्र प्रतीयते वायुस्त्वनुमीयते इति युक्तम् । Udayana, it should be noted, is far more advanced in arguments here than Śrīdhara. On p. 52 of the *Kandalī* the grammatical explanation of the word वृत्तिलब्ध्वा is a direct answer to Vyomaśiva's objection (p. 300). The views of 'ekas' on p. 134 ; p. 136 are exactly taken from the *Vyomavatī* (pp. 474, 477). The scathing criticism of the solution of an 'un-schooled' intellectual (*Kandalī* p. 147) is also directed against Vyomaśiva (p. 490). Compare also p. 200 of the *Kandalī* अच्येत् with p. 563 of the *Vyomavatī* ; here also Udayana agrees with Śrīdhara. Under the circumstances the lower limit of the date of Vyomaśiva would be 950 A.D. On p. 392 of the *Vyomavatī* a temple apparently built by a contemporary monarch named Śrīharṣa is referred to by way of illustration : श्रैहर्ष देवकुलमिति ज्ञाने ।

⁵ Vardhamāna's gloss is corrected in the *errata* as 'Vyomaśikhācārya,' but the reading 'Vyomaśivācārya' is found in a *Ms.* of the *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* preserved in the *Vāṅgiya Sāhitya Pariṣad*, Calcutta (fol. 61b).

We would identify this monarch with the Candella Harṣa (*cir.* 900 A.D.) rather than Śrīharṣa of Mālava (*cir.* 949-70 *vide Dynastic Hist. of North India*, Vol II pp. 667, 753, 921). Vyomaśiva's priority in age to Udayana and Śrīdhara makes it impossible to identify him with the saint Vyomaśiva abundantly eulogised in vv. 22-42 of the Ranod stone inscription (*Ep. Ind.*, I, pp. 351-61) which is assigned to the end of the 10th or the beginning of the 11th cent. A.D. The identification was first suggested in the *Intr.* to the *Tarkasāgraha* (G. O. S.) p. xix; also *I.H.Q.* X. pp. 165-6. The implication of Vardhamāna's reference to Vyomaśiva in the passage of Udayana cited above would, therefore, place Vācaspati in the latter half of the 10th cent. A.D. In other words, the year 898 correctly refers to the Śaka era which was commonly used in Eastern India.

5. The above view is supported in our opinion by the fact that Śrīdhara in his *Nyāyakandalī* nowhere betrays his acquaintance with the works of Vācaspati. Śrīdhara, for instance, in his famous dissertation on *tamas* (darkness) quotes two *kārikās* of an unknown author :— (p. 10)

तदुक्तं—न च भासामभान्नस्य तमस्त्वं वृद्धसंमतम्
छायायाः काष्ण्यमित्येवं पुराणे भृगुगश्रुते ॥
दूरासवप्रदेशादिमहदपचलाचला ।
देहानुवर्तिनी छाया न वस्तुत्वाद्दिना भवेत् ॥

The same verses are cited also by Vācaspati as from a Vārtikakāra in the *Nyāyakaṇika* (p. 76) with considerable variation of readings, showing that they drew from independent sources unknown to each other. Śrīdhara refutes at some length the views of the Sāṅkhyas on *Satkāryavāda* (pp. 143-44). The ancient *kārikā* असत्त्वान्नास्ति संबन्धः is found cited therein. At first sight it would appear that Śrīdhara was refuting the words of Vācaspati's *Sāṅkhyatattva-Kaumudī* (under *Kārikā* 9), where the same old *kārikā* is found cited. But a close examination of the passages proves

that the exact words cited and refuted by Śrīdhara do not belong to Vācaspati and the *kārikā* under notice is already cited in the earlier work *Yuktidīpikā* (*Cal. Sans. Series*, p. 61). Similarly, the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 67 is explained in the *Kandalī* (p. 284), but the better comment on the word अकारणप्राप्ती by Vācaspati is not referred to. This silence of Śrīdhara, who it should be noticed has quoted Dharmottara by name (p. 76), makes it impossible to assign 841 A.D., i.e. fully 150 years before his own time, as the date of Vācaspati.

Date of Udayanācārya

We are confronted now with the well-known date of Udayana's *Lakṣaṇāvalī* (906 Śaka = 984-5 A.D.) and we shall state at once that this date conflicts with all evidence about Udayana and must be rejected. The verse recording this date is not found in a Bengali *Ms* of 1621 Ś. belonging to the *Cal. Sans. College Descr. Cat.*, (pp. 260-1) and is neither presupposed in the *Nyāyamuktāvalī* commentary. We suspect that the reading तर्कस्वरांक is a misreading for तर्कस्वरांक (976 Śaka = 1054 A.D.) and manuscripts of the work should be carefully consulted to trace the correct reading of the date, which so long provided a bedrock in the chronology of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature.

Śrīdhara wrote in 991-2 A.D. and there cannot be any question that Udayana consulted his work and refuted his views in the *Kiraṇāvalī*.

- (i) Śrīdhara's well-known views about *tamas*, which he carefully recorded thrice in the *Kandalī* (pp. 9, 179, 240) apparently as his own, were discussed in the *Kiraṇāvalī* (B.I. Ed., pp. 111-12) and Vardhamāna definitely states here कन्दलीकारमतमुत्थापयति⁶

⁶ Vardhamāna vouches for the *Kandalīkāra*'s priority to Udayana also in the *Guṇaparakāśa* (S. B. Ed., p. 77 vide *Kiraṇāvalī*, Ben. Ed., p. 204).

- (ii) The line कथं भावधर्माध्यासोऽभाव इति चेत् व किंचिदेतत्: (p. 110) is also exactly taken from the *Kandalī* (p. 9, last line).
- (iii) Similarly the line पार्थिवपरमाणुगतरूपादिसंताने नैकान्तिकमिति चेन्न of the *Kiraṇāvalī* (p. 58) refers to the *Kandalī* pp. 4, 11, 13-14).
- (iv) In the section on *ākāśa* (*Kiraṇāvalī*, Ben. Ed., p. 109) we find अन्ये त्वात्मान्तरग्राह्यत्वादिति अनेकप्रतिपत्तुसाधारणत्वादिति हेत्वर्थं वर्णयन्ति, स तु संदिग्धासिद्धः। This is also a clear reference to the *Kandalī* (p. 60) as stated by the editor, the late Mm. V. P. Dube (*vide Intr. to the Nyāyakanaalī*, pp. 21-2);
- (v) In the section on *Prthivī* in the *Kandalī* (p. 31) we read :—परमाणुस्वभावायाः पृथिव्याः सत्त्वे किं प्रमाणं ? अनुमानम् । अणुपरिमाणतारतम्यं क्वचिद्विश्रान्तं परिमाणतारतम्यत्वात् महत्परिमाणतारतम्यवत् ।

This argument is exactly reproduced in the *Kiraṇāvalī* (Ben. Ed., p. 52 B. I. Ed., p. 224) with the heading अपर आह and refuted. Mathurānātha Tarkavāgiśa in his *Dravyakiraṇāvalīrabasya* (Ms No. 139 of the Cal. Sans. College, fol. 88a) comments here—कन्दलाकारोक्तं परमाणुद्वयणुकसिद्धिप्रयोजकमतुमानमाह अपरस्त्विति । अणुपरिमाणतारतम्यमिति । Mathurānātha must have access to an unknown source in the present case, as he is not borrowing either from Vardhamāna or Padmanābha, both of whom are silent on the point.

Following the opinion of the late Mm. V. P. Dube (*Intr. to the Kandalī* pp. 20-2) many scholars believe that Śrīdhara also controverted Udayana's views in several places of the *Kandalī*. This is on the face of it improbable. In the whole domain of Sanskrit literature there is hardly any case where two authors, coming again from different localities, have quoted from each other's works.⁷ As a

⁷ The only case we have come across is of Śūlapāni, the Bengali Smārta and Vācaspati Miśra the Mithila Smārta; the former cited the latter in the *Rasajatrāvivēka* (J.H.Q. Vol. XVII, pp. 464-65).

matter of fact the two instances of Śrīdhara's citation from Udayana referred to here (*ibid.* p. 21 f. n. 3) are quite wrong. In the first instance Śrīdhara states that according to some scholars (and Udayana is not certainly one of them) the age difference between the young and the old is caused not by the time-element but by the number of revolutions of the sun (*Kandalī* p. 64)—a view ascribed, as we have stated above, in the *Lilāvatī* (p. 283) to the *Bhāṣya* and found already cited in the *Vyomavatī* (p. 343) and the *Tātparyatikā* of Vācaspati (p. 280). In the second instance (*Kandalī* p. 119) it is Udayana who violently criticises (p. 204) Śrīdhara:— नष्टस्यापि समवायिकारणत्वमिति त्वलौकिकंमवैदिकं च. The opinion of Rājaśekhara, commentator of the *Nyāyakandalī*, (Intr., p. 19) is, therefore, substantially corroborated by internal and external evidences that *Vyomavatī* is the first, *Kandalī* the second and *Kiraṇāvalī* the third commentary on *Prasastapāda-bhāṣya*. Śrīdhara belongs to Bengal and the earliest date of Udayana who consulted his work should be a generation later in about 1025 A.D. As we shall presently see this date is also a bit too early for Udayana.

In the *Tātparya-parīśuddhi* (B. I. Ed., p. 713) Udayana refers to the celebrated Buddhist scholar Jñānaśrī by name and cites the following *kārikā* of his—

धर्मस्य कस्यचिदवस्तुनि मानसिद्धा
 बाधाविधिव्यवहृतिः किमिहास्ति नो वा ।
 क्वाप्यस्ति चेत् कथमियन्ति न दूषणानि
 नास्त्येव चेत् स्ववचनप्रतिरोधसिद्धिः ॥

This very *kārikā* is twice cited in Ratnakīrti's *Kṣaṇa-bhaṅgasiddhi* (*Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, pp. 62, 76-7) under the caption यथाहर्गुरुवः Jñānaśrī was the teacher of Ratnakīrti. Udayana concludes his discourse here with a fitting twist of the same *kārikā* thus—

शब्दस्य काचिदपि वस्तुनि मानसिद्धा
 बाधाविधिव्यवहृतिः क्वचिदस्ति नो वा ।
 अस्त्येव चेत्....

Udayana attacks him in the same vein also in the *Ātma-tattvavivēka* with much more direct and pungent remarks. (B. 1 Ed., p 423) Jñānaśrī is named but once in the latter work (p. 292), but if the commentary of Śaṅkara Miśra is closely studied it will appear that he was the greatest opponent Udayana sought to silence by arguments. (*vide* pp. 289, 292, 317, 436, 453, 464-5, 489-90, 841.) Some of the works of Jñānaśrī were still extant in the time of Śaṅkara, who has quoted many passages from him. According to Śaṅkara Miśra Udayana refuted the views of Ratnakīrti in two places रत्नकीर्त्तैः समाधिमतं दूषयितुमुपन्यस्यति बाह्यत्वैवमिति । (p. 435) रत्नकीर्त्तिमतं शङ्कते चित्राकारमिति (p. 462) This latter quotation is evidently from Ratnakīrti's चित्राद्वैतप्रकरण recently discovered in original Sanskrit *Vādanyāya* App. p. XV.

Now, according to reliable Tibetan evidence both Jñānaśrī and his pupil Ratnakīrti were living in the 2nd quarter of the 11th cent. A.D. We read in the Life of Atisa, authentically handed down in Tibet, that when the king of Tibet invited Atisa to come to Tibet Ratnakīrti, among others, was an eminent Pandit under him at Vikramaśilā Monastery. (*Journal of the Buddhist Text Society*, Vol. I, Part i, p. 17). He was helped on that occasion by Ācārya Jñānaśrī or Jñānaśrīmitra (*Ibid.* p. 20-21). Atisa left for Tibet in March, 1041 A. D. (*I. H. Q.*, Vol., VI., p. 159) and the invitation from the king of Tibet came three years before in 1037-8 A. D. Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti had already reached the peak of their celebrity; so that we may conclude that the period of their literary activity ended about 1025 A. D. and Udayana could not have written any of his works before say 1040 A. D.

THE CONCEPT OF DUḤKHA IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.¹

By JAIDEVA SINGH

The charge of pessimism has generally been levelled by Western writers against Indian philosophy. The most important reason of this charge seems to be the misunderstanding of the concept of duḥkha. It is the aim of this paper to show what exactly is meant by duḥkha in Indian philosophy.

The word kham means a hole, an aperture, and hence an aperture of the body, a sense-organ. It is in this sense that we get the word kham in the *Kaṭha* (II, I) “पराञ्चिखानि व्यतृणत् स्वयंभूस्तस्मात्पराञ्च पश्यति नान्तरात्मन्” “The self-existent one pierced the apertures (of the body) outward; hence does one look outward, not inward.” Roth derived duḥkha from the bad hole of a chariot. ‘Duḥ’ means ‘bad,’ and ‘kham,’ a hole. Duḥkha means a bad hole. If the central hole of a chariot was not properly made, the spokes could not be properly fitted, and in travelling, the chariot caused a jolt or a jar. The traveller naturally experienced discomfort under the circumstances. So duḥkha, meaning a bad hole was transferred to mental discomfort. Bhaṭṭa Kṣīrasvāmī, the commentator on *Amarakośa*, traces the derivation of duḥkham in the following way:—‘दुष्टानि खानि अस्मिन् इति दुःखम्’ Duḥkham denotes a state in which the sense-organs are injured, or contaminated or become unsound. Whether we derive it after Roth or Kṣīrasvāmī, the central truth stands out prominently clear. Where there is disturbance

¹ A paper read at the Indian Philosophical Congress, Lucknow, December 1944.

of harmony, we have duḥkha. It seems to me that suffering or sorrow is a very misleading translation of duḥkha. The best translation would be disharmony; dis-ease; com-motion; un-rest.

Let us now see in what sense the word has been used in Indian Philosophy. The Buddha after quoting a few familiar instances of duḥkha says, "In short the five upādāna-skandhas are duḥkha" (*Dīrghanikāya*-22). The five upādāna-skandhas are rūpa, vedanā, sañjñā, saṃskāra, vijñāna. In *Samyutta Nikāya*, he says, "O Bhikkhus, all the saṃskāras are anitya, all the saṃskāras are duḥkha and all the dharmas are anātma" (S. 21, 2). The Buddha says, "All saṃskāras are duḥkha." By saṃskāras he meant all formations, all formed or compounded things, all things that have a beginning and an end, all possible physical and mental constituents of existence. If we translate duḥkha by suffering, then, "All saṃskāras are duḥkha" would mean, "All saṃskāras are suffering" which does not yield very clear or cogent meaning. The Buddha says, "All the saṃskāras, all compounded things, all elements of phenomenal existence are anitya, in a state of perpetual flux" and follows it up by saying that they are duḥkha i.e., in a state of commotion, unrest. Vasubandhu maintains (*Ab. K. T. T.*) that the Buddha imparted to mankind a knowledge of the method of converting all utpatti-dharmas into anutpatti-dharmas i.e., of stopping for ever the commotion created by the operation of the forces active in the process of (phenomenal) life. "All phenomenal existence, according to him, is duḥkha, for in it, there is always an element of commotion or unrest; in Nirvāṇa alone there is peace. It may be said, therefore, that the Buddha means by duḥkha commotion, and therefore, phenomenal existence which is always in commotion. That is why he says "All the five upādāna-skandhas are duḥkha." It is said

in the *Madhyavṛtti* also “Tha hi pañcopādāna-skandha duḥkham ityucyate.”

It is not in Buddhism alone that duḥkha has been used in the sense of phenomenal existence. Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Nyāya-sūtra* I. i., 22 “तदत्यन्तविमोक्षोऽवर्गः” says, “तेन दुःखेन जन्मनाऽत्यन्तविमुक्तिरपवर्गः”. According to him also, duḥkha means janma i.e., phenomenal life. Vācaspati Miśra, commenting on this *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana (?) sounds a note of warning against a possible misunderstanding of duḥkha in the usual sense of pain, and says, मुख्यमेव दुःखमिति भ्रमो मामदत्त आह ‘जन्मनेति’। अनेन जायमाना दुःखशब्देन शरीरादय उच्यन्ते इत्युक्तं भवति।² Vācaspati Miśra very clearly maintains above that by duḥkha is here meant body etc. that are subject to birth and decay. In other words, duḥkha, means phenomenal life. It is clear from this that it is exceedingly misleading to translate duḥkha as misery, suffering, sorrow. It may be somewhat confounding to a person un-acquainted with the Indian way of thinking to find that even objects of sense and so-called pleasure are included in duḥkha. Udyotakara in his *Nyāya-Vārtika* remarks, एकविद्यतिप्रभेदभिन्नं पुनर्दुःखं—शरीरं, पञ्चिन्द्रियाणि, पञ्चविषयाः, पञ्चबुद्धयः सुखं, दुःखं चेति³

Sukha or pleasure, viṣaya or object of sense can hardly be called misery or suffering in English. It is perfectly clear from the quotations given above that by duḥkha is meant phenomenal life and its constituents.

We have seen then that (i) duḥkha means commotion, unrest. There is an element of commotion, unrest in all things that have a beginning and an end. (All the saṃskāras are duḥkha), (ii) it means phenomenal life or existence (the five upādāna-skandhas ; śarīra, ṣaḍindriyas,

² *Nyāya-Vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā*, p. 238 Chowkhāmbha edition.

³ *Nyāya-Vārtika*, p. 2, Chowkhāmbha edition.)

saḍviṣayas, etc.). Since the upādāna skandhas, śarīra, etc., are saṁskṛta, compounded, there is bound to be an element of commotion or unrest in them. Therefore, one meaning of duḥkha in Indian philosophy might be called physico-bio-psychical. In the very constitution of phenomenal, physico-bio-psychical, existence, there is an element of commotion, of unrest.

Another meaning of duḥkha in Indian philosophy is psychological. It means dis-harmony ; dis-ease ; pain. The psychological meaning is only an expansion, application or counter-part of the first meaning. To be in love with, to be attached to, to run after, to pursue things that have inherently an element of commotion in them is to create dis-harmony in one's life, to invite unrest. From the irritability of the amœba to the maddening passion of man, there is an element of unrest. This dis-harmony, dis-ease, un-rest, irritability, pain is the psychological counter-part of the commotion that is inherent in the phenomenal. The *Sāṅkhyā-kārikā*, ११ says clearly :—

तत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखं प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुंसः ।
लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेस्तस्माद् दुःखं स्वभावेन ॥

“The conscious being experiences duḥkha consequent on decay and death because of the non-discrimination of the subtle body as different from the spirit ; hence unrest is of the nature of things.”

This kārikā (1) refers to duḥkha, (11) gives its background and (111) its rationale.

It says that the conscious being experiences duḥkha, and gives its background in तत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखम्. Vācaspati Miśra explains ‘तत्र जरामरणकृतम्’, in the following way:— ‘तत्र’ शरीरादी । यद्यपि विविधा विचित्रानन्दभोगभागिनः प्राणभूदेहाः तथापि सर्वेषां जरामरणकृतं दुःखमविशिष्टम् ।” It is the lot of every human being to experience unrest consequent on decay and death. All phenomenal

things are in a state of perpetual flux. An element of commotion is inherent in them. The body, gross or subtle, belongs to the phenomenal. Decay and death are the common lot of all that is of the earth, earthy. Duḥkha-unrest is inherent in all that is in perpetual fluctuation. It is naturally consequent on decay and death.

So much for the background. The question arises, "Let there be a flux in all things phenomenal. What is the explanation of the psychological experience of pain or unrest?" The kārīkā gives the rationale of this feeling of duḥkha. The psychological experience is only a counter-part of the phenomenal. The answer is given in "लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेः". An element of unrest is of the very nature of things phenomenal. The body belongs to the phenomenal. So long as man identifies himself with his body, he is bound to experience unrest or pain. The kārīkā clenches the whole issue by saying, तस्माद्दुःखं स्वभावेन".

If man is in love with things that are perpetually fluctuating, it is in the very nature of things that he must experience duḥkha. Vācaspati Miśra explains लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेः in the following way :—"पुरुषाद्भेदाग्रहाल्लिङ्गधर्मानात्मन्यध्यवस्यति पुरुषः" Man is fundamentally a spirit. In his essential nature, there is no duḥkha whatsoever, but he experiences duḥkha, because he identifies himself with the body, with things phenomenal. Since the body belongs to the phenomenal, fluctuation or unrest is of the very nature of the body (लिङ्गधर्म). One cannot find rest in unrest. Abiding peace can come to man only when he rises above the turmoil of the elements of his lower nature.

These aspects of duḥkha are very clearly set forth by Patañjali in his *yoga-sūtras*. Says he, परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधान्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः⁴

⁴ II, 15.

Because of the pain of (a) change (b) anxiety or dread and (c) impressions and also by reason of the mutual conflict of the functions of the *guṇas*, all is pain to the discerning.

The conditions of *guṇas* go on fluctuating. Now *sattva* predominates, now *rajas*, now *tamas*. In this ever-shifting state of the *guṇas*, there is bound to be *duḥkha*; there cannot be an abiding peace. This very closely corresponds to the statement of the Buddha that all the *saṃskāras* are *duḥkha*. So *duḥkha* is of the very nature of the phenomenal. Then there is *duḥkha*, because of *pariṇāma*-change, sequential condition. The sequential condition of pleasure is pain. The result of enjoyment is that there is greater craving for the object of enjoyment, and this causes pain. The *Bhōjavṛtti* explains तापदुःखं in the following way:—उपभुज्यमानेषु सुखसाधनेषु तत्प्रतिपन्न्यनं प्रति द्वेषस्य सर्वदैवावस्थितत्वात्सुखानुभवकालेऽपि तापदुःखं दुष्परिहरमिति तापदुःखता । Even while experiencing pleasure one dreads that which may disturb it or place an obstacle in its way. So there is the pain born of dread, of fear, of anxiety. Again there is pain due to the *saṃskāras*, impressions or tendencies. These impressions are dynamic. A craving once satisfied is but the seed from which springs the craving for a similar satisfaction again. "The appetite comes in eating" says the proverb, and it grows by what it feeds on.

In short, there cannot be real joy in sense-enjoyment in listening to the clamour of the flesh, in satisfying the craving of our lower nature. *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* rightly remarks in this connexion.—

या भोगेष्विन्द्रियाणां तृप्तेरपशान्तिस्तत्सुखम् या लोल्यादनुपशान्तिस्तददुःखम् । न चेन्द्रियाणां भोगाभ्यासेन वैतृष्यं कर्तुं शक्यम् । कस्माद् यतो भोगाभ्यासमनुविवर्द्धन्ते रागाः, कीशलानि चेन्द्रियाणामिति । तस्मादनुपायः सुखस्य भोगाभ्यास इति ।"

Turn we now to the *Bhagavadgītā* which contains the quintessence of all that is best in Indian thought.

Śrīkrṣṇa says,—

मामुपेत्य पुनर्जन्म दुःखालयमशाश्वतम् ।
नाप्नुवन्ति महात्मानः संसिद्धिं परमां गताः ॥⁵

He calls पुनर्जन्म the abode of duḥkha. Here also we see that duḥkha is an element of phenomenal life, for phenomenal life is अशाश्वतम् always in a state of flux.

The psychological aspect of duḥkha as unrest, disease, dis-harmony, pain is stressed in the following verse:—

ये हि संस्पर्शजा भोगा दुःखयोगिन्य एव ते ।
आद्यन्तवन्तः कौन्तेय न तेषु रमते बुधः ॥

The pleasures born of sense-contact are verily causes of dis-harmony, for they are आद्यन्तवन्तः; they have a beginning and an end. They are perishing; they do not last. In nothing that is fluctuating and perishing can man find eternal satisfaction.

We have seen then that all along duḥkha in Indian philosophy is a characteristic, an element of the phenomenal. Because the phenomenal, the Sāṅkhāra, the saṁsāra, is ever-moving, never-staying; therefore duḥkha commotion, un-rest is inherent in it. When man pursues that which is ever-moving, when he is attached to, is in love with the phenomenal he is bound to experience duḥkha, disharmony, un-rest. Both of these ideas of duḥkha, are inter-connected. They may be distinguished, but they cannot be separated.

There is a yet higher sense in which the word duḥkha is used in Indian philosophy. It signifies our awareness of incompleteness, our feeling of imperfection, the burden of finitude, the sense of insufficiency which urges us to recover our lost integrity, to recapture that wholeness in which alone is abiding bliss.

⁵ VIII—15.

We read in the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* that Nārada once approached Sanatkumāra, and implored him to accept him as his disciple, "Tell me what you have learned, and I shall teach you something further than that" says Sanatkumāra. Nārada names a number of vidyās that he has learned and says he knows only mantras, not the Ātman, and concludes in the following words : "सोऽहं भगवः सोऽचामि । तं मा भगवाञ्छोकस्य पारं तारयतु इति ।" ⁶ "In spite of all my learning Sir, I am experiencing heartache, pain, a sense of gnawing emptiness. Ferry me over to the other shore across this water of miserable incompleteness." After taking Nārada to an ascending series of yet higher and higher truths, Sanatkumāra ends by saying, यो वै भूमा तत्सुखं नाल्पे सुखमस्ति । भूमैव सुखम् । भूमात्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्य इति ।" ⁷

As Śaṅkara remarks, here, sukham means niratiśayaṁ sukham, Supreme bliss. "Bliss is in the infinite, in the whole alone ; there is no bliss in the finite. The infinite, the whole should be sought to be understood." The following commentary of Śaṅkara on this portion deserves to be carefully noted :

"अतस्तास्मिन्नल्पे सुखं नास्ति । अल्पस्याधिकतृष्णाहेतुत्वात् । तृष्णा च दुःखबीजम् । न हि दुःखबीजं सुखं दृष्टं ज्वरादि लोके । तस्माद्युक्तं नाल्पे सुखमस्ति । अतो भूमैव सुखम् । तृष्णादिदुःखबीजत्वासंभवाद् भूमनः ।"

In his wonderfully penetrating analysis, Śaṅkara shows very clearly that the finite is the cause of craving and of duḥkha. Thus duḥkha is our sense of finitude, of incompleteness, imperfection, insufficiency.

To sum up, duḥkha (i) is un-rest, commotion, and thus a characteristic of all that is phenomenal. (ii) duḥkha is pain, dis-harmony, the psychological counterpart of commotion. (iii) duḥkha is our sense of finitude, incompleteness, insufficiency. These are all inter-con-

⁶ VII - I - iii.

⁷ VII-23- - i.

nected, one arises out of the other. The sense of finitude, insufficiency may be said to pervade all other senses.

If the sense in which *duḥkha* is used in Indian philosophy is fully grasped, it will be seen that the charge of pessimism against Indian thinkers is absurd on the very face of it. The insufficiency of the finite is writ large on all that is phenomenal. To pursue that which is ever-shifting, never-staying is to invite pain and disharmony. Indian philosophy is not afraid of facing the stern reality, the bitter truth of *duḥkha*, and of calling a spade a spade. It is no use shutting ourselves in a cocoon of illusion and trying to liquify hard facts with soft words.

Are we then doomed to a life of *duḥkha*, without hope of help? Indian philosophy could have been characterized as pessimistic if it had maintained this. But this is just what it does not maintain. Every system of Indian philosophy recognizes the hard fact of *duḥkha*, and points a way out of it. It gives the heartening message to man that it is open to him to regulate his life in such a way as to rise above *duḥkha*. The Buddha taught the four truths, viz., *duḥkha*, *duḥkha-samudaya* (the cause of *duḥkha*), *duḥkhanirodha* (the cessation of *duḥkha*), *duḥkha-nirodha-mārga* (the way which leads to this cessation). So also does *vyāsa* say in his *bhāṣya* on the *yogasūtras* of Patañjali. यथा चिकित्साशास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहम्—रोगो, रोगहेतुः, आरोग्यं, भेषज्यमिति । एवं इदमपि शास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहमेव । तद्यथा संसारः, संसारहेतुः, मोक्षः, मोक्षोपाय इति ।⁸

So does *Uddyotakara* say in his *Nyāya-vārtika*: हेय-हानोपायाधिगन्तव्यभेदाच्चत्वार्यर्थपदानि सम्यग्बुद्ध्वा निःश्रेयसमधिगच्छतीति । हेयं दुःखं तस्य निर्वर्तकमविद्यातृष्णे धर्माधर्माविति । हानं तत्त्वज्ञानं तस्योपायः शास्त्रम् । अधिगन्तव्यो मोक्षः ।⁹

And he declares roundly: “एतानि चत्वार्यर्थपदानि सर्वासु अध्यात्मविद्यासु सर्वाचार्यैर्वर्ण्यन्त इति ।”⁹ These four truths have been described

⁸ P. 136, Chowkhamba edition.

⁹ P. 12, Chowkhambha edition.

in all the systems by all the Ācāryas." Is all this pessimism ?

Indian philosophy recognizes the fact of duḥkha ; it does not try to explain it away, but at the same time, it emphatically maintains that duḥkha is not the destined end of man ; it only belongs to his phenomenal nature. His destiny is not duḥkha, but supreme bliss which he can attain to if he rises above the petty, personal life, if he is free from the selfish will for a separate self-aggrandisement, from the ego-centric point of view which impels him to grab at the part and ignore the whole. Nirvāṇa, Mukti can be experienced in this very life of ours.

Hear the triumphant words of the Buddha :

अनेक जाति संसारं संघाविरसं अनिद्विसं ।
 गहकारकं गवेसन्तो दुक्खा जाति पुनप्पुनं ॥
 गहकारकं दिट्ठोऽसि पुन गेहं न काहसि ।
 सब्बा ते कासुकाभग्गा गहकूटं विसंखितं ।
 विसंखारगतं चित्तं तण्हानं खयमञ्जगा ॥¹⁰

"Through many a round of birth and death I ran, seeking but not finding the builder of this house. Painful is repeated birth. O house-builder (i.e., तण्हा craving), thou art seen. No more shalt thou build. Broken are all thy rafters (i.e., passions), thy ridge-pole (i.e., avidyā) is shattered. My mind has attained the unconditioned विसंखारगतं चित्तं; achieved is the cessation of craving." Duḥkha belongs to Sāṅkhāra, but man can rise to the unconditioned (the asaṁskṛt state) and get rid of duḥkha for ever. So also Sāṅkhya and yoga maintain that duḥkha belongs to the life of man only so long as he is caught up in the whirling of the three gunas, but he attains to bliss supernal

¹⁰ *Dhammapada*—153—154.

when he becomes *guṇātīta*, when he transcends the fret and fever of the narrow personal life. This is also the burden of the song of Śrīkṛṣṇa. When man rises to *Brāhmīsthiti*, when he lives, *sub specie eternitatis*, only then is he free from the pain of incompleteness ; only then is he the full man. Fascinating as this theme is, I cannot enter into details, for it is beyond the scope of this paper.

The world-process is not a cruel joke. It is not a will fully laid trap for man to fall into and get crippled. No, resistance is essential to progress ; *duḥkha*, the burden of our finitude, the sense of imperfection serves as a divine discontent which makes us realize our insufficiency and rise to the higher life ; it makes us look before and after, and pines for what is not. So the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* says :

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतौ महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।

प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं इव परार्थं आरम्भः ॥¹¹

This play of *Prakṛti* is meant to awaken in us the sense of our true status, so that out of the incomplete personal life, may emerge finally the essential man, free from the limitations of the lower.

The bio-psychical man whose life is 'cabined, caged, and confined' within the limits of petty, paltry self, a narrow world of hopes, desires, fears and regrets, of lust and hate, ambition, envy, craving, speculation, curiosity, images and impressions is not the full, the essential man. The bio-psychical man is the veil and prophecy of the spiritual man. It is his mission, his destined end to realize that prophecy, so that the spiritual man may emerge in all his glory and enter his divine inheritance. It is the regeneration, resurrection of the spiritual man from the merely bio-psychical that is his

¹¹ 56.

F. 11

appointed goal and it is the regenerated, reborn man that is free from incompleteness, disharmony, pain. It is only then that, in the words of Browning,

The elements' rage, the fiend-voices that rave,
 Shall dwindle, shall blend,
 Shall change, shall become first a peace out of pain.
 Then a light--..

This is the teaching of Indian philosophy, this the clear paen of its music, the *leit-motif* of its song.

In the same vein St. Paul had said, "The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain...waiting for the manifestation of the sons of God."¹² So also St. Augustine, "For thou, O Lord, hast made us for thyself, and our hearts are ever restless till they find their rest in Thee." Nobody has yet called these utterances pessimistic, and yet they are not in any way different from the teaching of Indian philosophy.

¹² Rom. VIII.

GOSVĀMIN ŚIVĀNANDA BHATṬA, HIS WORKS AND DATE IDENTIFICATION OF HIS TWO ROYAL PATRONS

By SADASHIVA L. KĀTRE

Evidently there have been numerous Sanskrit authors bearing the name Śivānanda. In this paper we are concerned only with Gosvāmin Śivānanda Bhaṭṭa, a voluminous author on Tantra, who, as the passages cited below will show, was the son of Jagannivāsa and grandson of Śrīnivāsa. However, some more Śivānandas also bearing the titles 'Bhaṭṭa' and 'Gosvāmin' have been mentioned differently by Aufrecht and others. But as their works¹ are not before me, it is not possible for me to decide whether any of them was or not identical with our Śivānanda.

Aufrecht mentions² only two works by our Śivānanda, viz., (1) the *Lakṣmīnārāyaṇārcūkaumudī* and (2) the *Simhasiddhāntasindhu*. A third major work by him, viz., (3) the *Śrīvidyārcanacandrikā*, which I had not seen mentioned anywhere previously was recently traced out by me in the Manuscripts Library of the *Scindia Oriental Institute*, Ujjain.

Aufrecht had mentioned³ the *Mātangīmantrapaddhati* as an independent Tantra work by a different Śivānanda. However, the same has now come out⁴ to be only a section of our author's major work *Simhasiddhāntasindhu*.

¹ E.g., the *Vaidyaratna*, the *Tiṭhinirṇaya*, etc.

² *Catalogus Catalogorum*, Vol. I, Pp. 539^a, 655^a, 716^b; Vol. II, Pp. 171^a, 234^a.

³ CC, II, Pp. 103^a, 156^a.

⁴ H.D. Velankar: *A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prākṛta MSS. in the Library of the BBRAS*, Vol. II (1928), P. 269^a, No.864.

Further, a *Titbinirṇaya* is mentioned⁵ as a work by a different Śivānanda. I have not seen any MSS. of the same, but possibly it may prove out to be an extracted section of some major work by our author, since the topic is found dealt with from the Tāntrika's point of view at some length in his works (2) and (3).

The only MS. mentioned by Aufrecht of the *Lakṣmī-nārāyaṇārcaśaumudī* is in the Bikaner Library. As I have not seen it, it is not possible for me to furnish any definite details regarding the work except that it contains⁶ five chapters (Prakāśas) and deals, obviously enough, with the Tantric worships of Lakṣmī and Nārāyaṇa, both jointly and separately. Probably it is an independent work and not a part of any other major work by the author, although we find the topic dealt with almost exhaustively in his works (2) and (3). To get a complete and thorough knowledge of the *Lakṣmīnārāyaṇārcaśaumudī* and to see if it, like the author's works (2) and (3), bears any historical importance we have to wait till the discovery of a fresh MS. thereof or the publication of the revised *Bikaner Library Catalogue* that has already been promised.

The *Simhasiddhāntasindhu* is a gigantic treatise on Tantra. Aufrecht records some MSS thereof while a few more⁷ have come to light subsequently. Still, generally the Ulwar MSS described by Peterson in his *Ulwar Library Catalogue* (1892), No. 2425, Extract No. 673, has been the main source on which Aufrecht⁸ and others⁹ have

⁵ CC, II, Pp. 203^b, 230^a.

⁶ P.V. Kane: *History of Dharmasāstra*, Vol. I (1930), P. 616^a.

⁷ E.g., a MS containing only Chapters 1-14 in the Library of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal. *Vide* Chintaharana Chakravarti: *Revised Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS of the RASB*, Vol. VIII, Part, I, No. 6193. *Vide* also Hiralal's C.P. and Berar MSS Catalogue, P. 578, *Madras Triennial Catalogue*, Vol. III B, R. No. 2580, etc.

⁸ CC, II, P. 234^r.

⁹ E.g., H.D. Velankar *BBRAS Descriptive Catalogue*, Vol. II, P. 269.^a

hitherto drawn for their final information regarding this work. However, from a complete MS, recently acquired by me for the MSS Library of the Scindia Oriental Institute it is now possible to revise and amend our previous knowledge concerning this work.

The MS. under question (accession No. 6497) consists of 1027 straw-paper folios of the size $13\frac{1}{2} \times 6\frac{1}{2}$ inches. Each side of the folios leaves a margin of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches on its four sides and bears on the average thirteen lines with about forty bold and elegant letters on each line. The ink used is dark-black and marks of red and yellow pigments, too, are found at several places. The script is Devanāgarī throughout, but in the end after the concluding colophon of the last chapter a sentence 'Śrisundarīcaraṇāravindārpaṇam astu' appears in the Bengali script. The scribe's name and date are not mentioned, but the MS is old in appearance and has been scribed with considerable caution.

After an extensive introduction of 37 verses the author furnishes a detailed metrical index to the contents of the work. In the main body of the work we find an elaborate and exhaustive treatment of the various aspects of the hosts of Tantric topics, such as rules of conduct, restrictions, vows, etc., to be observed by a Tantra-sādhaka, Dikṣās; Mystic yantras, Mantras, etc., including their Bijas, Uddhāras, Siddhikarṇa, Japa, Puraścaraṇa, Anuṣṭhāna, etc., Upāsanaś and Pūjās including Āvāhana, Dhyāna, Sthāpanā or Prāṇapratiṣṭhā, Stuti, Balidāna, Havana, Viśarjana, etc., the various Pujā-dravyas and their use, etc., relating to the various forms of Gaṇeśa, Śiva, Viṣṇu, Bhairava, Nara-siṃha, Dattātreya, Hayaśīras, Kārttavīrya, Dakṣiṇāmūrti, Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa, Umā-Maheśvara, Śrī-Śakti, Sarasvatī, Bhairavī, Tārā, Bālā, Bagalā, Lalitā, Bhuvaneśvarī and other Deities. Scholastic and technical discussions concerning the vexed and knotty points of Tantra are found

almost at each step and the author throughout cites numerous authorities for supporting his statements and making his work as authoritative as possible. Among the works and authors cited by him here I could trace the following :—
 अक्षशास्त्र, अगस्त्य, अगस्त्यसंहिता, अग्निपुराण, अग्निस्मृति, अङ्गिरस्, अत्रि, आगमसिद्धान्त, आग्नेयपुराण, आचारार्क, आचार्यः, आचार्याः, आचार्यचरणाः, आयर्वेणिक नृसिंहतापनीय, आदित्यपुराण, आदिवाराह, आपदुद्धारकस्तोत्र, आम्नायरहस्य, ईशान-शिव, ईशानसंहिता, उत्तरतन्त्र, ऋग्विधान, ऋग्वेद, एकवीराकल्प, कपिलपञ्चरात्र, कपिलवचन, करङ्किणीतन्त्र, कर्पूरस्तवराज, कात्यायन, कात्यायनीतन्त्र, कात्यायनी-संहिता, कादिमत, कामधेनु, कामराजसंप्रदाय, कामिक, कारण, कार्तिकमाहात्म्य, कालत्रय, कालिकापुराण, कालिकोद्भव, कालीतन्त्र, कालोत्तर, कुब्जिकातन्त्र, कुब्जिका-मत, कुमारीकल्प, कुमारीतन्त्र, कुम्भसंभव, कुलचूडामणि, कुलप्रकाशतन्त्र, कुलमूलावतार, कुलार्णव, कुलावलीय, कुल्लापटल, कूर्मपुराण, केरलीय श्रीयन्त्रसार, कोलेशकोटिप्रभेद, क्रियासार, खिल, गणेशपरामर्शिनी, गणेश्वरपरामर्शिनी, गरुडपुराण, गर्ग, गान्धर्वतन्त्र, गीता, गुहकल्प, गुहकल्प, गोपालस्तवराज, गीतमीतन्त्र, गीतमीय, चतुर्विंशतिमत, चन्द्रपीठ, चिन्तामणि, छन्दोगपरिशिष्ट, जयद्रथयामल, ज्ञानमाला, ज्ञानरत्नावली, ज्ञानार्णव, ज्ञानोन्नयन, ज्योतिःशास्त्र, ज्योतिषरत्नमाला, डामर, तत्त्वसार, तत्त्वसार-संहिता, तन्त्र, तन्त्रचूडामणि, तन्त्रराज, तापनीय, तारातन्त्र, ताराप्रदीप, ताराार्णव, तारिणी-तन्त्र, तिथितत्त्व, तूष्णीपद्धति, तूष्णीयाग, तैत्तिरीयशाखा, तोतलमत, तोतलामत (= त्रोटलतन्त्र), त्रिकाण्डमण्डन, त्रिपुरार्णव, त्रिपुरासारसमुच्चय, त्रैलोक्यडामरतन्त्र, त्रैलोक्यविजय, त्रैलोक्यसंमोहनतन्त्र, त्रैलोक्यसार, दक्ष, दक्षिणामूर्ति, दक्षिणामूर्तिकल्प, दक्षिणामूर्तिमहिता, दशपटली, दिव्यसारस्वततन्त्र, देवल, देवीतन्त्र, देवीपुराण, देवीयामल, देव्यागम, देवज्जमनोहर, धर्मयामल, धर्मसार, नन्दिकेश्वर, नन्दिपुराण, नवरत्नेश्वर, नारद, नारदपञ्चरात्र, नारायणीय, नारायणोपनिषद्, निवन्ध, नीरतन्त्र, नीलतन्त्र, नीलसारस्वत, नृसिंहकल्प, नृसिंहतापनीय, नृसिंहपुराण, पञ्चमीद्वारीतन्त्र, पञ्चमीस्तव-राज, पञ्चरात्र, पदार्थादर्श, पद्मपादाचार्य, पद्मपुराण, पद्मवाहिनी, पराशर, पाद्म, पारि-जात, पिङ्गलामत, पुरश्चरणचन्द्रिका, पौष्कर, प्रकाशोदय, प्रतिष्ठापद्धति, प्रतिष्ठासार-संग्रह, प्रतिष्ठासारस्वत, प्रथमतन्त्र, प्रपञ्चसार, प्रयोगपारिजात, प्रयोगपारिजातसंग्रह, प्रयोगसार, ब्रह्मादिसंहिता, फेत्कारिणीतन्त्र, फेत्कारितन्त्र, फेत्कारीय, बह्वृचपरिशिष्ट, बह्वृचप्रातिशाख्य, बृहन्नारदीय, बृहस्पति, बौधायन, ब्रह्मपुराण, ब्रह्मयामल, ब्रह्माण्ड-पुराण, ब्रह्मोत्तरखण्ड, ब्राह्म, भगवद्बचन, भट्टचरणाः, भविष्य, भविष्यत्पुराण, भाव-चूडामणि, भुवनेशीपारिजात, भुवनेश्वरीजातक, भुवनेश्वरीपारिजात, भूतडामर, भैरवयामल, भैरवसंवाद, भैरवीतन्त्र, भैरवीप्रकरण, मत्स्यसूक्त, मत्स्येन्द्रसंहिता, मदन-पारिजात, मनु, मनोरमा, मन्त्रतन्त्रप्रकाश, मन्त्रतन्त्रराज, मन्त्रप्रकाश, मन्त्रमहोदधि, मन्त्रमुक्तावली, मन्त्ररत्नावली, मन्त्रशास्त्र, मन्त्रसद्भाव, मन्त्रसारसंग्रह, मन्त्रार्णव, मय,

मरीचि, महाकपिलपञ्चरात्र, महाभारत, महासंमोहनतन्त्र, महाहारकतन्त्र, माघमाहात्म्य, मातङ्गमनुकोश, मातङ्गीस्तोत्र, मातृकार्णव, माघवभट्ट, मायातन्त्र, मार्कण्डेय, मार्कण्डेयकल्प, मार्कण्डेयपुराण, मुण्डमालातन्त्र, मूर्तिरहस्य मृडानीतन्त्र, मोहशूरोत्तर, यन्त्रसार, यम, याज्ञवल्क्य, याज्ञवल्क्यसंहिता, यामल, योगयाज्ञवल्क्य, योगशास्त्र, योगशिवमत, योगसार-स्तोत्र, योगार्णव, योगिनीतन्त्र, योगिनीहृदय, योगियाज्ञवल्क्य, रत्नसागर, रत्नावली, रसग्रन्थ, रामानुस्मृति, रामार्चनचन्द्रिका, रुद्रयामल, रेवाखण्ड, लक्षणसंग्रह, लक्षसागर, लक्ष्मीकुलार्णव, लघुहारीत, ललितार्चनचन्द्रिका, ललिताविलास, लिङ्गपुराण, लोपा-मुद्रागस्त्यसंप्रदाय, वक्रतुण्डकल्प; वसिष्ठ, वसिष्ठसंहिता, वल्लिपुराण, वामकेश्वरतन्त्र, वामदेवतन्त्र, वामदेवमहातन्त्र, वायवीयसंहिता, वाराहपुराण, वाराहीतन्त्र, वाराहीय, वाराहीसंहिता, वासिष्ठकल्प, वासिष्ठलैङ्ग, वासिष्ठी, वास्तुशास्त्र, विजयमालिनीतन्त्र, विजयामालिनीतन्त्र, विज्ञानमाला, विनायकसंहिता, विशुद्धेश्वरतन्त्र, विश्वकर्मेन्द्र, विश्व-रहस्य, विश्वसार, विष्णु, विष्णुधर्मोत्तर, विष्णुपुराण, त्रिष्णुयामल, वीरतन्त्र, वीरागम, वृद्धमनु, वैद्यकशास्त्र, वैशम्पायन, वैशम्पायनसंहिता, वैष्णवस्तोत्र, वैहायसपञ्चरात्र, वैहायसमन्त्रकोश, व्यास, शंकराचार्य, शङ्ख, शङ्खलिखित, शांकरकल्प, शान्तिक, शाट्यायन, शारदा, शारदातिलक, शारदातिलकटीका (anonymous), शारदातिलक-टीका (माघवभट्टकृता), शिल्पशास्त्र, शिवताण्डवतन्त्र, शिवधर्म, शिवयामल, शिवरहस्य, शिवस्तोत्र, शिवागम, शैवदीक्षा, शैवपुराण, शैवरागम, शौनक, श्राद्धकल्प, श्रीकण्ठसंहिता, श्रीकुलार्णव, श्रीक्रमसंहिता, श्रीज्ञानार्णव, श्रीतन्त्रराज, श्रीमनोरमा, श्रीयन्त्रसार, श्रीयोगिनीतन्त्र, श्रीविद्यादीक्षा, श्रीसंमोहनतन्त्र, षडन्वयमहारत्न, संहिता, सनत्कुमार-कल्प, सनत्कुमारीय, संमोहनतन्त्र, संमोहनपञ्चरात्र, सांख्यायन, सारसंग्रह, सारस्वत-मत, सिद्धयामल, सिद्धसारस्वततन्त्र, सिद्धान्तशेखर, सिद्धेश्वरीतन्त्र, सूर्यसहस्रनामस्तोत्र, सोमशम्भु, सोमसिद्धान्त, सौत्रामणीतन्त्र, स्कन्दपुराण, स्कन्दयामल, स्कान्द, स्मृतिचन्द्रिका, स्मृतिरत्नावली, स्मृतिसमुच्चय, स्मृतिसंग्रह, स्मृत्यर्थसार, स्वच्छन्दसंग्रह, स्वतन्त्र, स्वायं-भव, हंसपारमेश्वर, हयशीर्षपञ्चरात्र, हरिद्रागणेशकवच, हरिवंश, हरिहरात्मकस्तोत्र, हारीत, and हेमाद्रि. Almost each one of these has been quoted tens or even scores of times in the work. On Folios 920-926 we find reproduced in full the *Mahāvīdyāpramodalabharī*, an elaborate and learned Stotra consisting of 35 verses of long metres in praise of Śakti, composed by Śivānanda himself.

R. L. Mitra's Notice No. 1621¹⁰ describes the *Simbasiddhāntasindhu* as "a handbook of Vaiṣṇava religious duties, diurnal, periodical and optical, including

10. *Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts*, Vol. IV (1878), P. 197.

the several feasts and fasts enjoined in the Vaiṣṇava Calendar." This is an imperfect and misleading description, not justified even on the basis of the MSS used which leave out several chapters both in the beginning and in the end. In fact, Vaiṣṇava Tantra engages only a small portion of the work which deals at length with the Tantras concerning all the important sectarian deities and allots a major bulk to Śaiva, Śākta, Kaulika and other Tantras. Probably the title 'Gosvāmin' of the author was responsible for the said description in the Notice.

Hitherto the Ulwar MS of this work, described by Peterson and containing chapters (= Tārāṅgas) 1 - 88, has been taken to be a perfect MS. However, on a minute perusal of our MS and comparison thereof with the details furnished by Peterson, I have to say that the Ulwar MS is not a complete MS as it ends only with a chapter colophon and leaves out the subsequent four chapters 89-92 found in our MS. As at the close of chap. 92 the author furnishes a metrical conclusion to the whole work and therein also accords his date of composition, we may be sure that ours is a perfect MS and that the work does not go beyond chap. 92.

As the author's lengthy introduction in this work has already been cited in full by Peterson and others, I cite here from the same in our MS only such passages as are essential for fixing some relevant data :—

(Verses 1—6 contain salutations to Gaṇeśa, Sūrya, Viṣṇu, Śiva, Pārvatī and Sarasvatī. Other verses left out simply continue the glorification of the heroes mentioned in preceding verses cited).

.....

दृप्यद्वैरिरामुच्चयक्षयकरः कीर्तिद्युतिद्योतिता—

शेषाकाशदिगन्तरः पटुतरः प्राज्ञीषवित्तार्पणे ।

राजद्राजसभासभाजितगुणग्रामाभिरामो भृशं

भक्तः श्रीनृहरेर्विभाति भुवने 'बुन्देल'भूपान्वयः ॥ ७ ॥

यत्पाणी नृहरेः सदेव चरणावानर्चतुः सादरं
 दाने चाङ्घ्रियुगं महीदिविषदां प्रक्षालयाञ्चक्रतुः ।
 युद्धे चिक्षिपतुश्च मार्गगणं हन्तुं परानीकिनीं
 त्रैलोक्यप्रथिताह्वयो 'मधुकरो' राजा स यत्राभवत् ॥ ८ ॥

सन्मानदाननिपुणस्तु तदात्मजन्मा सन्मानसस्थहरिभवितरुदारशक्तिः ।
 कौक्षेयकक्षतविपक्षजनो जगत्यां 'श्रीरामसाहि'रिति नाम नृपो बभूव ॥ ११ ॥
 आसीत्तदीयतनयो विनयोपपन्नः स्वच्छाशयो बहुदयो विबुधन्नजेयः ।
 युद्धे निकाममभयो विजयार्जितश्रीः 'संग्रामसाहि'रिति भूमिपतिः प्रसिद्धः ॥ १४ ॥
 तस्यात्मजो बलरजोभररुद्धभानुदृप्तद्विषद्वलनतीव्रमहः कृशानुः ।
 अत्यद्भुतो गुणगणैः प्रथितो धरण्यां 'श्रीभारतो' बहुलदानरतो बभूव ॥ १६ ॥

तत्सूनुः परिपन्थिमन्थिविलसद्द्वारोऽतिवीरो रणे
 बल्लगुत्तुङ्गगुरङ्गनिष्ठुरखुरक्षुण्णक्षमामण्डलः ।
 दानाम्भः शमितार्थिनैः स्वदहनः ख्याताभिवानः क्षिती
 'देवीसिंह'नरेखरो निरुपमो राजोत्तमो राजते ॥ २२ ॥

'देवीसिंह' ! महीमहेन्द्र ! भवतः प्रौढप्रतापोदय—
 त्रासादौजिभ परस्परं क्षितितले वरं समस्तैर्नरैः ।
 तच्चित्रं न यत्स्वदीयविदुषां गेहेषु वासोऽनिशं
 हित्वान्योन्यविरोधमद्भुततमो देव्योरपि श्रीगिरोः ॥ २५ ॥

आसीत्तस्य गुरु¹¹गुणगणैर्मन्त्राब्धिपारंगमः
 'श्रीगोस्वामिजगन्निवास' इति सन्नाम्ना जगद्विश्रुतः ।
 यस्याज्ञावशवर्तितः क्षितिभुजस्ते तेऽभवन्भूरिशो
 येषां कीर्तिरतीव भाति भुवने दाने कृपाणेऽपि च ॥ ३३ ॥

तत्तातस्तु तथाभवद्भवसमः 'श्रीश्रीनिवासः' कृती
 ज्ञानोदारकुठारदारितजगज्जाड्योऽरुभूमीरुहः ।

नानातन्त्रविबोधमाप्य मनुजा यस्यानुकम्पाजिघेः
 शिष्या देवतसेवनैरभिमतमह्नाय सिद्धिं गताः ॥ ३४ ॥

यस्याङ्घ्रिपद्मकृपया प्रथितः पृथिव्यामेतादृगेव जयति स्म 'जगन्निवासः' ।
 यः सर्वसिद्धिसहितो जगति द्विजानां तोषं व्यघादविरतं विविधोपकारैः ॥ ३५ ॥

¹¹ The Ulwar MS as cited by Peterson appears to read आसीत्तस्य गुरोर्गुरुः etc., making Jagannivāsa grand-preceptor, and not preceptor, of Devīsimha. It is, however, not a happy reading since the instrumental form गुणगणैः remains loose therein. As per reading in our Ms, the instrumental is easily connected with the second गुरुः meaning Br̥haspati.

ज्येष्ठस्तस्य सुतो जनोदित'शिवानन्दा'भिधानः क्षितौ
 श्रीविद्याचरणारविन्दयुगलध्यानैकतानोऽनिशम् ।
 'देवोसिंह'नृपेण धर्मकलितस्वान्तेन संप्राथित—
 स्तत्प्रोत्थं वितनोति धार्मिकजनश्रव्यं निबन्धोत्तमम् ॥३६॥
 गुरुचरणसरोजानुग्रहप्राप्यबोधः
 श्रवणजनितभक्तस्वान्तभूरिप्रमोदः ।
 निखिलमनुरहस्योद्बोधकोज्यं निबन्धो
 जयति जगति नाम्ना 'सिंहसिद्धान्तसिन्धुः' ॥३७॥

अत्र प्रातःकृत्यमादौ etc.

The work concludes in our MS as follows :—

.....इति तन्त्रराजे नित्याकवचम् ॥
 प्रोक्तं गणेशप्रमुखामराणामुपासनाया निखिलं विधानम् ।
 विलोक्य तच्चेतसि साधकानामात्मन्यमन्दो भवतात्प्रमोदः ॥१॥
 'चन्द्रवद्वितुरगैक'संमिते वत्सरे सहसि शुक्लपक्षतौ ।
 शीतरश्मिसुतवासरे शुभे ग्रन्थ एष परिपूर्णतामगात् ॥२॥
 इति 'श्री.गोस्वामिश्रीजगन्निवासात्मजगोस्वामिश्री शिवानन्दभट्ट'विरचिते ।
 'सिंहसिद्धान्तसिन्धौ' द्विनावतितमस्तरङ्गः ९२॥ श्रीसुन्दरीचरणारविन्दार्पणमस्तु ॥

The details furnished by the above extracts will be discussed below jointly after dealing with the author's third work.

The only MS known to me of Śivānanda's *Śrīvidyār-canacandrikā* forms Accession No. 5611 of the MSS Library of the Scindia Oriental Institute. It consists of 325 straw-paper folios of the size 10 × 6½ inches. Each page of the folios leaves a margin of about an inch on its four sides, is marked with border-lines in red or dark-black ink on two sides and contains on the average fourteen to fifteen lines with about thirty-eight Devanāgarī letters on each line. Dark-black ink is used for the text throughout and marks of red and yellow pigments are visible everywhere. Two scribes appear to have cooperated in scribing this MS. Folios 1—204 and 295b—325 being written by the main scribe and Folios 205—295a by another scribe. The handwriting of the main scribe is good and that of the other clumsy and the MS on the whole generally furnishes

correct readings. The scribes' names are not mentioned, but the main scribe records his date in his concluding colophon as follows :—

.....समाप्तमिदं ॥ श्रीमहाविद्यामन्त्रोद्धारार्चनपुरश्चरणादिप्रमाणं ॥
श्रीमहात्रिपुरसुन्दरीचरणाम्बुजापित्तमस्तु ॥ शुभं भवतु ॥ शके १७९९ संवत् १९३४ मार्ग-
शीर्ष वद्य ८ गृहवासरे लेखनं समाप्तं ॥ श्रीरस्तु ॥

The MS was thus completed on Thursday, the eighth day of the dark fortnight of the month of Mārgaśīrṣa in the year 1934 of the Vikrama era, i.e. c. January 1878 A.C. and is only 68 years old.

This, too, is a major Tantra work containing eighteen chapters (Prakāśas) of varied dimensions. As regards its contents, it traverses almost the same fields as the *Simbasiddhāntasindhu* but with special reference to Śāktism. To be brief, it furnishes in a well-arranged form and exhaustive manner everything (e.g., Śākta Mantras along with their Bijas, Uddhāras, etc., Japa, Puraścaraṇa etc., preparation of Śrīyantras, etc., various Śakti worships and the matters pertaining thereto, Tantric Tarpaṇa, Śrāddha, etc., Tithinirṇaya, Muhūrta, etc.) required by the Śāktas, including the Kaulikas, in their daily, periodical and incidental rites and can be easily described as a guide-book for Śākta Tantra. This work, too, exhibits the author's vast erudition and knowledge everywhere. Although in bulk it is only about one-third of the *Simbasiddhāntasindhu*, we find herein cited, though less number of times, almost all the authorities cited in the latter, plus several additional authorities. Among these additional authorities I could trace the following :—

अष्टचक्रेश्वर, आगमकल्पद्रुम, आगमसार, उदयाकरपद्धति, ऊर्ध्वाम्नाय,
कामकलाविलास, कारणागम, कुलतत्त्वसार, कुलतन्त्र, कुलागम, कौलिकतन्त्र, गवाक्ष-
तन्त्र, गोभिल, गोरक्षसंहिता, गौतमसंहिता, गौरीयामल, चामुण्डमाला, चामुण्डातन्त्र,
चिद्गगनचन्द्रिका, ज्ञानावतार, तत्त्वविमर्शिनी, तत्त्वसागरसंहिता, तन्त्ररत्नावली, तन्त्रसार-
संग्रह, तन्त्रार्णव, त्रिकूटारहस्य, त्रिपुरपद्मावली, त्रिपुरामहर्णव, त्रिपुरेशीतन्त्र, त्रैपुरपद्य-

वाहिनी, त्रैपुरवाहिनी, त्रैलोक्यमोहनतन्त्र, नारदीयकल्प, नित्यातन्त्र, पञ्चमीयामल, पद्मवाहिनी, पिङ्गलमत, पृथ्वीचन्द्रोदय, पीठिक त्रिकूटारहस्य, बृहच्छ्रीक्रम, भगवद्वाक्य, भुजङ्गवली, भैरवतन्त्र, मन्त्रचूडामणि, महाषोडशाष्टांगी, मातङ्गतन्त्र, मानसोल्लास, मालिनी-तन्त्र, राजमार्तण्ड, लक्ष्मिर्णय, लघ्वाचार्यचरणाः, विक्रमस्तोत्र, विज्ञानेश्वर, विद्यानन्द-नाथ, वैष्णवतन्त्र, शिवानन्दनाथ,¹² शीनकसंहिता, श्रीतन्त्र, श्रीपराक्रम, श्रीप्रकाशोदय, श्रीविद्याक्रमस्तोत्र, पद्मशती, संवादसूक्त, संकेतपद्धति, सनत्कुमारसंहिता, समयाचारतन्त्र, समयातन्त्र, सारसर्वस्व, सुभगोदय, सुभगोदयदर्पण, स्वच्छन्दभैरव, स्वच्छन्दमाहेश्वर ।

The *Śrīvidyārcanaśāstrīkā*, too, is prefixed with a lengthy introduction the main important portion whereof is ex-tracted below¹² :—

श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥

प्रारम्भेऽखिलकर्मणां विविमुखा देवा यदाराधनात्
सिद्धिं प्राप्नुतुमां प्रथमतो यः स्मर्यते श्रेयसे ।
यस्मादन्यसुरस्य कस्यचिदपि प्रत्यूहनिर्नाशिनी
नास्ते तादृशशक्तिरद्भुतगुण तं नीमि लम्बोदरम् ॥१॥
कृपापारावार त्रिपुरहरसारङ्गनयना—
महःसारं रम्योल्लसदरुणनारङ्गसदृशम् ।
कलागारं तारं मणिरचितहारं हृदि दध—
दगुणोद्गारं नीपद्ममवनविहारं विजयताम् ॥२॥
कलाशाला कालागहविहृतपत्रालिसुभगा
प्रवालाभा गात्रे सुमरुचिविशालाक्षरुचिरा ।
कुचद्वन्द्वसक्तोत्पलरचितमाला मनसि मे
पुरारातेर्वाला विधुशकलमाला विजयते ॥३॥

अथ राजवंशवर्णनम् ॥

गविष्ठारातिवृन्दोद्भूतदुर्गतरः कीर्तिचन्द्रातपोद्य—
त्कान्तिश्वेतीकृताशः पटुमतिविदितानेकशास्त्रोत्तमार्थः ।
दत्ताथि श्रातमत्तद्विपहयनिबहस्तीव्रतेजोनिवासो
लोकहृताताभिधानः स जयति वसुधामण्डले 'सूर्यवंशः' ॥४॥

¹² Vide ".....तत्प्रकारमाह शानार्णवे—करशुद्धिकरीं विद्यां मध्यमादितलान्तकम् । अङ्गुलीषु द्विरावृत्त्या करशुद्धिरिति प्रिये ॥ अङ्गुलीध्विति करयोऽपि गपदिति शेषः । अयमेवात्र स्थितिक्रम इति 'सुभगोदयदर्पणे' ॥ 'श्रीशिवानन्दनाथः' ॥ इति बीजत्रयावृत्त्या मध्यमादितलान्तकम् । करशुद्धिविधिं कुर्वीत् स्थितिन्यासक्रमेण तु ॥ तथा च बायवोयसंहिताय etc." (—Folio 64.)
It is not clear if this Śivānandanātha is meant to be associated with the work *Subhagodayadarpaṇa*. Anyhow, he appears to be different from our Śivānanda who cites him in this manner.

यो गम्भीरतया जिगाय जलाधि धर्मेण धर्मात्मजं
 वक्तृत्वेन बृहस्पतिं कवितया काव्यं श्रिया श्रीपतिम् ।
 कीर्त्या कैरविनीर्पति प्रभुतया पृथ्वीशितारं पृथुं
 तत्रोदारगुणान्वितः स नृपतिः 'श्रीमानसिंहो'ऽभवत् ॥५॥
 विप्रेभ्यो हरयो रयोजिततमा येनापिता भूरिशो
 मातङ्गा मदशालिनः परचमूविश्वसंभोमाः पुनः ।
 वृष्टिः स्वर्णमयी कृता कृतधियां गेहेषु धन्यात्मना
 तद्दानं कथमेकया रसनया स्तोतुं भवेयं विभुः ॥७॥
 युद्धे युद्धविशारदः परिलसद्दोर्दण्डचण्डोच्चण—
 द्वाणव्याहतवैरिवर्गपृतनां निर्मथ्य वित्तोत्करम् ।
 लुण्ठित्वाधिगणाय नित्यमददाद्यः सद्य उद्यन्मुदा
 पूर्णस्तत्तनयोऽभवद्भुवि 'जर्गत्सिहा'ह्यया विश्रुतः ॥७॥
 तस्मादुत्तमतेजसः क्षितिपतेरासीन्महाविक्रमः
 संग्रामेष्वपरिश्रमः सुमतिभिः प्रीतात्मभिर्वर्णितः ।
 नित्यं तोषितपण्डितो वसुभरैर्धर्मकतानाक्षयो
 नानादन्तिहयप्रदो भुवि 'महासिहा'भिधानो नृपः ॥८॥
 चञ्चच्चण्डकरोच्छलज्जलभरैः प्रक्षालयन्तस्तमः
 कुर्वाणा मदवारिभिर्वसुमती चक्रे महादुर्दिनम् ।
 विभ्राणा धरणीधरोन्नहवपुः प्रत्यर्थिपृथ्वीपति—
 ब्राताघातमहोद्धताः प्रतिबुधं येनापिता दन्तिनः ॥९॥
 यः शक्त्या निजया प्रचण्डतरया तूर्णं निहत्य द्विषो
 योधानीततदीयवित्तनिचयैर्विप्रान्सदा प्रीणयन् ।
 विश्वं विश्वमतीवनिर्मलगुणैर्यो मण्डयन्सततं
 तस्माच्छी'जयसिंह' इत्यभिधया ह्यातोऽभवद्भूमिपः ॥१०॥
 तस्मात्प्रादुरभूत्प्रतापमहिमा सिन्धोर्यथा चन्द्रमाः
 कीर्त्या चन्द्रिकया समस्तभुवनं निन्ये परां शुभ्रताम् ।
 लोकस्वान्तकुमुद्वतीशकुशलस्तन्वन् सुधासंनिभा
 वाचः साधुचकोरसंमदकरीः 'श्रीरामसिंहो' नृपः ॥११॥
 प्रत्यर्थिब्रातघातप्रबलभुजयुगञ्चण्डमार्तण्डतेजा
 दर्पदन्त्यश्वशश्वद्वितरणविलसत्कीर्तिशुभ्रीकृताशः ।
 गेहे गेहे कवीन्द्रैः प्रमुदितहृदयैः स्तूयमानः प्रकामं
 भूलोकख्यातनामा क्षितिपतितिलको 'रामसिंहो' बभूव ॥१२॥
 लोके यस्य प्रतापो दिनमणिमिषतो व्याततान प्रकाशं
 पूर्णेन्दुव्याजतश्चाशमयदिह तमःसंचयं यद्यशोऽपि ।

इत्थं प्रोद्यत्प्रनापो बहुविद्यदयशाः श्लोक्यमानो वृथावै—
 स्तस्मात्प्रादुर्बभूव क्षितिपतिपटलीसेवितः 'कृष्णसिंहः' ॥१३॥
 दाने कल्पतरूपमो भुजबले श्रीभीमगेनोपमो
 रूपे पञ्चशरोपमो नयविधौ साक्षात्सुरेज्योपमः ।
 सत्ये धर्ममुनोपमो रणमखे श्रीरामचन्द्रोपमः
 पुण्ये पुण्ययुगमोऽवनितले 'श्रीकृष्णसिंहो'ऽभवत् ॥१४॥
 श्रोदुर्गदेवतायाः प्रगुणगुणगणख्यापने यस्य जिह्वा
 कर्णौ नित्यं कथायां हृदयमपि पदध्यान एवानुसक्तम् ।
 हस्ती पूजाविधाने नयनयुगमपि प्रेक्षणे चोत्सवाना—
 मोदृक्षः शाक्तवर्यः समजनि धरणी धार्मिकः 'कृष्णसिंहः' ॥१५॥
 येन द्राग् द्रविणानि मौक्तिकमर्णामिश्राणि विश्राणिता—
 न्यथिभ्यो विपुला हया मदकला दत्ताश्च दन्तावलाः ।
 कीर्त्या चोज्ज्वलयोज्ज्वलीकृतमिदं सर्वं जगन्मण्डलं
 वर्ण्यः स्यात्स 'नृपालरामतनयः' 'श्रीकृष्णसिंहः' कथम् ॥१६॥
 ईशानस्य पडाननः सुरपतेः श्रीमाञ्जयन्तो यथा
 गर्वग्रन्थिलनैरिवर्गविजयी विश्वोल्लसद्विक्रमः ।
 एवं 'श्रीप्रभुकृष्णसिंहतनयो' विख्याततत्तद्गुणो
 राजाधीश्वर'विष्णुसिंह'नृपतिलोकेऽत्र विद्योत्यते ॥१७॥

(Verses 18—26 continue the eulogy of the Viṣṇusimha)

यो योद्धा यमुपासते नृपतयो येनाजितं सद्यशो
 यस्मै च स्पृहयन्ति नीरजदृशो यस्मान्न रम्यः स्मरः ।
 यस्य प्रेम शिवार्चनेऽनवरतं यस्मिन्ननेके गुणाः
 स त्वं श्रीनृप'विष्णुसिंह' ! सुचिरं जीव द्विजाशीर्गणैः ॥२६॥
 पीत्रः श्रीगिरिशोपमस्य कृतिनः 'श्री'श्रनिवासस्य' यः
 पुत्रः 'स्वामिजगन्निवास'विदुषो वागीशतुल्यस्य यः ।
 आस्ते तस्य महेश्वरस्य स गुरुः श्रीमुन्दरीपूजन—
 ध्यानासक्तमना भृशं भुवि 'शिवानन्दा'भिधानः सुधीः ॥२७॥
 प्रार्थितः 'श्रीशिवानन्दो' 'विष्णुसिंह'महीभुजा ।
 करोति तत्प्रमोदाय 'श्रीविद्यार्चनचन्द्रिकाम्' ॥२८॥

श्रीविद्योपदेशानन्तरं पूजनादेः कर्तव्यत्वादादौ सर्वेऽपि श्रं मूलविद्याभेदाः श्री-
 कामेश्वरमन्त्रपुरःसराः समुद्भिद्यन्ते etc.

The work end as follows :—

..... इति कुलाचारनिरूपणम् ॥

इति श्रीगोस्वामिसकलभूषालमौलिमणिमरीचिनिचयनीराजितचरणसरोज-
मुनिद्वन्द्वमितविद्याविलासविधानविचक्षणद्रविडवंशावतंसायमानश्रीनिवासाङ्गजश्रीजग-
न्निवासजन्मश्रीशिवानन्दविरचितायां श्रीविद्याचर्चनचन्द्रिकायामष्टादशः प्रकाशः ॥
समाप्तमिदं ॥ etc.

From the passages extracted above we can get a tolerable glimpse at the personality and environments of our Śivānanda. He came of a Draviḍa Brahmana family which, though originally hailing from the South, appears to have lately migrated to some unnamed place in the North. Śivānanda, his father Jagannivāsa and grandfather Śrīnivāsa all appear to be profound Paṇḍitas, highly proficient in various Tantras and each possessing a band of pupils and spiritual disciples. Among the latter, especially Śivānanda and Jagannivāsa appear to have some prominent contemporary princes who admired them highly for their learning and efficiency in Mantrasāstra and naturally made them receptacles of their rich royal patronages. Notably enough, Śivānanda, the eldest son of Jagannivāsa, applies the title 'Gosvāmin' only to his own and Jagannivāsa's names and not to Śrīnivāsa's name as well.¹³ Further, Śākta Tantra is associated here especially with Śivānanda alone who describes himself as ever mentally engrossed in the Tantric adoration of Śrīvidyā or Śakti.

As regards Śivānanda's Tantra encyclopaedias, one is at once impressed even by their numerousness of contents, volume and bulk, not to speak of their quality and originality which can be judged only by scholars well-versed in the techniques of various Tantras. It is also noteworthy

¹³. From the materials called by me recently I am shortly contributing a paper separately to prove the identity of Śrīnivāsa Bhaṭṭa, the author of the *Śivārcanacandrikā* and other works (vide CC, I, P. 670^b, etc.), with Śivānanda's grandfather and of Janārdana, the author of the *Mantracandrikā* (vide CC I, Pp. 198^a, 429^b; II, Pp. 40^a, 98^a), with a younger brother of Śivānanda.

that several sources of his citations are unknown to the three volumes of Aufrecht's CC.

Luckily, Śivānanda mentions his own date at the close of the *Simbasiddhāntasindhu* which is being noticed now probably for the first time. He finished that work on Wednesday, the first day of the bright half of the month of Mārgaśīrṣa in the year 1731 (of the Vikrama era) i.e., c. December 1674 A.C. Although the MS of the *Śrīvidyārcanacandrikā* does not mention the author's date, that work is definitely later than the *Simbasiddhāntasindhu* and must be assigned to 1699 A.C. on the strength of the identity of the author's second royal patron proved below. Even ignoring the said identity, the sequence of the two works is easily made clear on the consideration that Śivānanda composed the *Simbasiddhāntasindhu* at the instigation of his father's disciple Devīsinha, whose name its title is designed to commemorate, and the *Śrīvidyārcanacandrikā* at the instigation of his own disciple Viṣṇusinha.

In his introductions the author only assigns his two patrons to respective royal dynasties and mentions a few ancestors of each. He does not name their respective capital towns or exact dominions. His long and almost uniform descriptions of the heroes and of their ancestors, though polished literary pieces, are generally confined to their excessive valour, extreme munificence to the Brāhmaṇas and the learned, ardent devotion to God and religion, charming personality, admirable literary habits, unrivalled fame, etc., and furnish very few specific details useful in establishing their exact identity.

Still, Devīsinha, who is described as a Bundela king flourishing about 1674 A.C. and the genealogy of whose line is mentioned in the order Madhukara-Rāmasāhi-Samigrāmasāhi-Bhārata-Devīsinha by Śivānanda, can with utmost precision be identified with Devīsingh Bundela of Chanderi.

Raja Madhukara,¹⁴ Devisingh's great-great-grandfather, was a renowned ruler (1554-1592 A.C.) of the main Bundela State of Orchha and his cenotaph,¹⁵ too, is below the fort of Orchha on the edge of the river Betwa. On his death in 1592 in the course of a warfare against the Mughal forces of Akbar, Rām Sāha,¹⁶ his eldest son, succeeded him and held the throne of Orchha till 1604 when he was deprived of his sovereignty as a result of his own weakness and others' intrigues. His younger but far more celebrated brother Bir Singh Deo, who had espoused the cause of Jahangir by murdering Abul Fazal, was installed as Raja of Orchha (1605-1627) by that Emperor who for a time confined Rām Sāha at Delhi but subsequently released him about 1606 and presented him with the fief of Chanderi. Thenceforth Rām Sāha¹⁷ and his descendants for several generations ruled from Chanderi, as governors on behalf of the Mughal Emperors till Aurangzeb's death and subsequently as independent kings till 1811¹⁸ or 1815¹⁹ when Chanderi was captured by Jean Baptiste Filose for his master Maharaja Daulat Rao Scindia. The present representatives of this line of Bundela Rajas are probably living²⁰ at Datia as pensioners. A complete list of these chiefs of Chanderi is furnished by M. B. Garde in his historical narrative²¹ of Chanderi and it fully agrees with Śivānanda's list so far as the latter goes. However, Mr. Garde's narrative assigns

¹⁴ *Imperial Gazetteer of India—Central India* (1908), P. 349.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, P. 355.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, P. 349. In fact, Madhukara's eldest son was Horal Deo, but he had been killed in a battle in 1577.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, P. 165.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, P. 165.

¹⁹ M. B. Garde: *A Guide to Chanderi* (1928), P. 14.

²⁰ *Ibid*, P. 15.

²¹ *Ibid*, PP. 14-15, footnote 8. These names are:—(1) Ram Saha—1606-1628, (2) Sangram Saha—1628-1642, (3) Bharat Saha—1642-1654, (4) Devi Singh—1654-1663, (5) Durga Singh—1663-1687, etc.

Devi Singh Bundela to the period 1654-1663 and the *Central India* volume of the *Imperial Gazetteer of India* (p. 165) states that Devi Singh Bundela was appointed governor of Chanderi in 1680. The dates furnished at these two places conflict with each other and both appear to be erroneous in the light of the contemporary evidence furnished by Śivānanda who clearly describes Devīśimhā as a living ruler in 1674.

The identification of Śivānanda's Devīśimhā with Devi Singh Bundela of Chanderi is justified on some other grounds, too. The patron's line is described in the above extracts as closely attached to God Narasiṃha. As corroborating this description we find²² the beautiful temple of Narasiṃha in the town of Chanderi to have been built by the local Bundela chiefs. Devīśimhā appears to have patronised some other authors as well. We already know²³ one Mohanabhaṭṭa, also called Kavipaṇḍita, who under this very Devīśimhā's instructions composed an artificial epic entitled *Kaṃsavaḍha-mahākāvya* consisting of twenty-one cantos and intended to give practical illustrations in Grammar while depicting the life of Kṛṣṇa upto the slaughter of Kamsa. At the end of this epic the poet furnishes a more exhaustive genealogy of Devīśimhā's ancestors also including ten predecessors of Madhukara.

Śivānanda's other patron Viṣṇusiṃha, too, can be precisely identified in history, although with some difficulty. The author, one of whose works was completed in 1674 A.C., terms himself as guru or spiritual preceptor of this prince who is said to come of a solar dynasty and to be a devout worshipper of Durgā and whose predecessors are mentioned in the ascending order Kṛṣṇasiṃha (described as a staunch Śākta or ardent devotee of Durgā, etc.),

²² *Ibid.* Pp. 39, 44.

²³ *BBRAS Descriptive Catalogue*, Vol II, P. 331f., No. 11.63

Rāmasimha, Jayasimha, Mahāsimha, Jagatsimha and Mānasimha (described as a poet, orator, etc.). Each successor is described here as son of his predecessor. The patron is definitely identical with the Cutchwaha prince Bishen Singh²⁴ of Amber who on his death in 1699 was succeeded to the throne by Sevai Jai Singh (1699-1743), the celebrated patron of letters and founder of modern Jaipur.

The Cutchwahas claim a Solar descent²⁵ and in Tod's *Annals of Amber*²⁶ we find most of the names given by Śivānanda among those of Bishen Singh's immediate predecessors, in almost the same order though not always in the relation of son and father. Man Singh, Raja of Amber and an outstanding personality in Akbar's Imperial Court, died about 1615 and was succeeded by his son Bhao Singh²⁷ who on his death in 1621 was succeeded by his son Maha Singh. Maha Singh died soon after his accession and was succeeded by Jai Singh who is said²⁸ to be a grandson of Man Singh's brother Jagat Singh who is, however, not stated to be on the throne of Amber at any time. This Jai Singh, commonly known as Mirza Raja, is closely associated with several important military and political achievements of Aurangzeb, including Shivaji's temporarily coming to terms, appearance in the Imperial court etc. On his death in 1667 he was succeeded by his son Ram Singh who is said to have helped Shivaji in his mysterious escape from Agra in 1665. Ram Singh on his death in 1699 is

²⁴ Tod : *The Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, Vol. II (Madras, 1880), P. 328 ff.

²⁵ *Ibid*, P. 319.

²⁶ *Ibid*, P. 326ff.

²⁷ *Ibid*, P. 327. From the synopsis of the chapter on P. 318, however, we catch the impression that Rao Bhao Maha was the full name of one person only. Śivānanda does not mention any separate Bhāvasimha.

²⁸ *Ibid*, P. 327.

said²⁹ to have been succeeded directly by Bishen Singh who lived to enjoy the dignity only for a few months and was succeeded by Sevai Jai Singh in the same year.

Two difficulties appear to come in the way of establishing the identity of Śivānanda's patron and his ancestors with these Amber rulers as described by Tod. They are : (1) Difference in relationships and (2) Absence of Kṛṣṇasimha in Tod's narrative. The first difficulty, even taking for granted that Tod's narration is quite accurate, can be easily got over on the consideration that several Hindu poets are seen to be in the habit of describing a successor as son of his predecessor whether he was so actually or not and Śivānanda's 'son,' too, may be explained in the sense of an adopted son or successor. The other difficulty seems to hamper the identification seriously unless either Śivānanda or Tod has committed a blunder. The former case is not likely, as the hero (viz., Kṛṣṇasimha), stated to be the father of the author's patron and disciple, was almost a contemporary of the author and is specially eulogised here in four verses. Hence the mistake or incompleteness of account, whatsoever it is, lies with Tod. This mistake or incompleteness, too, is minimised to a considerable degree when on a close inspection of Tod's narrative it is revealed that he nowhere says that Bishen Singh was son of his predecessor Ram Singh and is quite silent regarding the relationship between the two heroes.

All difficulties and misgivings in the way of my identification of Śivānanda's Viṣṇusimha with Bishen Singh of Amber are at once set at rest in the light of the following contemporary evidence. The well-known *Jayasimha Kalpadruma*, composed by Ratnākara in Samvat 1770³⁰ (= 1713 A.C.) under the patronage of Sevai Jai Singh,

²⁹ *Ibid*, Pp. 328, 333, 335.

³⁰ *History of Dharmasāstra*, Vol. I, Pp. 548^a, 727^b.

Bishen Singh's son or immediate successor to the Amber throne, furnishes in its introduction the genealogy of the Amber rulers exactly in the order and mutual relationship in which Śivānanda furnishes it i.e. as मानसिंह-जगत्सिंह-महासिंह-जयसिंह-रामसिंह-कृष्णसिंह-विष्णुसिंह-जयसिंह (Sevai). Here, too, each successor is described as son of his predecessor. The relevant passages mentioning Kṛṣṇasimha and Viṣṇusimha read : तत्पुत्रः (= रामसिंहस्य पुत्रः) कृष्णसिंहः प्रथितगुणगणः कृष्णवत्सोत्सवाद्यो जातः पृथ्यां पृथुश्रीररिगणतिमिरध्वंसने भानुरूपः । तस्माच्छ्रीविष्णुसिंहः क्षपितः त्रिपुगणः पालकः सज्जनानां राजा राजीवनेत्रः समजनि मधुरा पालिता येन पूर्वम् ॥ (Introductory verse 14, folio 2^a of MS No. 2352 of the S. O. Institute, Ujjain), etc. Kṛṣṇasimha and Viṣṇusimha are again alluded to in the following verse occurring at the conclusion of several sections of the *Jayasimbhakalpadruma*— श्रीमद्विलीशसेनोद्भटविकटभटोद्दण्डमत्तेभसिंहश्चण्डोन्माद्यत्तुष्कक्षुभितवसुमतीपालने धर्मराजः । पौत्रः श्रीकृष्णसिंहक्षितिपकुलमणोविष्णुसिंहस्य पुत्रः श्रीमान्राजाधिराजो जयहरिरमराधीशवत्कौ सुखी स्यात् ॥ Thus it is proved beyond any shadow of doubt that in the genealogy of the Amber rulers Kṛṣṇasimha really intervenes between Rāmasimha and Viṣṇusimha and that Śivānanda's patron is no other personage than king Bishen Singh of Amber. It is really very strange that Kṛṣṇasimha so vividly mentioned by contemporary authors like Śivānanda, Ratnākara, etc. should have completely escaped Tod's notice.³¹

Śivānanda mentions Viṣṇusimha as the 'present' ruling chief of his line. Hence, on the basis of the identity established above, the *Śrīvidyārcanaśandrikā* has to be taken to be composed some time in 1699 A.C. since the patron was on the throne only for a few months in that year as per Tod's account. Śivānanda's literary activities thus appear to have covered a considerable period.

³¹. As mentioned above incidentally, Tod's narration conflicts with the statements of Śivānanda and Ratnākara also with regard to the genealogical positions of Mānasimha, Jagatsimha, Mahāsimha and Jayasimha.

As stated above, Śivānanda calls himself a scion of the Draviḍa line. A Draviḍa Brāhmaṇa family, it is personally known to me, has been residing at Jaipur as the line of the hereditary Rājagurus of Jaipur Maharajas and enjoying a big jagir to this day. There are also a few other families of Draviḍa Brāhmaṇas at Jaipur and Benares drawing hereditary muafi incomes from Jaipur State for spiritual reasons. It is quite probable that Śivānanda was the founder of some of these Draviḍa Brāhmaṇa families at Jaipur and Benares.

RELATION ACCORDING TO THE NEW SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC (NAVYA-NYĀYA)

By TARA SANKAR BHATTACHARYA

Relation plays a very prominent part in the literature of the New School of Indian Logic (Navya-Nyāya). The critical discussions on universal relation (vyāpti) in the commentaries of Raghunātha, Mathurānātha, Jagadīśa and the sub-commentaries of Gadādhara, Jagadīśa, Bhavānanda and others abound in numerous relations unknown to the commentators of the Old School. The principal relations in the Old School are conjunction and inherence, though several other relations are recognised. Udyotakara, in discussing the nature of perception, adopts the Vaiśeṣika conception of the different types of sense-contacts which are the variants¹ of conjunction and inherence. Attributiveness (Viśeṣaṇatā), which is the type of contact in the perception of negation, is another relation added to conjunction and inherence. The negation of the jar on a particular spot on the ground, for instance, is an attribute of that spot. In the perception of this negation the eye is united with the ground particularised by the negation

¹ The different types of contact between the sense and the positive object are the following :

- (a) Conjunction.—An external object like the tree is perceived through conjunction with the eye.
- (b) Conjoined-inherence.—In the perception of the colour of a thing, the eye is conjoined with the thing in which colour inheres.
- (c) Conjoined-inherent-inherence.—When we perceive colourhood, the eye is conjoined with the object in which colour inheres and in this colour again colour-hood inheres.
- (d) Inherence.—Sound, when perceived, inheres in the ear-hole.
- (e) Inherent-inherence.—Sound-hood inheres in the sound which again inheres in the ear-hole.

of the jar. Hence the type of contact in this perception is particularity² or attributiveness. This relation of attributiveness is also called the relation of self-sameness (svarūpa-sambandha) in the Navya-Nyāya. The svarūpa-sambandha is constituted by the relata themselves without reference to any further relation. The negation of the jar on the ground exists as such negation and no further relation is necessary to connect the negation and the ground. Hence, the relation of negation to its substratum is self-sameness.³

The causal relation is also recognised by the Old School. But the three kinds of causes, like the inherent cause, the non-inherent cause and efficient or auxiliary cause, show that the causal relation can also be resolved into those of inherence and conjunction. The inherent cause is the substratum in which the effect inheres, e.g., the cloth inheres in the threads. The cause which is related with the inherent cause is the non-inherent cause. The *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī*'s explanation of the nature of this relation shows that the non-inherent cause also is nothing different from the relation of inherence: Now, the non-inherent cause may be connected with the cause in two ways---by being connected with the same object as the effect is, or by being connected with the same object as the cause is. An example of the first is this: The conjunction of the two halves of a jar is the non-inherent cause of the jar and so on. Hence, the cause, viz., the conjunction of the two halves, is connected with the same object, viz., the two halves, as the effect, the jar, is. An instance of the second: The colour of the two halves of a jar is the non-inherent cause of the colour of

² Vide, *Tarkasaṅgraha*, 44, of Annam Bhaṭṭa.

³ For the relation of Self-sameness or Svarūpa-sambandha, Vide, S. C. Chatterjee: *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 188.

the jar. Here the jar is the inherent cause of the colour etc., belonging to it ; and this colour is connected with the same object, viz., the two halves, as the jar is. In other words, (the non-inherent cause is connected with the inherent cause) sometimes (directly) through the relation of inherence, and sometimes (indirectly) through the relation of inherence in that in which it itself inheres."⁴ Lastly, the efficient cause like the loom etc., in the production of the cloth, bears the relation of conjunction to the threads, and so on.

The relation of Identity is another relation mentioned in the Old School. Vācaspati Miśra in his *Nyāya-Vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā* speaks of the mutual negation as the Negation of Identity (*tādātmyābhāva*) and this shows that the Relation of Identity has a place in the thought of the Old School.

With regard to Space relation and Time relation, the Old School thinks that they are qualities. The spatial relations, like remoteness, nearness etc., and temporal relations of dastness, futureness, etc., are qualities. The New School also takes them to be qualities. They are called in it as *daisika-viśeṣaṇatā* and *kālika-viśeṣaṇatā*. That the Old School also takes finite space and time as both qualities and relations, is indicated by Jagadīśa in his subcommentary on the *Dīdhiti* of Raghunātha on the *Siddhānta-lakṣaṇa* of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*⁵. Jagadīśa here says that the Old School takes the absolute negation of cow to be non-existing in time in space relation (*daisika-viśeṣaṇatā*).

These are the several relations recognised in the Old School and the principal relations among these are conjunction and inherence. The New School, on the contrary, recognises, in addition to these, almost an indefinite

⁴ Swāmi Mādhavānanda, *Bhāṣā-pariccheda* with *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī*. PP. 25-26.

⁵ Jagadīśa-*Siddhānta-lakṣaṇam*, Benares, P. 103-104.

number of relations quite a good many of which figure very prominently in its arguments. We shall enumerate several main relations of this school.

But before enumerating these relations let us explain briefly the nature of relation as conceived by the Navya-Nyāya.

The New School agrees with the Old that a relation is perceived. Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Nyāya-Sūtra* says that a relation is seen, i.e., perceived.⁶ Similarly, Viśvanātha says that conjunction is an object of the eye⁷ and "the perception of inherence is due to the relation of attributiveness."⁸

A relation forms an integral part of the object cognised. The object is a synthesis of a substratum, qualities and the relation between them. Viśvanātha observes: "The notion that a thing is possessed of qualities, actions, etc., is based on three things—something that is qualified (*viśeṣya*), a qualifying adjunct (*viśeṣaṇa*), and a relation between the two."⁹ Indeed, the relation is the cementing bond between the substratum and the qualities.

The relation is the determinant of the object. The difference of the relation makes the terms different and the difference of the terms differentiates the relation. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the Navya-Nyāya admits an indefinite number of relations.

On the question whether the Navya-Nyāya conception of relation is external or internal, it may be said that some relations are external and some internal. Conjunction is an external relation, but it is not like a hook added to the terms, but is a quality inhering in the substance. Inher-

⁶ Vātsyāyana-*Bhāṣya* on the *Nyāya-Sūtra* of Gotama, I. i. 5.

⁷ *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, verse, 54.

⁸ *Ibid*, verse 61. Swāmi Mādhavānanda's translation.

⁹ *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī*, 11. (The English rendering is taken from Mādhavānanda's translation).

ence again is an intimate and internal relation, but is perceived. And when we consider the fact that terms modify relations and vice-versa, we can say that relations and terms are reciprocally internal.

Relation determines cognition which is of practical value. Determinate perception and inference are made possible by relation. An abstract entity, having no relation to anything, can neither be perceived nor be interred. Relation concretises facts. There is, of course, indeterminate perception which is an undifferentiated cognition and as such devoid of relation whose function is differentiation. But indeterminate perception is useless for all practical purposes. Hence, relation plays a very important role in our knowledge.

Every relation implies two terms one of which is said to rest on another. The term which rests on a substratum is called the *pratiyogi* and the substratum is called the *Anuyogi*. The same *pratiyogī* may bear more than one relation to its *anuyogi*. The jar, for example, exists in the relation of conjunction and in time relation on the ground.

Relation is not a separate category. It is included in the seven categories. It becomes this category or that according to circumstances. Inherence, for example, is itself a category; conjunction, again, is one of the twenty-four qualities and so on.

Of the relations there are some which are determinants of existence (*vr̥ttiniyāmaka*) of a thing in a locus. Conjunction explains the existence, for example, of a jar, on the ground; inherence defines the existence of quality, action and generic attribute in their substrata; self-sameness marks out the existence of negation in its locus and so on. There are also relations which do not determine the existence of things in their substrata (*vr̥tṭyāniyāmaka-sambandha*). They are identity, locus-

hood, collective extensity, etc., The jar, for example, is identical with itself, but does not exist in the relation of identity on the ground ; a thing or a quality, again, exists in a locus in the relation of conjunction or inherence, but not in the relation of locus-hood and so on.

Having thus described the general nature of relation, let us now enumerate the important ones¹⁰ among them:--

- (1) Conjunction (*saṁyoga*).—The relation of one substance with another is called conjunction. No two categories of the six categories of substance, quality, action, generic attribute, particularity and inherence can have, between them, the relation of conjunction. Conjunction itself again is a quality and as such inheres in a substance. The substance A, for example, stands on B and, therefore, has the relation of conjunction with B. Here conjunction is a quality of A.
- (2) Inherence (*samavāya*).—It is an internal and permanent relation between a composite substance and quality, action, universal and the particular. The *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī* brings forward an argument to prove its permanence.¹¹ In the knowledge of a substance possessing quality there are the qualified, the quality and a relation between them. But this relation cannot be conjunction ; for conjunction obtains between two substances. Nor can it be self-sameness. For in that case we have to assume an infinite number of self-samenesses, the self-sameness of no two things being identical. In other words, there is an infinite number

¹⁰ Babu R. N. Ghose in his *Navya-Nyāya*, which is a translation work, in Bengali, of Mathurānātha's *Vyāpti-pañcaka-Rahasya*, gives us a list of the important relations of the Navya-Nyāya.

¹¹ On verse. 11.

of substances in this universe possessing qualities ; if every substance, possessing attributes, is an instance of self-sameness, then we have to assume an infinite number of self-samenesses. Again on this hypothesis a substance having different attributes will have different kinds of self-samenesses, which is absurd. Hence, the only alternative is the relation of inherence taking place between the substance and the attribute. The principle of simplicity also recommends this. If we can explain the relation by one inherence, it is useless to assume an infinite number of self-samenesses.¹²

- (3) Self-sameness (svarūpa).—It is a relation between an essence, which does not imply a generic attribute, and its locus, between existence and the existent and between substratum-hood and the substratum. Negation again abides in the relation of self-sameness in its substratum. This relation between negation and its support is also called attributiveness pertaining to negation (abhāviya-viśeṣaṇatā). The relation between existence and the existent, on the contrary, is a type of self-sameness which is called attributiveness pertaining to existence (bhāviya-viśeṣaṇatā), because existence is a positive category. A genuine attribute exists in its substratum in the relation of inherence and, therefore, cannot stand to it in the relation of self-sameness.
- (4) Identity (tādātmya).—The relation of a thing to itself is identity, i.e., everything is identical with itself.

¹² For a detailed discussion on conjunction and inherence, see, S. C. Chatterjee : *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 186-91.

- (5) Time-relation (kālika-sambandha).—The relation that an entity, whether eternal or transitory, bears to time is called time-relation. Everything in this world has time-relation to everything else, because things are either co-existent or successive. The *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī* discusses briefly the nature of time—a discussion which throws a flood of light on the nature of time-relation.¹³ In the first place, time is the support of the moving world and the auxiliary cause of the things which are produced. But what is the proof of this? It can be proved by a simple case of perception. Take the cognition, "Now, i.e., at the present moment, the jar is there." This cognition has a reference to the position and (apparent) movement of the sun, because the exact hour implied by the present moment is determined by the position of the sun on the horizon, i.e., any particular point of time is certainly sun-time. Hence in the cognition, "Now the jar is there," there is a relation between the jar and the (apparent) motion of the sun. This relation is not conjunction (as the jar cannot be conjoined with the movement of the sun, movement being not a substance); nor can this relation be inherence or identity. Hence, it must be time. In time both the movement of the sun and the jar subsist and from this it follows that time is the support of the whole universe. Thus time is the sustainer of the ever-moving world. It is one continuous whole and not the aggregate of succeeding moments.

¹³ *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī* on verse, 45.

Past, present and future do not effect time, but time is converted into these by its limiting adjuncts (upādhi). The *Tarka-saṅgraha* expresses in two short sentences the nature of time and time-relation. The one eternal all-pervading time is converted into past, present or future for practical purposes. Time, in fact, is the substratum of all things, i.e., all things exist in time-relation, and it is the instrumental cause of all activity.¹⁴ It is a substance having the five qualities of number, measure, disjunction, conjunction and division.¹⁵

- (6) Space relation (dikḥta-viśeṣaṇatā).—The remarks applied to time apply *mutatis mutandis* to space also. Space is one eternal all-pervading substance in which the distinctions of east, west, north, south, etc., are due to its different limiting adjuncts. Space is the cause of distance, nearness etc. Like time it is the efficient cause of everything that is produced. Everything, in fact, must exist in some spatial relation. Like time also space has the qualities of number, measure, disjunction, conjunction and division.
- (7) Object-hood (viśayatā).—The relation that knowledge, attraction, repulsion and effort bears to things is called object-hood.
- (8) Knowledge-hood (viśayitā).—The relation that objects bear to knowledge, attraction, repulsion and effort is called knowledge-hood.
- (9) Cause-hood (kāraṇatā).—It is the relation of the effect to the cause.

¹⁴ *Tarka-Saṅgraha* and *Tark-dīpikā*, p. 16.

¹⁵ Vide, *Tarkāmṛta* of Jagadīśa.

- (10) Effect-hood (kāryatā).—It is the relation of the cause to the effect.
- (11) Location (ādheyatā).—It is the relation of the locus to the located.
- (12) Locus-hood (ādhāratā).—It is the relation of the located to the locus.
- (13) Collective extensity (paryāpti).—This relation has application in the case of number. When we say, for example, “fine pots,” a number with a collective extensity is given. The number extends up to five which again is a collective integer. Hence the relation of the number five to pot, may be called, collective extensity.
- (14) Ownership (svāmitva).—The owned exists in this relation to the owner.
- (15) Ownership (svatva).—The owner bears this relation to the owned.
- (16) The substratum-hood of negation (abhāvatva).—It is the relation of a thing to the substratum in which it does not exist. Smoke, for example, does not exist in water. Smoke, therefore, stands to water in the relation of substratum-hood of negation.
- (17) Conjoined-inherence (saṃyukta-sāma-vāya).
- (18) Conjoined-inherent-inherence (saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya).
- (19) Inherent-inherence (samaveta-samavāya).
- (20) Partial extension (avyāpyava).—Smoke does not exist in a red hot iron-ball. Hence, the relation of smoke to fire is an instance of partial-extension.
- (21) Non-existence-in-the-substratum-of-the-non-existence-of-itself, i.e. the term related (svābhāva-tavṛttitva).—Fire is negated in water in which smoke does not exist. Hence, the relation of

fire to smoke may be called non-existence-in-the-substratum-of-the-non-existence-of itself.

- (22) Co-existence (svasāmānādhikarāṇya).—Things existing in the same locus bear this relation to each other.
- (23) Counterpositiveness (pratiyogitā).—It is the relation between negation and the thing negated and vice versa. The relation between relation and the term related is also called pratiyogitā, but the pratiyogī, in this connection, means that which rests on a substratum.
- (24) Substratum-hood (anuyogitā).—A negation exists in this relation to its substratum and conversely.
- (25) Determination (avacchedakatā).—The categories have this relation to their determinants.

ASSYRIAN AND SANSKRIT—THEIR RESEMBLANCE¹

By VIDYADHAR SHASTRI

It is usual to compare Sanskrit with languages like Latin, Greek and German. A language, however, older than all these, namely, Assyrian, has till now been rather neglected; but that Assyrian, too, is not unrelated to Sanskrit would be seen from the study of the following words culled from Assyrian inscriptions ranging from the year 2500 B.C. to 500 B.C.

- (1) Assyrian MUTU meaning 'death' equals Sanskrit *Mṛtyu*
 (2) „ SU „ 'that' „ „ *sa* or *Asau*
 (3) „ DIPAR „ 'lamp' „ „ *Dīpa*
 (4) „ NARĀMU „ 'love' „ „ *Narma*.

The Sanskrit form of the word can be seen in "*narma-saciva*." *Amara* uses the word in the sense of *keli* or *krīḍā*.

- (5) Assyrian SIRU meaning "dawn" equals Vedic *Śīram*.
 The word occurs in a *prātaranuvāka* and has been noticed in the *Nirukta* by Yāska who, after putting the remark, "*ityanavagatam*," interprets it as "*anūsāyinam vāśinamiti vā*." But the context seems to suggest "dawn." By Yāska's time the right meaning of this word may have been forgotten.

- (6) Assyrian ASRU meaning "place" equals Sanskrit *Āśrama*
 (7) „ ŚIHRU „ "small" „ „ *Hrasva*.
 (8) „ RAMU „ "to love" „ „ *Ram*.
 (9) „ ŚUKŪDU „ "spear" „ „ *Śakti*.

¹ A paper read at the second monthly meeting of the Śārdūl Research Institute.

| | | | | | | | |
|------|----------|----------|---------|--------------|--------|----------|-------------------------------|
| (10) | Assyrian | ŠIPRU | meaning | "craft" | equals | Sanskrit | <i>Śilpa</i> . |
| (11) | " | ŠĀRU | " | "to pass" | } | " | <i>Sr</i> or <i>Sar</i> . |
| | | | | "to go" | | | |
| | | | | "wind" | | | |
| (12) | " | ŠĪRU | " | "body" | " | " | <i>Śarīra</i> . |
| (13) | " | ADGURU | " | "vessel for | " | " | <i>Aguru</i> . |
| | | | | incense" | | | |
| (14) | " | APSŪ | " | "Ocean" | " | " | <i>Āpas</i> . |
| (15) | " | ŠĀTU | " | "eternity" | " | " | <i>Śāśvat</i> . |
| (16) | " | INANNA | " | } | " | " | <i>Idānīm</i> |
| | | INANNU | | | | | |
| (17) | " | ADŪ | " | "now" | " | " | <i>Ādya</i> . |
| (18) | " | UMMU | " | "mother" | " | " | <i>Ambā</i> . |
| (19) | " | GAMRU | " | "whole" | " | " | <i>Grāma</i> . |
| (20) | " | HADUO | " | "to rejoice" | " | " | <i>Hlād</i> . |
| (21) | " | I-ŠA-RU | " | "righteous" | " | " | <i>Īśvara</i> |
| (22) | " | TI-IB-NU | " | "straw" | " | " | <i>Tr̥ṇa</i> . |
| (23) | " | KAKKABU | " | "star" | " | " | <i>Kakubha</i> . ² |
| (24) | " | ABU | " | "father" | " | " | <i>Āpta</i> . |
| (25) | " | ILU | " | "God" | " | " | <i>Idya</i> . |
| (26) | " | PARAKKU | " | "shrine" | " | " | <i>Prekṣaṇīya</i> . |
| (27) | " | ŠUBĀTU | " | "garment" | " | " | <i>Suvastra</i> . |
| (28) | " | ELLU | " | "bright" | " | " | <i>Ujjvala</i> . |
| (29) | " | NAKRU | " | "Hostile" | " | " | <i>Nakra</i> . ³ |
| (30) | " | CAMMULU | " | "Camel" | " | " | <i>Kramelaka</i> . |
| (31) | " | NĀRU | " | "river" | " | " | <i>Nirā</i> . |

² *Kakubha* means direction; a star shows direction.

³ The name *Nakra* for a crocodile seems to have been given on account of its hostile nature.

SOME UNPUBLISHED MAITHILĪ SONGS

By RAMANATHA JHA

Seven years ago when the late Sir Ganganatha Jha took me to the Darbhanga Raj Library, it was one of the many precepts he blessed me with that I should make it a point to examine an old sanskrit manuscript very carefully and minutely specially if it happened to be a palm-leaf manuscript. These old volumes, he said, often contained on the covers both inside and outside and even on extra leaves placed both ways for the protection of the main MS., little bits of most useful information which cannot otherwise be had.

In course of these seven years, specially during the last three years, many hundreds of old Sanskrit MSS, sometimes as old as 600 years, have passed through my hands and sold to Raj Library ; and following faithfully the precept I have hardly allowed any manuscript pass without carefully scanning it in the beginning, at the end and at all odd corners of the bundle. Not a few of them have yielded rich fruits to me in the shape of (i) old documents, e.g. deeds of sale, gift and redemption of slaves, books, etc., (ii) stray verses in Sanskrit and also in Maithili sometimes with the names of the author, but often quoted anonymously, (iii) exhaustive lists of articles required in the various *śāstra*'s including *śāstra*, all in Maithili language, giving us chaste forms of Maithili words 300 or 400 years ago.

All that is presented here was found by me on three rotten leaves found placed at the end of two bundles of old palm leaves brought to me for inspection before offering them for sale. The first leaf is written on both the sides. On the first page there are 6 lines containing two

complete songs one of लल्लिमिनाथ and the other of विद्यापति, written very clearly and correctly in the archaic style of the 4th century of the La. Sam. era, specially the three letters उ, ज, and त. On the reverse, there are five lines. This is written almost a hundred years later in fainter ink, by another man, not at all correctly, and the page ends while the excellent song is still incomplete. The general condition of the leaf is not bad ; only the central hole has widened enormously and eaten up two to three letters in three lines on one side of the hole on either sides of the leaf.

The Second leaf is very much rotten and worn off on all ends. It is written on both the sides by the same man almost correctly and the style of writing resembles that of the 5th century of the La. Sam. era. There are five lines on the first page and only three and a half on the reverse. The leaf contains two complete songs, both of Vidyāpati, the second one begins on the first page.

The third leaf is more in tact though the central hole here also has widened very much eating the contiguous letters. There are five lines on the first page and only three on the reverse, where the second song, which had begun on the first page, ends. The style of writing is clearly modern on account of the use of य, यी, etc., in place of अ, ई, etc. This tendency of the use of य which found its zenith in the writings of the late Chandā Jhā is not more than 200 years old.

There are thus 7 songs on these three leaves. Of these five are clearly by Vidyāpati. One in the oldest writing is of लल्लिमिनाथ who mentions his patron कृष्णनाराजेन with his new love देवजना. There is a song by one लल्लिमिनाथ (note the difference in the spelling) also in the collection of the songs of Vidyāpati, on palm-leaves in the Nepal Durbar Library. The last song, the song on the reverse of the 1st leaf, is incomplete. This is an excellent song

in दण्डक metre describing the figure of Mahākālī in mixed Sanskrit and Maithilī language like the one on गङ्गा by Vidyāpati (song No. 978 on page 329 of Vidyabhusan and Mitra's recent Bengali edition of Vidyāpati). As the colophon is missing it cannot be said with certainty whose composition this is, but this may be a song of Vidyāpati himself.

Two of these five songs of Vidyāpati are also published in the edition of N. N. Gupta and I have compared the two texts in the notes. This find of the songs with indigenous text on old palm leaves proves conclusively how very incomplete and corrupt the text of some of the published songs of Vidyāpati may be.

But the most important song from the point of view of real advance of our knowledge about Vidyāpati is the second song on the first page of the first leaf which is written in a style more than 400 years old and is the prototype of a host of such other songs sung still all over Mithila to the bride-grooms at the time of feeding for full one year after the date of marriage or even afterwards. These songs, called जोग, describe the various magic devices calculated to make the husband subservient to the newly married wife. It is an important branch of व्यावहारिक songs, songs fitted for ceremonial occasions chiefly festive and we have for each of our festive occasions suitable songs often with the name of Vidyāpati in the colophon. Though sung all over Mithila from mouth to mouth no व्यावहारिक song associated with the name of Vidyāpati was found in any old MS. Sceptics had therefore come to doubt the tradition that Vidyāpati did compose व्यावहारिक songs. The find of this जोग song, called here by its राग name, मालव, written on a palm-leaf more than 400 years ago, confirms the tradition and sets all doubts at rest for ever. For its excellence I would commend its close study to all students of literature and invite them to compare this with the "Witches' Dance" of the *Macbeth*.

Before, however, giving the text I feel I owe a few words by way of explanation for what I have inserted after each song as its "Interpretation". The essence of correctly reading an old MS., specially in Maithili, lies in the interpretation one is able to give to what he reads in the particular context. The reasons for this are obvious. Old Sanskritists noted for their writings have always been lacking in proper application of पदच्छेद in a sentence and it required the ingenuity of a man to make out words from letters written one after the other in a line. Secondly, so many letters are written alike in Maithili script that one cannot decide what letter a particular sign indicates unless one can interpret the letter in the word of expression correct to the context. Such, for example, are the letters च and व, व and र, न and ल, म and स. As a concrete case of the necessity of this interpretation I should cite the first word in the fourth line in the first song on the third leaf which I read as 'चरिमे' but which can very well be read as 'वरिसे' also. If I am asked why I have चरिमे and not वरिसे I would say that चरिमे suits the context; that I can interpret the fourth दोष of कामावस्था as क्लृप्ता and this is exactly what the दूती conveys in the line—the anguish of the emaciated lady lying in love forlorn.

Vidyāpati, moreover, is noted for vividness of his imagery and clarity of his expression. He has in an abundant degree what is called प्रसादगुण in Sanskrit poetics. It does not therefore stand to reason that anything Vidyāpati wrote could be so obscure as some of the lines of the songs of Vidyapati printed in some of the published collections of his songs. Wherever any line of Vidyāpati is obscure I begin to doubt if it was properly written or it has been correctly read. In the case of my find I have read the leaves and interpreted them and I feel I have interpreted them so as to make the meaning clear and the picture vivid.

Where I have failed to find out the clear import that may be deducible from the combination of letters which suits the context exactly, I have said so in the notes and given there what I just suggest as a possible interpretation. But such cases are only three or four where the writing is not clear.

The text of the songs, otherwise, is exactly as I have found it and if there is any mistake in the writing or there are letters worn off, I have not made any change in the text but suggested my own restoration, improvement or emendation only in the note. Now follows the text :*

Leaf No. 1. Page No. 1. Song No. 1.

भूपाजी रागे

उलुगण¹ गल गगन मन्द

अचल चरम चहुल चन्द ।

ध्रु० । तेजहि² माधव तेजहि³ आज ।

पुनु पुनु पुनु पेअसि काज ।

तमूचुर³ रवे मलय वाति

लाजें कि कहव बहलि राति ।

‘लखिमिनाथ’ कह धनि सार

सब तह भल रस सिङ्गार ।

‘कृष्णनराजेन’ गुणक गेह

‘देवजना’ देवि नव सिनेह ॥

* I must thank Pandit Jiwanand Thakur of the Raj Library and Professor Subhadra Jha Shastri of the Chandradhari Mithila College, who have very sincerely helped me not only in the reading of the text but also in its interpretation.

¹ उलुगण should be read as उडुगण meaning the stars—The whole line means—“The stars have faded away and the sky is charmless.”

² The refrain gives the clue to the song. Here the lady has been waiting anxiously throughout the whole night and when it is dawning she bewails her lot in these words, addressed to her absent lover who has cheated her—You may leave me, O Mādhava, you may forsake me to-night. But again, again and again you will need your beloved प्रेयसी ।

³ तमूचुर is the Maithili form of ताम्रचूर meaning a cock.

Leaf No. 1. Page No. 1. Song No. 2.*

मालव

कुढ़⁴ एकाङ्गी⁵ एकल वीर⁶
 × च⁷ चितउर जैन्तिक सीर⁸ ।
 पिसि देवओ⁹ हरितारी मान¹⁰
 होएवह¹¹ धिअ जमाई परान ॥
 ध्रु० ॥ जोग जूगुति सुनह धिआ ।
 नहि परवस होअ पिआ ॥
 गूर¹² गूर¹³ अओर वहेला¹⁴ ।
 माकर¹⁵ माछी¹⁶ मण्डपचेला¹⁷ ॥

* The central idea underlying this type of songs is given by Vidyāpati in the refrain here. "Listen carefully, oh my daughter! to the devices of जोग (जादू, टोना, magic) by means of which your (newly married) husband will not fall into the influence of others." In every treatise on the science of erotics (कामशास्त्र) there is a chapter on वशीकरण which describes the different processes of bringing men and women under one's control. Usually there are three types of these processes—(1) A herbal concoction for drink; (2) An incense to be burnt, and (3) A special collirium to apply to the eyes—In this song one recipe for each one of these processes is given—for the concoction in lines 1—4, for the incense in lines 7—10; and for the collirium in lines 11—14.

⁴ These are common herbal plants.

⁵ A common aromatic herb.

⁶ The lonely plantain plant. Plantain plants usually grow in clusters—Here a lonely plant is prescribed.

⁷ The missing letter may be व giving the word वच a common medicinal herb.

⁸ Root.

⁹ Give you after grinding.

¹⁰ Sulphuret of arsenic, a common drug.

¹¹ This line describes the result accruing as a result of using the concoction. By drinking this the daughter will be (as dear as) life to the son-in-law.

¹² Unclearified sugar.

¹³ A common incense.

¹⁴ वहेला = बहेला = the fruit of a common herbal plant, one of the famous त्रिफला ।

¹⁵ माकर = मकड़ा = A spider.

¹⁶ The common fly.

¹⁷ This phrase is not quite clear to me—The letters are clear but perhaps the clue is lost. It may be either मण्ड (gruel) पचेला = पचल = decomposed or it may mean the चेला = चेरा = the faggot of a मण्डप ।

शानि महेसर¹⁸ जारव आगि ।
 पहु हुङ्करव¹⁹ तोरा लागि ॥
 खंजन²⁰ आँखि परेवा²¹ पीत²² ॥
 होएवह धिअ जमाइक हीत²³ ॥
 नयन काजरे करव पान्ति²⁴ ॥
 हाकद²⁵ पहु परेवा भान्ति ॥
 भने विद्यापति कहल सार ।
 जोगव²⁶ बान्धल धिक संसार ॥
 राजा रूपनराजन जान ।
 सुखें सुखमादेवि-रमान ॥

Leaf No. 1. Page No. 2. Song No. 3.

ओं नमो दुर्गायै । दण्डक । कानरा रागे ।
 भुजगराज भीषण भुज समुचित कलित काल करवान²⁷ करा ।
 तरुग तिमिररुचितनुरनुरूप्या द्वीपिचर्मपरिधान धरा ॥
 प्रस्फुरदुदपदुर्गकिरणद्वि²⁸ति दूर निमग्नदृष्टिवदना ।
 उद्धतकपिल जटावय × × त²⁹ (राजित) वरवैकुण्ठ सदन भुवना ॥

¹⁸ The first letter of this line is a strange one the like of which there is not found on the leaf. The only letter which this sign can be is, in my opinion शा, giving the meaning of the line as "Mixing them all together, make of the mixture a Shivalinga (like the one people make of clay) and then burn it."

¹⁹ हुङ्करव literally means "to say हूँ हूँ" to support everything that is said. हुङ्करव is also used to express the sound produced by cattle. It may therefore mean "that as a result of burning this incense your husband will be as subservient to you as the cattle and support you in whatever you say or do."

²⁰ A common bird noted for its eyes.

²¹ परेवा = पक्षी = the pigeon.

²² पित्त = liver.

²³ जमाइकहीत = helpful to the son-in-law, her husband.

²⁴ पान्ति = पाँती = पक्ति = a line. Mark the spellings of पान्ति & भान्ति for पाँती & माँति

²⁵ As a result of this special collirium, the bride is promised power to "send her husband like a pigeon (at her bidding)."

²⁶ The idea expressed in the refrain is again emphasised in the colophon which means, "The world is bound up with the devices of जोग ।"

²⁷ ख here is a mistake for ल giving the word करवाल = sword.

²⁸ This is obviously a mistake for द+य् ।

²⁹ The two worn off letters seem to have been रा and जि ।

ध्रु॥ जयति जगत्रय³⁰तापकरामुर वीर विदारण धीरतरा ।
 काली कमल पांनि कमलासन णाकणाद्य³¹कृतनुति निकरा ॥
 × × दि³²निकृन्त गलद्रुधिरारुण मुण्डावलि मण्डित हृदया ।
 पदरविन्दभरें चलद्रुव्वीर्वरधृत विह्वलफनि विततदया ॥
 कवलित रथ रथि गजवार्णा³³त्रजचूरणचतुरदशन मुंसला ।
 अजराजित गुह्यङ्गरपण्डित चण्डमुण्डखण्डनकुशला ॥
 विविद³⁴वक्र पातालतलोधि³⁵त भीमभुजङ्गीसम रसना ।
 पीताम्बर शोणितमधुमत्ता पटपटहृध्वनि कटु हँसना ॥
 रक्तबीज सन्तान समुद्भवसर्वसुपर्व्वभीति समना ।
 भूतवैताल समाज.....

This song describes the figure of महाकाली who destroyed चण्डमुण्ड and the rest, described in the चण्डीमाहात्म्य ।

Translation.—Glory to Kāli, the patient destroyer of all brave Asuras, the tormentors of the three worlds—She, who is lavishly praised by Viṣṇu, Brahmā and Indra.

She has in her hand a death-like scimitar suited to the arm, like the terrible trunk of the Snake king. In appearance she is pitch dark and she has the skin of an elephant as her raiment.

Sparkling like the effulgent morning mountain peak, her face reveals her eyes directed far away. Her plaited hairs, all yellow, are standing on edge. Her abode is in high Vaikuṇṭhaloka.

She has a garland of red human heads just chopped off and is still streaming with blood. She has extended her pity to the holder of the earth (the Śeṣa-Nāga) who

³⁰ This should have been य ।

³¹ This is clearly नाकनाथ meaning the king of the heaven, Indra.

³² The two missing letters are obviously स and य giving the word सपरि = just then.

³³ वाणी is meaningless. Can this be a mistake for वाजी (Horse) ?

³⁴ विविद is a mistake for विविध

³⁵ खि = पि

under the pressure of her lotus-feet moves and holds his thousand hoods in pain.

Having taken into her mouth lots of chariots, charioteers, elephant and horses, She has her teeth as the pestle to grind them down. She is the expert to cut into two such veteran war heroes as Caṇḍa and Muṇḍa, invincible even of the gods.

She has her tongue like the tongue of the terrible many-headed She-Snake living in the Pātāl. She has a yellow (upper) garment. She is intoxicated with wine and blood. The ḍamaroo is sounding पट पट and she is laughing boisterously.

She is the Agent for the eradication of all fears of the gods arising out of the progeny of Raktavīja, in the company of Bhūtas and Vetālas.....

Leaf No. 2. Page No. 1. Song No. 1.

कोलार ।

साँझहि³⁶ चान्द उगिए गेल दिन सम निरमल राति³⁷ ।

कत परिवोवह अगे सपि कओने अङ्गीरव³⁸ मोरि साति ॥

ध्रु ॥ आजे हमे क × ³⁹ हठ परलाहुँ, कहलिहूँ नहि परकार ॥

एतएक ऐसन कजगति⁴⁰ × × ए⁴¹ अरतल⁴² बरनाह ।

³⁶ Suggests that it was a full-moon night.

³⁷ अङ्गीरव = to take upon oneself. Compare Vidyapati (Vidyābhusan and Mitra ed.) अवनुक अङ्गिरल कर निरवाह रे । (820).

³⁸ साति is from Sanskrit शास्ति meaning "inflict pain." Compare Vidyāpati: हमर वचन यदि नहि परतीत

बूझि करइ साति जे हो उचोत (348).

³⁹ There is a letter worn off but it appears to have been ओ which fits in exactly in the context.

⁴⁰ कजगति appears to me to be a corrupt form of कार्यगति ।

⁴¹ The first two letters of this word are broken from the middle below but the upper loops are in tact. They appear to have been ओ & न giving the word ओतए which with एतए of the 1st pāda fits in exactly with उभएहुँ.

⁴² अरतल is a verbal form from आरत. Compare Vidyapati:

आरति अरतल आवए पास, अछइत वधु नहि करिअ उदास (95)

उभएहुँ⁴³ संसए परलाहुँ के जान कंसने निरबाह ॥
 विद्यापति भने सुन्दरि अचिरे⁴⁴ होएत समधान ।
 राजा रूपनराएन लषीमादेविरमान ॥

Leaf No. 2. Pages 1 and 2. Song No. 2.⁴⁵

मालव ।

सैसव समय पेलि⁴⁶ पिओलासि मधुर माएक पीर ।
 दधोदुव घृत भरि⁴⁶ भुञ्जओलासि कोमल काञ्चव सरिर ॥
 चानन चोर⁴⁷ चवाए चिहओलासि अपन पर समाज ।
⁴⁸भनर जजो फूल छूइते छाड़िसि निलज तोहि न लाज ॥
 ध्रु ॥ वएस कतए तेजीए गेला ।
 तोहि सेवइते जनम खेपल तँओ न अपन भेला ॥

⁴³ The meaning of these two lines seems to be—Here you see the situation; there the good lover is anxious. I am in a fix. If I go, my position as a कुलकामिनी will be compromised; if I do not go, I will be false to my words.

⁴⁴ अचिरे = without delay. The suggestion here is that soon her scruples will all be drowned in the intensity of her love of which indications are already there in her description of the वरनाह.

⁴⁵ This song is the same as song No. 839 in N. N. Gupta's edition or No. 838 of the recent Bengali Edition of Vidyapati by Vidyabhusan and Mitra but the text as printed is hopelessly incomplete in the face of this complete song as reproduced here. In the printed text there are, besides the two lines of the refrain, only 6 lines, the lines Nos. 1, 8, 13, 12 and 18 of the song as found by me. But the text as reproduced here is nevertheless mutilated on account of the leaf on which this is written being extremely rotten. It is however an important song in the form of an address to Age in which the different stages of a man's life are most graphically described, especially the extreme senility of old age which is full of pathos.

⁴⁶ पेलि and भरि are adverbs meaning "to the full."

⁴⁷ चानन चोर seems to be a single word, meaning "a piece of Sandal wood." Compare Vidyapati विससम चानन चोर (702).

The meaning of the first part of the line seems to be :—that the first knowledge of sandal wood was gathered by the poet or is gathered by an average man while yet a child, by chewing the piece and thereby realising the mistake, recognise the thing.

⁴⁸ Age is said here to be as shameless as a black bee that forsakes the flower the moment it has sucked up the juice. Age too is always fleeting and every moment it is passing away. Hence the comparison.

जौवन दसाँ खोजी खोजओलासि काञ्चकपूर तमोर⁴⁹ ।
⁵⁰ बुद्ध सिरिफल छाह सोखओलासि कोमल कामिनी को × ⁵¹ ।
⁵² × × × × तोजे ततए खओलासि जओ नहि रस सबाद ।
 पवन पाछाँ लागि जएलाहुँ मोहि भेल परमाद ॥
⁵³ केसन केस की भए विमल⁵⁴ वन भरी रहु काठ⁵⁵ ।
 आखि मलमलि⁵⁶ कान न सुनीअ सुखि गेल तनु आठ⁵⁷ ॥
 दान्त भरी मुख थोर भए गेल जनि कमाओल⁵⁸ साप ।
⁵⁹ ठाम बैसलें भूवन भमिअ भरी गेल सबे दाप⁶⁰ ॥
 जाहि लागी गृहचातर⁶¹ लाओल बूझल सबे असार ।
 आखि पाखी⁶² दुहु समरि⁶³ सोएल जनि त सबे विकार⁶⁴ ॥

⁴⁹ तमोर = ताम्बूल = betel leaves.

⁵⁰ A finely drawn picture of blooming youth !

⁵¹ The worn off letter must be र giving the word कोर (the lap).

⁵² The meaning of these two lines is obscure for want of four or five letters in the first line which I dare not restore. The meaning seems to be—"You ran after things without taste and I, not realising the real situation followed you (fleeting) as the wind" एवन, the wind is spoken here as the type of ever fleeting age. प्रमाद means mistake, mistake to understand the real significance of age and youth.

⁵³ A graphic picture of old age begins from here.

⁵⁴ विमल is twice used in this song and nowhere else by Vidyapati. It must mean "whitened."

⁵⁵ Here the body of an old man is said to resemble the bare leafless trunk of a tree.

⁵⁶ The word मलमलि is almost clear. It might have been used in the sense of "blurred vision" as we say nowadays झलफल

⁵⁷ तनुआठ = अष्ट अङ्ग which comprises (1) hands (2) feet (3) knees, (4) eyes, (5) head, (6) vision, (7) speech and (8) mind.

⁵⁸ कमाओल, I take to mean, "Charmed" by having the fangs extracted. Thus only can a toothless man be compared to a snake. Also, an old man is as harmless as a fangless snake. The reading in the printed editions कचुमाएल meaning having worn off the old skin seems unwarranted. For the use of the verb कमाएल we still use it in the sense of, say, "shaving" in the case of a barber.

⁵⁹ i.e., even when he (the old man) cannot move about and remains sitting, his mind is wandering over the whole world.

⁶⁰ दाप = दप = pride.

⁶¹ गृहचातर may be an idiom like our modern घरदार or लोकवेद

⁶² आखि पाखी = vision and resources—we still have this idiom.

⁶³ समरि = समरि = having withdrawn.

⁶⁴ i.e. all sorts of distempers are cropping up.

छोरकी सोरकी⁶⁵ भोंह विमछल वन फूल गेल कासी⁶⁵ ।
⁶⁶एक दिस जदि बान्धि निरोधीअ तरे उपरे उकासी ॥
 भने विद्यापति सुन न मालति⁶⁷ मने न करह वाद ।
⁶⁸हरि हर पय पङ्कज⁶⁹ सेवह ते न रह अवसाद⁷⁰ ॥

Leaf No. 3. Page No. 1. Song No. 1.

रामकरी रागे ।

मनजनमा अरि तिलकवैरिवैरि तावैरि आनन दासा ।

ताहेरि बाहु जत पाए मरति तत केवल तोहर उदेसा ॥

माधव दूसह तनु पचवाने ।

चरिमे दोषे पाड़लि सेहे बाला त्रीवध कर × × धाने⁷¹ ॥

की देवागण आनन धसि पैसि मरति से अनल धसाइ ।

सुमरि सिनेह अन्तपुर जाइति जुगजुग तुअ शुध ला × ⁷² ॥

× × × जनमा बाहन आहवसन ते जानल जिय सायी⁷³ ।

भनइ विद्यापति शिर्वासह नरपति अवसर हलह⁷⁴ बुझाइ ॥

This song is unique inasmuch as it is full of riddles (कूट्स) some of which I have tried to interpret. The refrain

⁶⁵ छोरकी सोरकी । It is not quite clear—what this means. But as this is placed with भोंह (eye brows) to have been whitened, I surmise that these two word might have meant in those days the two eyelashes, the upper and the lower ones.

⁶⁶ कासी is the कास flower to which white hairs are compared.

⁶⁷ i.e. if I take precaution against any distemper, violent coughing sets in that shakes the whole system.

⁶⁸ Was मालती the name of some one whom the poet consoles ?

⁶⁹ Mark the reference to हरिहर Does not this prove that Vidyapati was not a Vaisnava nor a Saiva but a Smārta who adored like the text of the Maithils the five chief gods praised in the Smritis.

⁷⁰ पय=पद ; अवसाद=Depression, sadness of spirits.

⁷¹ The two missing letters are obviously अ & व ।

⁷² Here the missing letter seems to be ई or यी ।

⁷³ सायो or सइ is a variant of सोइ 'the same.' Compare Vidyapati (Vidyabhusan and Mitra) अरि सम गअए मन पुनु रअए अपन मनोरथ साइ (141) The य in this word as also in the preceding जिय points out the later date of the writing on this leaf. More than 200 years ago, this would have been written जिअ (is living) सई (the same).

⁷⁴ For हलह in the sense of चलह (let us go) compare Vidyapati. परसि हलह जुनु पिसुनक बोल (461).

gives us the clue in the form of the central idea underlying the song. The friend, दूती, says to माधव (lover) : Cupid is unbearable in her body. She is lying in the 4th कामावस्था which is कृशता, emaciated, and think of स्त्री वध (in case she dies).

The first two lines are riddles—They mean—“If she attains to the tenth कामावस्था which is death by taking recourse to poison, it will be on your account.” Let us see how this meaning is derived :—

मनजनमा = कामदेव His अरि = शिव His तिलक = चन्द्रमा His वैरि =
राहु His वैरि = विष्णु, तावैरि = रावण, His आनन = 10; दासा is
a corrupt form of दशा. Thus all that the first
line conveys is “Tenth—(काम) दशा”—ताहेरि =
रावण's बाहु = 20 = विस = विष = poison !

The next two lines seem to mean, “She will die by drowning herself or enter a burning fire but even when she goes to यमपुर she will remember you long for your love.” कीदेवागण आनन is not quite clear. The आनन (mouth) of देवागण is अग्नि (the fire) but that is distinctly told by अनल towards the end. If one be taken as the विशेषण of the other, then घसि पैसि becomes redundant. If it may mean a river, the meaning will be clear.

The next line is obscure for want of the first two which are completely eaten up by the central hole on the leaf and I dare not restore the reading specially as it undoubtedly contains a riddle. The later part of the line means—“Thus alone one knows she is still alive.”

Leaf No. 3. Pages 1 and 2. Song No. 2.⁷⁵

सुहब रागे ।

माधवक के विसरलि बरनारि ।

भल⁷⁶ परिहर गुणदोष विचारि ॥

⁷⁵ As noticed above, this song too is found in the printed editions and is the same with material variations as the song No. 767 in N. N. Gupta's edition or No. 761 in Vidyabhusan and Mitras (V. M.) Edition—I note here the variations in the two texts leaving aside mere spelling variations,

⁷⁶ VM has बह ।

प्रथमहि रभस हृदय⁷⁷ उपजाए ।
 पेमक अंकुर गेला हे बढाए ॥
 आव सेहो भेल श्रीफल गाछ⁷⁸ ।
 तहि तरुतरे मनमथ लेल वास ॥
⁷⁹नयन सरोरुह⁸⁰ दुहु भर नीर ।
 काजर पघरि पघरि पर चीर ॥
 तेजे शोभित⁸¹ भेल उरज मुभेस ।
 जनि मृगमदे पूजू कनक-महेस ॥
⁸²काजरे बाहु उरग लिच का × ।
 × × नयन रच मलयज पाँक ॥
 सुपुरुषवाचा सुपहु सिनेह ।
 कवहु न बिचल पखानक रेह ॥
 भनेइ विद्यापति × हे⁸³ रस जान ।
 राए सिवसिंह लखिमादे (वि)⁸⁴ रमान ॥

⁷⁷ Instead of रभस हृदय V. M. has रङ्ग रभस !

⁷⁸ V.M. has, instead of this line, से अब दिन दिन तरुत भास but the reference to श्रीफल is suggestive of the fully developed state of the बनारी, In song No. 53, Vidyapati says :—

पहिल बदरि कुच पुन नव रङ्ग

अब कुच बादल सिरिफल जोर

Moreover, without reference to any line in the first line how can the reference to it by ताहि तरुतर in the second line be appropriate ?

⁷⁹ Before this, there is a stanza of two lines more in V.M. which is not in my *Ms.*, the lines पिक पञ्चम उरे मदन तरास, सर गदगद घन तेज निसास are important.

⁸⁰ V.M. has सरोज

⁸¹ V.M. has निमित्त which is explained as रजित; certainly शोभित is a better reading.

⁸² These two lines, which are obscure for want of letters in both the lines, are not to be found in the printed editions. The meaning seems to be :—Collirium coming down with tears spreads out in the figure of snakes on the arms of the lady while the sandal paste on her forehead melts down and adorns her eyes where the collirium should have been. The missing letter in the first line may be झ giving the word काञ्च=काँच=green, and the letters in the second line may be कञ्ज or वसल to qualify नयन

⁸³ The missing letter must be इ.

⁸⁴ There is no letter after दे which is a mistake of the scribe. There must be either वि or इ.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN HINDU PHILOSOPHY— By
Dr. S. K. Saksena, published by Nandkishore and Sons,
Benares ; Price Rs. 7-8.

This is a thesis that Dr. Saksena submitted for his Doctorate to the London University. In it, Dr. Saksena has discussed the various aspects of consciousness as set forth in the Upaniṣads and the orthodox systems of Hindu Philosophy and gathers together from a critical study of the systems the most important conclusions at which Hindu thought has arrived regarding the nature of consciousness.

The problems that the author has set himself to solve may be put in the following words :—

1. Is there a non-dual, immediate, and distinctionless consciousness which is universal and unchanging, or is all consciousness always one of distinctions, changing and particular in the form 'this is this'?

2. Is consciousness the very *svabhāva* of Ātman or is consciousness only *guṇa* and not the *svabhāva* of it?

3. How are the two opposites of *cit* and *acit* related? Are these two substances the one permanently conscious, and the other permanently unconscious, or is there only one reality, *cit* or *acit*, which modifies itself into its opposite?

After a critical consideration of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and other views, Dr. Saksena emphasizes the following points regarding consciousness ;—

1. That consciousness is the ultimate presupposition of all knowledge and of all distinctions of *grāhaka*, *grāhaṇa*, and *grāhya*.

2. That consciousness is not an attribute of but Ātman itself.

“The subject and the object of knowledge are distinct and different only numerically, and not *per se*. They do not lie wholly outside the range of experience but are rather distinguished within one unitary and universal consciousness. This self-existing and pure consciousness has a double aspect of transcendental and empirical reality. Under the former, it is to be understood as one, universal, unchanging, inactive and distinctionless ; while under the latter, as particular, changing, active, and full of distinctions.” (p. 68).

The author has very convincingly demolished the arguments of Jayanta, Śrīdhara, Rāmānuja and others against the self-illuminacy of consciousness and has upheld the *svataḥprakāśatva* of consciousness.

3. With regard to the problem of *cit* and *acit*, the author is disposed to favour the Advaitic view that *acit* is only a manifestation of *māyā* and concludes by saying that the problem of the relation between *cit* and *acit* is insoluble at the intellectual level.

After a critical survey of the various theories, the author has arrived at the following conclusions regarding consciousness.

1. *Ātman* and *cit* are the same. Their relation is that of *tādātmya* ; *cit* is not the *guṇa* of Ātman.

2. There is self-illuminacy or *svataḥprakāśatva* in consciousness.

3. The *cit sattā* is foundational and the presupposition of the changing states of consciousness as well as the feeling of egoity and personality.

4. Deeper than the realm of phenomenal experiences is the realm of Ātmasvarūpa which is completely devoid both of the fluctuations of experience, however sublime


in themselves they might be, and of the self-consciousness however intensive.

5. "The limit of our thought is not the limit of our experience, it is the limit only of one form of experience. Logic cannot carry us to the end in our search for the ultimate reality, for logic works only so long as the distinctions of the subject and the predicate last, beyond which is the world of the non-different, transcendental consciousness of which we may have only the supra-intellectual and an immediate intuition without the feeling of the 'other'" (p.212).

The author has been influenced through and through by Prof. A. C. Mukerji's 'The Nature of Self,' which is a masterpiece of constructive metaphysical thinking. He has displayed considerable critical acumen in the handling and analysis of the various problems of consciousness. His style is lucid, and his arguments are cogent. He deserves the congratulations of all the lovers of philosophy for his brilliant essay.

The translation of *māyā* as illusion is rather misleading and obscures the deep philosophical significance of the word. The author admits that *cit* in its final aspect transcends the duality of subject and object. The use of the word consciousness for *cit* is, therefore, unhappy. The word consciousness connotes the duality of subject and object. There is hardly a word in English which can bring out the transcendental significance of *cit*, 'Sciousness' would be the nearest word that we can use for it. There are a few misprints which, we hope, will be corrected in the next edition.

—JAIDEVA SINGH.



A DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE OF THE SAMSKRITA AND PPRĀKRITA MANUSCRIPTS in the Library of the University of Bombay, Books I and II, Pages 9 + 877, 1944, Price Rs. 20 for the whole set.

The volumes under review contain the notices of Sanskrit and Prakrit MSS in the Bhadkamkar Memorial Collection and the Bhagavatsinghji Collection of MSS in the University Library of Bombay. It is a very important collection consisting of over 2000 MSS on almost every branch of our studies. The compiler, Professor G. V. Devasthali of H. P. T. College, Nasik, has taken great pains in giving us a good deal of information from these Mss. At times he gives us in great detail almost all the references found in the Ms. How useful would it have been had references and other important notes been given from every Ms? However, all that has been placed before the Orientalists is indeed the result of useful and honest labour of Mr. Devasthali. It would have added to the worth of the volumes, had certain peculiarities of the MSS regarding the date, etc., been given in the Introduction. Both the compiler and the authorities of the University of Bombay deserve congratulation for bringing out this catalogue.

TANTRASIDDHĀNTARATNĀVLIH : By Mm. Pandit A. Chinna-swami Sastri of the Benares Hindu University, 1944, Price Rs. 3.

It is a treatise on Pūrvamīmāṃsā by one of the well-known Panditas of the B. H. U. He belongs to the old traditional school of Mīmāṃsā. There is no doubt that the study of this system has become unpopular, and it is not due to any fault of the reader but to the very nature of the subject-matter of the science itself. But we cannot overlook its importance. We know

without its help the correct interpretation of the rules of Dharmasāstra is impossible. We congratulate Pandit Chinnaśwami Sastri for encouraging the study of this science. It is mostly due to him that the study of this Śāstra is still flourishing in the University. Realising the difficulties of the students who cannot afford to devote full time to its study, our Śāstri has written this work in easy language and in brief he has given all that is needed by the beginners of Mīmāṃsā. The appendix supplied by Pt. P. N. Paṭṭābhīrama Sastri is also very useful. It deals with some of the more important points of difference between Kumarila and Prabhakara. It is an useful addition to the literature.

DHVANYALOKA OF ĀNANDAVARDHANA ALONG WITH THE
LOCANA OF ABHINAVAGUPTA, KAUMUDI OF UTTANGO-
DAYA AND UPALOCANA OF S. KUPPUSWAMI. First
Udyota. Edited by the late Mm. S. Kuppuswami
Sastri and Dr. T. R. Chintamani. Published by the
Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Madras. 1944.
Price Rs. 8.

This is a memorial volume published in the memory of the late Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, a scholar of great reputation. The work was undertaken by Sastriji as early as 1927, but due to his ill-health, it could not be published during his life time. Since a Research Institute has been established associated with his name, it was most befitting to publish this last work of his as the first publication of that Institute.

The *Dhvanyāloka* is one of the most important and authoritative texts on Sanskrit rhetoric. But it is an irony of fate that this book has not been so popular in recent times. That is one of the reasons why at present even when efforts are being made to revive its study no

correct text is available. There have been two more new editions of this work, but much labour is still needed to have a complete and correct edition of it. The edition under review is the outcome of Sastriji's hard labour and scholarship. His own brief notes are quite useful. It is sure to be of immense value to the students, though I am afraid it is very costly and it will be difficult for Sanskrit students to afford to purchase a copy of even this volume, let alone the complete set.

ACYUTARĀYĀBHYUDAYA OF RAJANĀTHA DIṆDIMA Edited by A. N. Krishna Aiyangar and published by the Adyar Library, 1945. pp XV+38+62. Price Rs. 3-8.

The work under review is a historical kāvya, written in the court of Acyutarāya of Vijayanagar (1529-42). It is an interesting piece of literature. The first six cantos of the work were published by the Varivilāsa Press of Srirangam in 1907. The present volume contains 7 to 12 cantos. The editor has added an exhaustive introduction to the book dealing with the various aspects of the work and its author. It is indeed a very good addition to our literature and both the Editor and the Adyar Library authorities deserve our praise for bringing out such a fine work.

INDEX TO VOLUME II

Articles

- Abhijñāna-Śākuntalam, 243.
 Aesthetic experience in the light of Ābhāsavāda, 19, 145.
 Analysis of verbal forms of Maithili, 51, 213.
 Anūpavilāsa or Dharmambhodhi of Dikṣita Maṇirāma, 115.
 Antiquity of caste names, 59.
 Assyrian and Sanskrit—their resemblance, 401.
 Attempt at Demonstration of non-numerical Mathematical discourse of Linguistics, 167.
 Concept of Duḥkha in Indian Philosophy, 357.
 Conception and number of Pramāṇas according to Vṛttikāra Upavarṣa, 237, 321.
 Crescent as an emblem of Islam, 189.
 Definition of Brahman, 287.
 Glories of Marwar and Dr. Ishwari Prasad, 225.
 Historical notes and questions, 13.
 Lord Wellesley and the Puri Priests, 293.
 Maithill songs, some unpublished, 403.
 Mystic significance of Evam, 1 Nandi—Purāṇa, 305.
 Pāṇini—his life and works, 81.
 Problem of Rasavad-Alaṅkāra in Sanskrit Poetics, 233.
 Puranic date of Mahābhārata, 125.

- Rafi-ul Khilaf, 7.
 Relation according to the new school of Indian Logic, 389.
 Sārasvatādvaitasudhā, 69.
 Sir John Shore, 31.
 Śivānanda Bhaṭṭa Gosvāmin—his work and date. Identification of his two royal patrons, 369.
 Theory of suggestion—the locus classicus of, 337.
 Udayanācārya and Vācaspati Mishra, date of, 349.
 Vācaspati Mishra and Udayanācārya, date of, 349.
 Were the Guptas contemporaneous with Kuṣāṇas, 159.

Authors

- Agrawala, V. S., Dr.—Pāṇini, his life and works, 81.
 Bhandarkar, D. R., Dr.,—Historical notes and questions, 13.
 Bhattacharya, Dinesh Chandra,—Vācaspati Mishra and Udayanācārya—date of 349.
 Bhattacharya, Tara Sankar,—Relation according to the New School of Indian Logic, 389.
 Bose, Anima, Miss,—Problem of Rasavad-alaṅkāra in Sanskrit poetics, 233.
 Gai, G. S.,—Demonstration of non-numerical mathematical discourse of Linguistics, 167.
 Gode, P. K.,—Antiquity of Caste-names, 59.
 Hazra, R. C., Dr.,—Nandi-Purāṇa, 305.

- Hiriyanna, M., Prof.,—Definition of Brahman, 287.
- Jha, Ramanatha,—Maithili songs—Some Unpublished, 403.
- Jha, Subhadra, Dr.,—Analysis of Verbal forms of Maithili, 51, 213.
- Kaviraj, Gopinatha, Mm.,—Mystic significance of Evam, 1.
- Katre, S. L.,—Śivānanda Bhaṭṭa Goswāmin—his work and date, 369.
- Lakshmi Narayan, V.,—Were the Guptas contemporaneous with Kuśāṇas, 159.
- Mishra, Shrikrishna,—Theory of Suggestion—the locus classicus of—, 337.
- Pande, K. C., Dr.,—Aesthetic experience in the light of Ābhāsavāda, 19, 145.
- Raja, C. K., Dr.,—Anūpavilāsa or Dharmāmbhodhi of Dikṣita Maṇirāma, 115.
- Raja, Rao M.,—Purāṇic date of the Mahābhārata, 125.
- Reu, Bishweshwaranath, Mm.—Glories of Marwar and Dr. Ishwari Prasad, 225.
- Rehman, Naim-ur., Crescent as an emblem of Islam., 189.
- Sankaran, C. R.,—Demonstration of non-numerical mathematical discourse of Linguistics, 167.
- Sarma, K. Madhava Krishna.—Sārasvatādvaitasindhu, 69.
- Shastri, V. A. Ramaswami,—Conception and number of Pramāṇas according to Vṛttikāra Upaśarṇa, 237, 321.
- Shastri, Vidyādhara,—Assyrian and Sanskrit—their resemblance, 401.

- Sen, S. N., Dr.,—Sir John Shore, 31; Lord Wellesley and the Puri Priests, 293.
- Sinha, Jaideva.,—Concept of Duḥkha in Indian Philosophy, 357.
- Sinha, Kshemadhari, Babu,—Abhijñāna-Śākuntalam, 243.
- Tarachand, Dr.,—Rafī-ul-Khilaf, 7.

Reviews of Books

- Acyutarāyābhyudaya, 422.
- Archaeology and ancient Indian history, 78.
- Assamese, its formation and development, 77.
- Āśvalāyana Gṛhya-Sūtra, 75.
- Bhagavad-Gītā—solution of life problems, 73.
- Bhāvārtha Ratnākara of Rāmānujācārya, 78.
- Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts*
- Alphabetical Index of Sanskrit Mss in Adyar Library, 284.
- Catalogue of Anup Sanskrit Library, Fas. 1., 284.
- Catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts of Vanga Sahitya Pariṣad, 284.
- Descriptive catalogue of Sanskrita and Prakṛita manuscripts in the University Library of Bombay, I and II, 420.
- Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with Locana, Kaumudī and Upalocana, 421.
- Mīmāṃsā Śloka-Vārtika. Part. III., 76.
- Mudrā-Rākṣasa, or the Signet ring., 283.
- Nature of consciousness in Hindu Philosophy, 417.

Prasthāna Trayī or the three fold Vedānta, 73.

Rgvedic culture of the Pre-Historic Indus Vol. I and II. 281.

Tantra—Siddhānta-Ratnāvalī., 420.

Ganganatha Jha Research Institute :

Rules of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, Pages, i to xv.

Foundation stone-laying ceremony held on 13-2-45., 269.

Secretary's Report., 269.

His Excellency's speech, 278.

Good wishes sent from Societies and persons., 278.

